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# ***CENTRAL EURASIA***



# FBIS Report: Central Eurasia

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18 May 1994

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## POLITICAL AFFAIRS

### Deputies' Slack Duma Attendance Noted

944F0651A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 16, 22-28 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Oleg Zhirnov: "Ghosts Have Appeared in the Duma"]

[Text] Supernatural things sometimes happen in our young Russian parliament. On 13 April the state Duma was disturbed by the news of the NATO bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia. They decided to consider the situation, as speaker Ivan Rybkin put it, "concretely and specifically." And immediately the deputies turned their attention to the fact that Andrey Kozyrev was not among them at this difficult time.

The renowned minister and unknown deputy Kozyrev had failed to grace the Duma with his visits previously as well. But here a case like this! Some of the Duma members lost their patience. Vladimir Semago angrily demanded that "the deputy from the Murmanskii electoral district working also as minister of foreign affairs, Kozyrev, be in attendance in our ranks, that he be here if only for two or three sessions."

Kozyrev did not show up that day and his deputy, Sergey Lavrov, answered for him to the people's elect. And yet—and here is the supernatural part!—the elusive deputy minister, it turns out, was at the session of the state Duma on the morning of 13 April. He was—if you are to believe the information from the electronic registration.

It was not so easy for the OBSHCAYA GAZETA observer to get his hands on this information. Although it is not secret, according to a just adopted regulation of the state Duma, permission for access to the information from the electronic system shall be granted "to individuals other than deputies" by the chairman of the committee for organizing the work of the lower chamber. They were warned in the committee that granting permission depends on the newspaper's position toward the state Duma. Ultimately it turned out that OBSHCAYA GAZETA was "not the worst newspaper" and the permission was given.

Taking up 27 sheets, the registration table contains a good deal of interesting information. Above all—about the diligence of the people's elect. It is understandable that the electronic system does not know the reasons for the absence of a deputy—they can be quite respectable, nonetheless....

First place in terms of the number of sessions missed is held by a group of deputies who simultaneously hold eminent posts in the structures of executive power. And the undoubted record holder among them is A. Kh. Zaveryukha: If one is to believe the electronic registration, he did not manage to attend a single session.

Slightly behind him are two other deputy prime ministers—A.B. Chubays (attended four sessions out of 50) and A.N. Shokhin (six sessions). Minister of Culture Ye.Yu. Sidorov as a deputy attended seven sessions, Minister of Justice Yu.Kh. Kalmykov—nine, and Minister of Labor G.G. Melikyan—10. Added to this group of deputies are A.L. Adamishin, first deputy minister of foreign affairs (he was at six sessions out of 50) and V.P. Kvasov, leader of the government apparatus (he was at eight sessions).

Two other "risk groups" consisting of deputies who also seem to be engaged on the outside (entrepreneurs and eminent scholars) are more disciplined. Most frequently absent is academician-economist N.Ya. Petrakov (he attended only 12 sessions).

In this position the journalist has a right to ask a number of rhetorical questions. Why, for example, do the voters need deputies who do not attend sessions? Does their behavior not contradict the spirit and letter of the Constitution, which says that "deputies of the state Duma work on a permanent professional basis"? Finally, for what services do the absentee deputies enjoy the rights, privileges, and benefits granted to members of parliament? It is not mandatory to answer these questions. Even before the elections it was clear that the deputy prime ministers and ministers would not be going to the sessions in the Duma. And why they were elected is a question not for them but for the voters.

But God be with them, the ministers—at least they have other duties that also are for the state. Moreover, they do not receive deputy wages. It is more difficult to understand the "free politicians," especially the leaders of factions and parties, who do not grace the Duma with their attention either. About half of the plenary sessions were missed by Ye.T. Gaydar, G.A. Yavlinskiy, and V.P. Lukin, and more than half—by B.G. Fedorov. Understandably, leaders of parties, factions, and deputy groups have other business than sitting in parliament, but none of them was forced to do this, and ever today it is not too late to refuse the mandate.

The "continuous absence" of a number of deputies at plenary sessions is, incidentally, only the surface. As it turned out in the case with Andrey Kozyrev, attendance registered by the electronic system is sometimes worse than out-and-out failure to show up. According to the figures from the registration the deputy minister was at that morning meeting on 13 April, although no one within the walls of the Duma saw him or could have seen him. It turns out that this is a fairly simple natural miracle: A.V. Kozyrev turned his deputy card over to his colleague in the faction, who not only marks the minister as present but also, possibly, votes for him. (The OBSHCAYA GAZETA observer could give the name of the deputy who has Kozyrev's card in his pocket, but is refraining from this because of ethical reasons.) This is an undoubted violation of the regulations of the state Duma, not to mention propriety.

Unfortunately, turning their cards over to someone else has become a bad habit. The pathetic explanation: "Where is the Duma subcommittee on ethics looking!"—would sound like a weak report on inoffensive pranks. For the essence of the matter is that the fictional, "electronic" presence of the deputies raises doubts about the results of the voting. More than once already the chairman has garnered the votes he lacks literally one by one. In such cases one or two fictional votes could bring about the most "fatal" decisions.

### **Business Leaders Request Representation**

944F0651B Moscow *OBSHCAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 16, 22-28 Apr 94 p 7

[Article by Aleksandr Protsenko: "To the Kremlin With Your Desk"]

[Text] The chairman of the Coordination Council of the Business Roundtable of Russia, Ivan Kivelidi, has written letters to President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The letters are different. To the president: "Participants in the Business Roundtable of Russia are convinced that the interests of Russian property owners are alien to you..." To the prime minister: "Participants in the Business Roundtable of Russia note with alarm a certain distancing of the government from the needs and concerns of the Russian entrepreneurs..."

The letters differ but the essence is the same: The entrepreneurs want to have their own organ for administration and coordination at the state level. The authorities would also like to have some organ for management of the entrepreneurs. But the entrepreneurs, in turn, do not want what the authorities want. Incomprehensible?

Let us begin at the beginning. One cannot say that our domestic businessmen are functioning without state oversight now. Russian entrepreneurs have at least seven nannies. First, the State Committee for Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship. Second, the department for organization of management of property and entrepreneurship in the government apparatus. Third, the committee for support of small enterprises and entrepreneurship under the State Committee for Administration of State Property. Fourth, the Federal Fund for Support of Entrepreneurship in Antimonopoly Policy. And there are also the corresponding departments in the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Finance, the president's apparatus...

We know what happens with seven nannies. Russian businessmen, gathering as early as October at the constituent congress of the Roundtable, decided that they need a single chief. Something like a minister, or in the extreme case a state committee chairman. So they wrote in their resolution: "An important step toward strengthening the union of entrepreneurs and the government would be the transformation of the currently existing Council for the Development of Entrepreneurship under the Government of the Russian Federation into an organ of state administration—the State Committee for Affairs of Private Business."

The businessmen asked and the authorities responded: There immediately appeared a project for the creation of a kind of Federal Center for the Development of Entrepreneurship with its own scientific research institute and All-Russian Exhibition Center (VDNKh) as a base. The enterprises, however, howled: We do not want a bureaucratic "superstructure," we ourselves want...

"The terrible thing was that an organ for directive management of entrepreneurship was created," explains the official secretary of the Coordinating Council of the Business Roundtable of Russia, Aleksandr Orlov. "Although one can understand the bureaucrats: The sphere of state business is being eaten away and the management structure is spreading. The version of 'reorientation' toward private business seems very tempting. It is another matter that the idea was stillborn: The entrepreneur can only trust another entrepreneur and then not all the time. But a bureaucrat..."

In general private business "formed a solid front"—and the idea of a federal center died a noble death. But...

"We learned recently that this plan had been exhumed," says Aleksandr Orlov. "And now they are trying to push it through in a new version, in the form of some kind of 'consolidation commission.'"

In the opinion of the businessmen the motive force for the plan came from bureaucrats in the structures of power, who understand that sooner or later Russian entrepreneurs will achieve the creation of the kind of coordination-consultation organ they need. And then the "seven nannies" will have nothing to do. And who wants that?

An unseen war is now in progress in the corridors of power—the bureaucrats and the entrepreneurs are constantly exchanging "responsive-warning blows," trying to work to get ahead of the enemy. Ivan Kivelidi made his next move today by proposing the draft of the presidential edict "On the Creation of a Federal Public-State System for the Development of Free Entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation." The main point of the plan, of course, is to form in the government structure a federal administration for affairs of entrepreneurship which would participate in the processes of development of draft laws and normative documents, coordinate financial support for small and medium-sized business, assist entrepreneurs in acquiring state orders, etc. Actually, they are proposing the creation of a legal lobbying structure which defends the interests of private business at the government level. And not only at the government level. The draft of the edict envisions the creation of the position of adviser to the president of Russia on affairs of entrepreneurship.

In general, it seems, Russian private business no longer has much hope of a favorable disposition on the part of the government. In previous letters from Ivan Kivelidi to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin one can read, for example, these lines: "No recommendation, no warning, and no information we have presented to the Council of

Ministers has ever been heeded or accepted." Or: "Unfortunately, the Council for Development of Entrepreneurship has received neither a reaction nor a response from the government apparatus to the memorandum submitted to you previously. The conviction is growing stronger that certain forces are deliberately isolating Russian business circles from the government...."

Consider that Kivelidi wrote these lines while holding the position (public) of chairman of the Council for Development of Entrepreneurship under the Government of the Russian Federation. That is, this was not some kind of stranger. But, as he wrote in another message to the prime minister, "the apparatus lobby turned out to be stronger."

Now Ivan Kivelidi is the chairman of the coordination council of an organization which includes more than 80 movements, unions, and large private firms and banks of Russia (for example, the Most group, Moscow Real Estate, the Stolichnyy Bank, the RSPP, the International Brokers Guild, the Volga Union of Business Circles, the Union of Entrepreneurs of the Northern Caucasus, etc.). But so far it does not seem that this "lobby" has gained any respect in the White House. Who knows, perhaps in the Kremlin the Business Roundtable of Russia will find more attentive patrons.

#### **Muscovites Polled on Daily Problems, Yeltsin's Presidency**

944F0659A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 17, 29 Apr 94 p 8

[Article by Vsevolod Vilchek: "Moratorium on Impeachment"]

[Text] Although the data of sociological surveys (including those of my own service) have to be treated with great caution, I feel that some things can nevertheless be judged quite definitely—for example, what concerned the public most and least in recent weeks.

The biggest worries were crime, inflation, and insecurity (these were named by 40-60 percent of the 2,000 Muscovites we polled). What worries them least are the political maneuvers "at the top," including those connected with the treaty on public accord (around nine percent of the respondents mentioned these).

This might seem paradoxical: After all, the accord of various political forces should give citizens a stronger sense of security, promising perhaps not a bright future, but at least a less dismal one. There is no paradox here, however. We asked: "Do you believe that the different parties, social movements, Duma factions, and branches of government can reach an accord and work together constructively?" Only 7.5 percent said they did believe this, 54.5 percent said they did not, another 25.5 percent did not say no, but did express doubts, and the rest had no response.

Our fellow citizens have no doubt at all that the ceremonial signing of this kind of paper could take place, but they have strong doubts about the authenticity and significance of this protocol of good intentions and, in general, are not inclined to believe that the main participants in this undertaking represent the public interest rather than personal and private interests. This is shocking in view of the fact that it has been only 100 days since the election. When we asked the respondents whether they knew the names of their deputies in the State Duma, only seven percent answered that they did, and only five percent said they still expected the deputies to live up to their expectations.

If Yeltsin's persistent attempts to conclude a supra-constitutional agreement with his opponents have not aroused any public enthusiasm and clearly do not have the same meaning as last April's referendum, what is their real purpose? The sociological data suggested two interrelated hypotheses.

The society has reached a definite impasse. Today 65 percent of the people in Moscow are living below the poverty line, and around 10 percent do not have enough to eat. Hidden unemployment in Moscow, judging by an extremely accurate indicator—the abnormally high ratings of daytime television programs—has already reached 15-20 percent and could take the form of clear and obvious unemployment at any time. The people have endured even worse problems in the past, of course, but not when they have had to watch others race by in a Mercedes or have had to see the advertisements for the Harlequin Night Club, for example, offering businessmen erotic floor shows, roulette, and a dinner menu including lobster and baby alligator ragout.

There are extremely strong feelings of nostalgia in the society—no, not for the actual past, but for a lost social ideal. The ratings for old movies of the socialist realism genre provide a more precise indication of this than our ambiguous surveys. In reality, however, the ideological vacuum is being filled more and more by Orthodoxy, which is being inculcated as the state religion, and by a brand of nationalism with an emphasis on anti-Semitism, which one out of every four Muscovites feels no need to conceal today.

The changes are irreversible, of course: Only 15 percent of the inhabitants of the capital (half of them retired) believe that Russia should get back on the socialist track. In other words, people seem to be "in favor of reform." Only 14 percent of the Muscovites, however, said that they had the necessary qualities to succeed in life and that they feel like outsiders in the society. The society seems to be stuck: It does not want to go back, but it cannot move forward because it has not found a suitable course to follow.



The only thing that unites the vast majority of people today is their total ignorance of current developments. In the past the public was told that the reforms were being obstructed by the conflict between the branches of the government. What is obstructing them today? Evidently, just one thing: their own fundamental infeasibility. If members of the president's team have not realized this yet, the purpose of the document on civil accord is to provoke discord and find a scapegoat. If they have realized this, then the agreement has another purpose: a radical adjustment of the reforms, probably in the social democratic spirit, to prevent social upheavals, and a consequent change in political points of reference. It is the president's job to achieve this change in a relatively peaceful manner by sacrificing a few secondary officials who can easily be accused of corruption and can then fill the vacuum in Lefortovo Prison.

There is one important fact, however, that raises questions about the value of this hypothesis. We asked the 2,000 Muscovites whether B.N. Yeltsin had a chance of being re-elected for a second term—15.5 percent said yes, 52.5 percent said no, 24.5 percent were not certain, and 11.5 percent had no response. The president's staff probably has comparable data. They could be obtained from the counterintelligence service, which managed to come within 1-2 percent of the outcome of the December election in its predictions. If this is true, then the declaration of accord is certainly an ultimatum, as G. Zyuganov said, but an extraordinary ultimatum, stipulating the terms and nature of payment for the opposition's signature—direct access to public opinion, signifying the start of the election campaign. Because the text of the agreement says nothing about any specific anti-crisis measures, which would warrant agreement, the accord is essentially nothing more than a moratorium on impeachment.

Incidentally, this is also a noble goal: The institution of a precedent in Russian history for a democratic change of government.

### Support for Democracy Wanes

944F0651C Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 16, 22-28 Apr 94 p 7

[Article by Nugzar Betaneli, director of the Institute of Sociology of Parliamentarianism, under the rubric "Television": "Democracy in Russia: A Lowering of Values"]

[Text] All of the 20th century in Russia has passed under the "sign of democracy," that is, in the struggle either for or against it. Paradoxically, what all of the country's leaders have in common, regardless of their real intentions, has been and still is an obvious indifference to the democratic phraseology: "popular rule," the rights and freedoms of the individual, etc. It is no accident that democratic rhetoric is to be found in almost equal measure in all Russian constitutions—from the "Leninist" one of 1918 up to the "Yeltsin" one. During the

"Gorbachevian" and "Yeltsinian" periods the appeal to the values of democracy reached such force that there was hope for irreversibility of Russia's movement toward real democracy, toward real freedom. But recently the political expectations of citizens of postcommunist Russia have begun to assume an uncontrolled internal dynamic. "Flight from authoritarianism," it seems, is not happening. The political and economic reforms in Russia, which began in the name of democratic rights and freedoms, not only did not increase the significance of these "general human values" but even began to evoke an effect of rejection in the mass awareness.

An all-Russian public opinion poll we conducted in December 1993 in all 12 economic regions of the country (a sampling of 6,000 respondents) showed that the orientation of Russian voters toward the values of democracy and freedom of speech is appreciably "dying out." Five years ago it was expressed immeasurably more intensively and coincided with the "average" figures for the USSR (December 1988, the Union-wide poll with a sampling of 4,000 respondents). Here is how the responses to the following question were distributed (in percentages) then and now:

#### "What is most important to you personally at the present time?"

	December	
	1988	1993
High standard of living	52	73
Public law and order	54	67
Glasnost, freedom of speech	51	12
Participation in making political decisions	16	4

Some people will look for the reason for these changes in the traditional Russian psychology, in the people, their "authoritarian past"; some people will look—in the objective circumstances, in the historical situation. Although both are right in their own way, it would be wrong to think that "an authoritarian fate" is hanging over Russia or that the present "psychological leaning" is fatal in nature. The problem is not with the people but with state policy, which influences the sociopsychological situation in society.

It is this policy that creates conditions so that, for example, one (political, moral, sociopsychological, etc.) type of individual succeeds in society, another—barely survives, and a third—dies out altogether. In other words, it is the state policy, its "successes-failures," that are frequently the generator of various social attitudes.

The all-Russian poll showed that in all regions of the country people are bothered most by problems of purely physical survival, particularly living conditions, the economic situation (65 percent), the condition of law and order and the fight against crime (57 percent), the ecological situation (26 percent) and, to a lesser degree—

the sociopolitical situation (8 percent) and the spiritual, moral-psychological situation (15 percent). The social situation in the country has become fairly strained and many are not perceiving the changes that are taking place. To the question "can you say that now your time has come?" most of the population of the country who were questioned—79 percent—answered "no."

The type of individual produced by today's political and economic situation and the one that takes root in Russian society more and more successfully can be seen from the example of the dynamic of the mass awareness of Muscovites. A recent poll of the Institute of Sociology of Parliamentarianism (31 March 1994) showed that even in the comparatively "democratic" Moscow there has been a marked rise of the level of sociopsychological intolerance of people with different views. Thus there has been an increase from 28 percent (May 1993) to 43 percent (March 1994) of the number of people who think that not everyone in Russia (people, parties, movements, mass media) should have freedom of speech to an equal degree and another 2 percent think that freedom of speech should be restricted for everyone, 13 percent "find it hard to answer," and only less than half of the Muscovites (42 percent) are convinced that "everyone should have freedom of speech to an equal degree."

Every fourth Muscovite exhibits religious intolerance as well: 21 percent think that "not all religions in Russia should enjoy equal rights" and another 4 percent suggest "limiting the rights of all religions." Moreover, every third respondent (32 percent) thinks that the Russian mass media have too much freedom of speech (compare: in May 1993—22 percent) and that the Russian leaders should more strictly control the content of publications and materials of the domestic mass media (35 percent).

Among certain people social intolerance is not limited to an aversion to freedom of speech but extends even to human rights: Only 68 percent think that "all citizens of Russia should have equal rights," 17 percent, on the contrary, think that "the rights of certain citizens should be restricted," and 15 percent find it difficult to determine their opinion. The "recommendations" of some of the respondents regarding "the signs according to which the rights of 'certain citizens' should be restricted" are curious: 7 percent of those questioned advise limiting rights "according to convictions, affiliation with parties and social organizations," 4 percent—"according to national and race indicators," 2 percent—"according to official position," 1 percent—"according to place of residence," 1 percent—"according to property position," and 4 percent—"according to other indicators."

To be fair, one must note that the negativism toward "others'" rights is strangely interwoven in the mass awareness with a surprisingly indifferent attitude toward their own rights. Thus 31 percent of Muscovites do not know their constitutional rights at all and 39 percent find it difficult to name specifically the rights and freedoms that are most important in their view.

At the same time many are aware that they are living in a nondemocratic world. Thus only 14 percent of Muscovites consider present-day Russia to be a democratic country (August 1992—21 percent). And the majority—68 percent—consider present-day Russia an undemocratic country (August 1992—59 percent) and 18 percent—find it "difficult to decide." Nonetheless, the "nondemocratism" of Russia perceived by many people is not causing mass protest.

With this level of knowledge of their constitutional rights and with this attitude toward the values of democracy, it is not surprising that 30 percent of Muscovites are prepared to "support a policy of improving social order and the standard of living in the country at the expense of restricting democratic freedoms," 28 percent—"find it difficult to determine" their position, and only 42 percent say "no" to such a turn of events.

#### **Principles, Theses of 'National Doctrine of Russia' Viewed**

94P50139A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 21 Apr 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "In a Minute of Distressing Reflections"]

[Text] "I am not the first warrior, I am not the last, Russia will be sick for a long time," wrote Aleksandr Blok sometime during a moment of doubt, a moment of distressing reflections about Russia's fate. Today, almost 100 years later, reflections and doubts are no less distressing, but thanks to the development of the social sciences we, as opposed to the poet, can express them in a more strict, more scientific form: "Having lost the status of a superpower, Russia moved swiftly into the ranks first of all of the developing and now of the regressing countries. It is possible that the danger of global military conflict does not threaten us, but internal instability, chaos, economic ruin and the psychology of losers comprise no fewer threats to national security."

This quotation, having a clearly apocalyptic character, was taken from the work "The National Doctrine of Russia (Problems and Priorities)" which was prepared by the not unknown "RAU-Corporation." [For a translation of excerpts from this work, see the FBIS Report; Central Eurasia, Number FBIS-USR-94-047 dated 4 May 94]. Despite some painful prognoses (the transformation of inflation into galloping hyperinflation, growth of prices, fall of production, corruption of society, increase in crime, demographic regression, danger of a social explosion, etc.) the book also contains, frankly speaking, some unusually optimistic ideas. It is true that these are more general in character: "Russia is a great country with a great history, a difficult present and a great future. We believe that the approaching 21st century is the century of Russia." At first glance these

prognoses about the near future cancel out these hopes for a kingdom of Freedom, Peace, Spirituality and Democracy. But this is only at first glance.

In recent times one often hears the opinion that the situation in Russia cannot be forecast. According to all appearances, the very term "non-forecastable [neprognoziruemy]" can, from a historical point of view, be understood as "it will be so lousy that there is nothing to even talk about." Such a position is accessible to many, although it is not very constructive. The authors of the "National Doctrine," in no way closing their eyes to today's problems, not only try to predict the situation, but also offer some short-term goals which may be general, but nonetheless help us to see a picture of civil peace and harmony. "As soon as a strong and responsible government is consolidated Russia will once again become a center of attraction."

The reestablishment of Russia as a specific world, as a specific civilization, one of the subjects of world history—this is the goal for our country. And the main task of the patriotic movement is to avoid spontaneity, which can direct the development of our country into the channel of reaction. Today, in the opinion of the book's authors, we should turn our attention to those factors which unite us: The Motherland and the state.

One more quotation: "The main thing today is to prevent the weakening and disintegration of the state. It is impossible to do this only by the traditional administrative-state or financial methods: for Russia this is small. We must resurrect the Russian idea which forms the basis of unity and the national doctrine which represents the goals and tasks for developing society recognized by the majority..."

"The National Doctrine" is not dogma, but an invitation to discussion. Reactions to the conclusions of the authors' collective, of course, will be extremely varied. The work itself is intended for those people who draft and make political decisions—first of all for deputies of the Federation Council. But not only for them.

The new economic structures created as a result of market transformations are more and more actively being included in the political life of society. And this is understandable: their activity, earlier based on purely economic factors depends to an ever greater degree today on those processes which are taking place in spheres not directly connected with business. The possibility of forecasting, of predicting events, is extremely important for them, especially under the conditions of political and economic instability. It is no accident that many entrepreneurs, without any apparent benefits for themselves, are cooperating with scientists. Thus the latest work of the "RAU Corporation" was partially financed by a private company. The TOO [limited liability partnership] "Group MOST" paid for the preparation and publication of the "National Doctrine of Russia." It required 180 million rubles in order for this book to see the light of day.

In the words of the leader of "Group MOST's" analytic service Ye. Ivanov, the sponsors do not completely share some of the ideas and suggestions of the "National Doctrine." First of all the idea of the economic basis of the doctrine gives rise to criticism. In Ivanov's opinion it has a one-sided character. No constructive alternative is provided in the criticism of the ideas and practices of monetarism. There is no new "model" of social-economic progress.

The section "Military Security and the Military Policy of Russia" received particular criticism. History shows that it is better not to have enemies than to fight with them...

Nonetheless the leadership of "Group-MOST" sees this work as "an interesting and necessary attempt to delineate and to a well-known degree work out a set of problems, without which thought it will be impossible to move ahead."

As regards the authors of the "National Doctrine", in the words of the leader of the authors' collective A.I. Podberezkin "the RAU-Corporation responded with pleasure to the suggestion of Group MOST on writing this work. "If there are new orders in the future we are ready to fulfill them—that is our work."

Someone, probably I.A.[Joseph] Brodsky said that if we elected a government according to their reading experience, and not their political program, there would be fewer ills on earth. It seems that this statement is just, to a certain degree, and in our case the experience gathered in the book "The National Doctrine of Russia" should help our society avoid many convulsions and cataclysms peculiar to it in the past.

#### **New Limonov Book on Zhirinovskiy Excerpted**

944K1193A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 18, May 94 p 3

[Excerpts from Eduard Limonov's book "Limonov Against Zhirinovskiy: Limonov Against Zhirinovskiy: Obscure Facts From the Life of the LDPR Leader"]

[Text] "*Limonov Against Zhirinovskiy*" is the title of writer Eduard Limonov's new book on the subject of his former political ally Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. For a while Limonov was a member of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] and was even a minister in its "shadow cabinet."

We are offering our readers excerpts from E. Limonov's new book. The book itself will soon be released by the Konets Veka publishing house.

#### **Parisian Secrets**

On 19 September 1992 Zhirinovskiy called me from Moscow and said that they were arriving on the 23rd. He me asked to arrange for a meeting with the National Front and with Chirac. He also asked me to get in touch with the Russian Embassy. He said that his hosts in Paris will be "our businessmen, a certain banker."



The next day at 0800 I was awoken by Zhirinovskiy: "Eduard, please get me the telephone numbers of Chirac and Pasqua. I will talk to them myself." I promised that I would, but not before 1000, and besides, he should not count on me getting their home telephone numbers—this is not Russia, you have to follow protocol in everything. If I get the numbers of their personal secretaries, this will be a great achievement. By 1000 I delivered to Minakov the telephone numbers of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] chairman and Paris Mayor Chirac and former Minister of Interior Pasqua. If only the LDP people knew what efforts this had cost me! And what strings I had to pull! Zhirinovskiy clearly had an exaggerated notion of his fame. The French newspapers did write about him, but not much, during the presidential elections in Russia in 1991, but in September 1992 he remained a "dark horse" for this country. Chiefs of the international departments of major newspapers asked me "who?" when I called and invited them to a press conference.

Political figures who had never heard of him were not anxious to meet him, while those whose secretaries understood who Zhirinovskiy was actively did not wish to meet him. A majority, however, completely indifferent to his name, were simply busy; besides, meetings with leaders of parties in France are not arranged on a moment's notice: "Is it all right if we drop in? We are right around the corner, a 10-minute walk." I was completely dumbfounded to learn that Zhirinovskiy and his team nevertheless made several raids on parties' headquarters, uninvited, the only calls being to find out the addresses associated with the telephone numbers I gave them. The result of these raids, in my opinion, was zilch: They were received by whichever party functionary happened to be at the headquarters at the time. In most cases these people even refused to provide their names. "If Zhirinovskiy always travels abroad this way," I remember thinking, "this is a deception." Returning to Russia, the LDP will circulate in the mass media reports of meetings with leaders of French parties. And the Russian masses, seeing among them the name of Le Pen, which they are more or less familiar with, will think naively that Vladimir Volfovich received a warm welcome in the political establishment of France, while at other parties the people who talked to him may have been secretaries on duty or doormen.

On Friday 25 September I arrived at the hotel Amina (where Zhirinovskiy and his team stayed) earlier than 0945, because I wanted to make sure that everything was going as it was supposed to.

We are going to visit Mr. Le Pen at home, not at the party headquarters. We drove down the Champs-Élysées. French and Kazakh flags were flying everywhere: Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev was in Paris at the time. I think there was only one Frenchman who knew that these were Kazakhstan's flags—Mitterrand.

Passing Montrait Park [as transliterated], we approached the cast iron gate of our destination. We were led

upstairs to a large living room with yellow-ocher wallpaper. Yellow roses adorned the coffee table between two yellow leather coaches. A couple of marble busts in the corners of the room. The terrace to the left of the entrance provided a magnificent view of Paris from the Saint-Cloud hill; the right terrace opened to the garden. We were left alone. After peeking at the terraces, Zhirinovskiy said to Minakov: **"See how politicians live here, Valentin Nikolayevich. This is how the head of a party should live! And I huddle in a two-room apartment..."**

"Far from all political figures in France have villas, Vladimir Volfovich," I interjected. "Jean-Marie Le Pen inherited this villa from a deceased National Front member, who left the villa to him in his will." Zhirinovskiy stayed on the subject and began to talk very seriously about this being a good idea—to will property and apartments to a party... and that it would be good to include this point in the LDP rules. I thought that he was suffering from a middle class complex toward the upper class standard of living. If Zhirinovskiy ever comes to seize power, he will live in the fast lane and greedily grab property.

Zhirinovskiy was silent throughout the entire first half of the meeting. It so happened that I had to talk more than the others. "Aside from the language problem, his knowledge of local politics is not great," I wrote in my diary at home the next day. In the end he did get into the conversation. His French is poor, stammering, university-level, dead, hard to understand for the interlocutor, because it lacks precisely the hundred or so most frequently used modern words. "Where did these icons come from?" I asked Le Pen. It turned out that he had known artist Ilya Glazunov for a long time—that is where the icons came from. He had not seen Glazunov for about 10 years, though. "What happened to him? He used to be nationalist and monarchist a good 20 years ago." I explained what had happened to Glazunov. We started talking about the American penetration of Russia and France. Cultural and political. "I would prefer to eat borscht in a cellar than an American hamburger in McDonald's on Pushkin Square," said Le Pen gaily.

Zhirinovskiy then bragged about his only victory: 6.2 million votes in the presidential elections. And said that his LDP is the largest right-wing party in Europe. Le Pen, being a polite host, did not argue. He in turn asked Zhirinovskiy why his party had such an unsuitable name: "Here, Mr. Zhirinovskiy, the liberal democrats hate the National Front; they are our enemies." Stammering, Zhirinovskiy began to explain that for the Russian people "nationalism" brings out an association with Nazism (not true, Russians most often use the word "fascism." "German fascism," "Italian fascism"); that Russians have not yet matured for a party name that would include the word "national." As he was saying this he cast sideways glances at me. The Russian National Assembly and the National-Republican Party already existed, and in October of the same year the National Salvation Front [FNS] was launched. Zhirinovskiy was lying.

Since the LDP delegation expressed the desire (and Vladimir Volfovich louder than everyone else) to visit Paris' dens of iniquity, I took the delegation on a tour of the Pigalle with its sex shows and sex shops, striptease and massage parlors. The driver waited for us at the agreed place. I myself pass through this area maybe once every couple years: the noise, colors, advertising, dirt, and throngs of tourists are tiresome. I go there precisely on occasions like this—to show it to visiting friends and acquaintances. They, however, did not limit themselves to a passing look. In another seedy area of Paris, Saint-Denis, the talkative Vladimir Volfovich stopped several times and chatted with prostitutes, while other members of the delegation giggled shyly. I invited them all to a sex show. To a place where I thought the girls on the photos looked more tempting. We barged inside. The place turned out a bit of a dump and unpleasant, like a public laundry. Behind the counter was an oriental-looking young man, but the noise created by the delegation, and most of all by Zhirinovskiy (maybe he was so raucous out of shyness) brought out the owner, a short and unkempt type of undefinable oriental origin—Lebanese or something. The owner dropped tokens onto the counter, turned a handle, and left.

A naked girl with a face showing that she had been around the block a few times appeared behind the glass and began making movements to the music. We sat there in the dark for quite a while; then another girl appeared; they petted each other in rhythm with the music, but no "sexual act" promised on the marquee ever materialized. The lights went out. We emerged from the booth. In the lobby Vladimir Volfovich demanded our money back, yelling that the owner was a crook. The noise brought out of the establishment's bowels a bow-legged woman in a shawl, carrying a cup of tea. She turned out to be Russian! "Vladimir Volfovich, the hell with them, let us go!" I said. "What do you mean, the hell with them? Let them refund our money, or at least half of it. Where is the act? They promised the act, and we did not see any act. Did you see the act, Zhebrovskiy?" Zhebrovskiy said that he did not. "So let them refund half the money, or I will hand them over to the police!"—"Vladimir Volfovich, this entire industry rests on deception. If you walk in here, you are already permitting yourself to be deceived. One way or another they will cheat you." I talked him into leaving. "Who is he?" asked the bow-legged woman. "Zhirinovskiy?" She watched us leave with her mouth agape. IZVESTIYA recently reprinted from BILD magazine a story that had allegedly taken place in Germany: Vladimir Volfovich and a Russian-born prostitute. Let this story remain on the conscience of BILD magazine. Such an incident could have taken place, but I consider its darkly sadistic interpretation improbable. Vladimir Volfovich is more of a grumbling trouble-maker, who wants to get the best possible service for his money. He is an aggressive Philistine, not a Dracula. You are a prostitute? I have paid you? Cheats! They did not give me a full serving!—this is more his style.

### Divorce

The first time I saw Zhirinovskiy after Paris was on 24 October in the hall of the Parliament Center at 2 Tsvetnoy Boulevard. As usual, the communists-patriots would not let him in their games. He did manage to be admitted into the building, but certainly would not let him become a member of the National Salvation Front. Zhirinovskiy was willing to sign anything in order to be accepted. He was sitting in the audience, expecting to be given the floor. Zyuganov, who was increasingly gaining momentum then (he had already squeezed out Anpilov), promised everything to everyone, and to me, too: "We will make you a member of the political council," put me in the presidium and let me speak that evening. But the cunning syrappy communist has not kept his main promise.

I want to dwell a little here on the National Salvation Front congress. When we speak of Zhirinovskiy, it is impossible to ignore the context in which he found himself in the fall. Here is what the political status of the opposition was by 24 October 1992: Anpilov was not included in the Front. Zhirinovskiy was not included; he did enter the building but left during the second half of the proceedings. On the other hand, 40 boyars in tall hats, ceremonial generals—most of them useless or of little use—were included in the National Council.

At this juncture it should be explained that these boyars originated from the perestroika elite of the Gorbachev period, and a considerable number even from the Brezhnev nomenklatura. Not a political class, they, sitting on the stage (I sat in the first row in the rightmost seat, but was the only one who was not a "former") resembled most of all precisely BOYARS—a social group that has done a lot of harm to Russia at all times. Selected by the voters (in the case of deputies) or by the authorities around 1990, mainly for being sympathetic to "reform"—then-fashionable among the voters—they were people from the country's past, who had an increasingly diminishing grasp of its present. They had been selected by rank, by the number of stars on their shoulder boards, loudness of voice, the weight of their name during the Brezhnev times, and the degree of frenzy in their anti-Stalin or antistagnation demagoguery. Their merit in 1990 was that they—people of the past—supported some vague "civilized" future. Such transitional groups inevitably appear during periods of social catastrophe, and it is normal that for the lack of a real political class they temporarily fulfill this function. I emphasize: TEMPORARILY.

It is quite natural that these BOYARS, incapable of thinking ahead (political mentality), simply changed obediently together with the country and the population. And when the country screamed, unable to bear any longer the sadistic experiments it had been subjected to by "Yeltsin's team," and the people screamed, some of the BOYARS screamed and became outraged together with the people, too. The 40 up on the stage were mostly of this kind, mere conduits of the country's emotions, its fear and

pain. There was another group—frankly unprincipled ones, far more unprincipled than the CPSU nomenklatura had ever been. This group of BOYARS is characterized by a complete lack of morals and responsibility, as well as disarming opportunism. Just as in the past the boyars, their coattails pulled up, ran to Dimitriy the Pretender and then back to the legitimate tsar—wherever they thought the best opportunity would present itself, quite a few such “runners” appeared in the FNS. Well, a majority, to be honest.

During a break between sittings I happened upon a backroom, where all the members of the FNS organizational committee had gathered. They were dividing the leadership pie there, and quite unpleasantly at that. Unpleasantly in the sense of being quarrelsome and hypocritical. There was an obvious rivalry between Zyuganov and Konstantinov, which ended in Konstantinov's victory. Baburin, his cheeks flushed, upset over being elected only to the political council, was angrily saying something from the door. DEN editor Prokhanov—the man who united them all together with his communicative temperament and romantic imperialism, was silent. Nine cochairmen and a coordinator with two aides were elected. Konstantinov was elected coordinator. The communists in the leadership were clearly outnumbered by bearded defectors, “new patriots”—Astafyev among them. I do not like defectors and cannot stand those admitting “past errors.” Therefore, the presence of some General Sterligov (he was the one who went to arrest the GKChP [State Committee on the State of Emergency] members) in the FNS was an unpleasant surprise for me. While I like writer Rasputin, I remember very well, however, that it was Gorbachev's State Council, of which Rasputin was a member, that on 6 September 1991 recognized the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. I was not the only one disgusted with the backroom bickering over power. An organizing committee member—a gaunt man who appeared to be a blue-collar worker—got up, noisily pushed away his chair, and said angrily: “Some representatives! Now they will start dividing salaries!” And slammed the door behind him. The Kazakhstan representative tried to appeal to FNS leaders from the door: “What am I to say to my people? Kazakhstan's Russians are waiting for concrete guidance—‘what to do,’ and you are doing what!”

During the second part of the congress, Zhirinovskiy was no longer in the audience. I think this congress pushed his patience beyond the limit. He could not know, of course, what was happening behind the scenes, but was guided by his instincts. He realized that he was not accepted, finally and irreversibly. And will not be in the future. (The reasons are not that important.) So he decided to look for allies in another camp. In order to do this, however, he had to change his behavior (albeit temporarily) and change the image of the party. There is no question that it was after the FNS congress that Zhirinovskiy decided to become a “centrist.” Just as there is no doubt that it was then that he decided to take

Jean-Marie Le Pen's advice and “purge” the LDP of “young people in leather who will pull his movement toward national-socialism.”

#### Shakhray on PRES, Chechnya, Cossacks

944F0652A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian  
No 16, 26 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Discussion with Sergey Shakhray, minister for nationalities and regional policy, deputy prime minister, and leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, at the ROSSIYA editorial office, recorded by Andrey Zhdankin; date not given: “I Am Not About To Become Involved in Wrangling”]

[Text] Politicians are always better informed than journalists. This applies also to Sergey Shakhray, minister for nationalities and regional policy and deputy prime minister. He is, in addition, leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES). Sergey Mikhaylovich met with the members of the editorial office and shared his vision of the present situation.

[Shakhray] The picture of the situation will be sufficiently full and accurate if it is seen from three positions, three levels: the state of society, then the problems and contradictions of the economy, and, third, how economic interests are superimposed on the political structure.

The period of diarchy: the unnatural “cohabitation” in the constitution of two types of power, ended tragically with the events of 3 and 4 October, which we consider an episode of civil war. The state is attempting to “crawl out” of the consequences and to find its feet. Society, however, does not have the immunity to protect itself. The recent elections confirmed that society is in a state of apathy. All the questions of power and economics may be decided within the framework of the Sadovoy Beltway.

Enough has been said about the fact that the economy is in profound crisis. From my viewpoint, it resembles a layer cake and consists of three levels linked by a system of communicating vessels. The upper level is the legal economy, and concerning this there are the basic data of the State Committee for Statistics, forecasters use them, and the attempts to form the budget are based on them. Below is the level of the shadow economy, and lower still, the criminal economy. All attempts to do anything at the legal level, to raise taxes, for example, lead to capital flowing to the shadow and criminal “floors.” The legal sphere is being squeezed constantly, like shagreen leather.

The economic situation is being made worse by regional disproportions. Only 22 components of the Federation “feed” themselves, and the federal budget is sustained on what is produced on these territories, and 67 components are subsidized.



The actions of the government, whoever is a part of it, will for this reason consist of maintaining a balance between an austere financial policy and social explosion. Neither the communists nor the patriots nor the democrats (whoever calls himself this) can any longer deny either private property or land reform or attempts to transform the system of administration of the government of the country. Both territorially and politically.

[ROSSIYA] What should the government's priority measures be in this situation?

[Shakhray] A set of measures to bring financial discipline to bear must be engendered in the government: a reduction in the burden of arrears, the conveyance of funds to the addressees, a fight against the existence of enterprises' parallel accounts. It is necessary to prepare for a change in the tax system and move toward a sharp reduction in the rate of tax. The sole problem whose resolution no one is offering as yet is how to live between point A (the moment when taxes are sharply reduced) and point B (when, on account of this, there is a revitalization of the economy, and the treasury receives the same or even more funds).

Currently economics has become a hostage of politics. There is no time for it at the federal level—an unconcealed power struggle is under way. In politics and, through it, in economics also everything is being determined by the struggle of three politico-economic groups, elites.

[ROSSIYA] Which precisely?

[Shakhray] There are three determining sectors in our economy: the fuel and energy complex, the military-industrial complex, and the agrarian complex. The economic and political interests of millions of citizens and thousands of enterprises are tied up in these complexes. The reflection of this complex combination of three sectors with regional structures in Moscow's corridors of power signifies a complex configuration of the capital's political elite. More than 70 percent of the country's entire finance capital here is concentrated in Moscow, which means the impossibility of the realization of a single serious investment project in any region of Russia without the attraction of these bank resources of Moscow.

[ROSSIYA] Things are more or less clear when it comes to the elites. But what position should the authorities adopt in this struggle?

[Shakhray] The role of the government, the president, and parliament under such conditions is exceptionally big. They must assimilate the functions of arbiter among these three main groups and their representatives. Unless the Government of the Russian Federation finds a format of ascertainment of the interests of these complexes and ways of resolving the contradictions among them, the situation will become complicated and will periodically signify political cataclysms.

[ROSSIYA] As we all know, your party "distinguished" itself by voting in the Duma for amnesty for the Lefortovo inmates. Passions in this connection have not subsided even today.

[Shakhray] An analysis of the situation led us to conclude that unless there was a change in the situation, society could become an overheated steam boiler. It was for this reason that the PRES Party consciously voted for the amnesty. Prior to the amnesty, everything had been prepared for shooting in April-May: an ultimatum to the president and resignation of the government, up to and including the power version. The publication of Version 1 was a trial balloon for the elimination of the entire power Olympus for its replacement by a new administration. But society gained a breathing-space. We have time until September-October, I believe. All problems of the sharing of power must be resolved at the 1996 elections. A shorter timeframe would be an attempt to rush to divide up power without the rules of the game having been agreed.

[ROSSIYA] Sergey Mikhaylovich, the problem of Chechnya is, evidently, one of the most acute for Russia. The negotiations are proceeding in very contradictory fashion, and there is no way out of this situation in sight, it would seem. What is the situation now?

[Shakhray] The sequence of the decisionmaking chain is this: a message of the president, a decree of the government, acts of the State Duma and the Federation Council. A common approach to the Chechen problem for all organs of power has been observed in accordance with this format for the first time.

The approach is built on a recognition of the impossibility of a power solution of the question. Then, and primarily, affirmation of the fact of multiple authority in Chechnya. This demands the conclusion that a political settlement of the conflict means negotiations with all real political forces: with Dudayev and with Nadterechniy District and with the Provisional Council and with the illegally dissolved Checheno-Ingush Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. The subject of the consultations is a treaty on a delineation of authority and terms of reference.

The negotiations should begin momentarily, their purpose being the treaty. But signatures to it will only be appended following free elections in Chechnya. If they are held this year, very well, in 1995, certainly. We are not dictating or determining the timeframe. At this time we, I allude to the federal authorities, are prepared to discuss and tackle specific issues. I, for example, am currently dealing with pensions for the citizens of Chechnya.

[ROSSIYA] Could it be that this prudent path will not be realized and that separate negotiations will begin once again?

[Shakhray] As long as I am working here, I will be responsible for all negotiations. If there is a retreat from this format, I will simply step aside because this would then be deception.

[ROSSIYA] How do you evaluate the policy in respect to the Cossacks, does it not look, rather, like flirting? Another state committee for the Cossacks is being set up. A democratic government is attempting to support a public organization whose mission is the restoration of Russia within the 1914 borders, which is not taken seriously.

[Shakhray] I know what is making this committee's ears "stick out." It is the manifestation of an amateurish approach, on the other hand, the uncoordinated work of two departments—the Executive Office of the President and the government. State committees may be created only following a recommendation of the prime minister and within the system of executive power. The formation of the above committee by someone else is the promise of a carrot, which will in a week or two be taken away.

It is particularly dangerous acting this way in respect to the Cossacks. The Cossacks are 2.5 million people, and with their families, more than 10 million. They are capable in almost any part of Russia of putting together a detachment of 100,000 men within three days. This is a force which could be unconstructive in certain situations.

The state should say that the debate as to whether the Cossacks are a "people" or "not a people" is for scholars. The Cossacks are interested in a state from the viewpoint of public service. This is a particular type of public service, military, border service primarily, included. The community is issued land, and when the Cossack goes "to arms," the community works the land for him and supports his family. Land legislation has been drawn up on these matters here also.

[ROSSIYA] In order for the concept to become a guide to action, not simply an interesting idea of Sergey Shakhray's, should some documents be signed?

[Shakhray] The basic provisions of the concept of official policy in respect to the Cossacks and the assignments pertaining to the preparation of drafts of the corresponding prescriptive enactments have already been signed by the prime minister. There is a Security Council decision.

For me the revival of the Cossacks is a good opportunity for the resolution (albeit partial) of a very serious geopolitical problem. Thirty-two million persons reside here at this time between the Urals and the Far East. According to the forecasts, 8-10 million will remain on this entire vast territory by the year 2010. China, Japan, and Korea are looking in this direction. No wars would be needed with such a development of events, territories could "fall away" from Russia of their own accord. If the Cossacks are implanted there along the border—if they

are given land free of charge, taxes for them are abolished, and they are allowed to live and work the land—they would thereby strengthen the borders.

[ROSSIYA] It is being rumored in the journalist fraternity that your appointment as deputy prime minister was compensation, a counterweight for the departure of Gaydar upstairs, and a new rapprochement with the president?

[Shakhray] I do not regard Gaydar as an alternative to myself. I believe that the dependence here is totally different. We have to wait for the allocation of duties. Aside from regional and nationalities policy, the government's interaction with the media and parliament will, possibly, be entrusted to me. I will not ultimately be entrusted with the press—it is too important a sector—but I could perfectly well be entrusted with exchanging abuse in the Duma. I am not about to become involved in wrangling, for that matter, I am of a mind, like the government as a whole, for constructive interaction.

#### State Legal Directorate Chief on Significance of Jury Court

944F0659B Moscow *OBSHCHAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 17, 29 Apr 94 p 6

[Interview with Sergey Anatolyevich Pashin, department head in State Legal Directorate of RF Presidential Administration, by Leonid Sharov; date and place not given: "Sergey Pashin: 'Trial by Jury Is Not a Show, but a New Philosophy'"]

[Text] Whether we like it or not, jury trials are back in Russia. Attorneys, predictably, were immediately divided into passionate supporters or imperturbable opponents of the restored legal institution. After Igor Tsykunov's article "Jury Performance for Foreigners" was published in *OBSHCHAYA GAZETA*, No. 14/39 of 8-14 April, describing the first jury trial in Ryazan, people were irritated. It seemed to be just another campaign: First they came up with non-alcoholic weddings and now they are promoting jury trials. It is easy and safe to reject the new and unfamiliar (even when it did exist in the long-forgotten past), but paving the way for it, especially at a time of pervasive legal nihilism, is a different matter....

That is why we interviewed one of the "pavers"—Sergey Pashin, department head in the State Legal Directorate of the RF president's administration.

[Sharov] Sergey Anatolyevich, it seems there has been enough criticism of the State Legal Directorate for the restoration of the jury trial....

[Pashin] More than enough. Furthermore, many of our opponents are doing this because of what might be called a historical bias. When they argue the inadvisability of juries, they make references to the trial of Vera Zasulich, who fired a gun at a tsarist official and was acquitted by a jury, and to Katyusha Maslova. The most erudite are also invoking the "Brothers Karamazov." Let us take a

look, however, at the history of the Soviet courts. We could spend months recalling the unjust, immoral, and illegal verdicts of our judges. This was a system of injustice! It administered revenge. It was a conveyor belt. It killed people—and these were real people, not fictional characters.

[Sharov] How is a jury trial better than a conventional trial?

[Pashin] The jury is not encumbered by bureaucratic duplicity. Anything can be written down on paper: the presumption of innocence, adversary procedure.... But what is the reality? The conveyor belt I mentioned. The defense of strictly corporate interests. Who administers justice in our country? It is a bureaucrat! One of the fundamental principles of his existence is that one hand washes the other. The opinion of the procurator is much more important to a judge than the opinion of the accused. Here is what we always hear in the courts: Why are you so concerned about the guilty party? You see, the defendant is referred to as the guilty party. I know one judge who has been on the bench for 18 years and who was so surprised when she was told that there are no guilty parties in a trial court. After all, a person is guilty only after the verdict acquires legal force. Our procurator does not have to show up in court to support criminal charges. Many cases are tried in his absence. Then the functions of the procurator are assumed by the judge, usually involuntarily, but sometimes even by choice. Is this done in the interest of justice? If not, then what interests does it serve? It keeps the conveyor belt running smoothly. In a jury trial the procurator does not simply press charges; he has to prove the accusation. There were complaints after the very first trial by jury in Saratov and after the Ryazan trial with which the readers of OBSHCHAYA GAZETA are familiar: The punishment for these hardened murderers was too lenient, people said; they should have been sentenced to much longer prison terms, if not something worse. What was the reason for the mitigation of the punishment, and even the acquittal of the defendant in Ryazan? Why did the jurors arrive at these verdicts? Because the prosecution's investigators did not collect enough evidence, and the prosecuting attorneys did not present enough evidence to the court (take note of this: I did not say, to the judge). Would you want jurors to arrive at a guilty verdict on the basis of the "results" of the usual kind of investigation, basing their conclusions on a haphazardly prepared case?

[Sharov] Wait a minute. Are you suggesting that jury trials will change the accepted system of proof in Russia?

[Pashin] They will not change it, but they will introduce legal principles into the system. This will take the place of the notorious expediency we once had. Verdicts should be the logical result of the evidence presented.

[Sharov] Yes, you could say that there is not much adherence to logic in our investigative agencies. The procuracy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs with its counterintelligence service will be facing a dilemma. It

would not be an exaggeration to say that all kinds of mistakes, inconsistencies, and omissions can easily be found in ANY criminal case.

[Pashin] It is not surprising that one of our chief opponents was Stepankov, the former procurator general. He expressed his fears: If the poor investigating official's signature is in the wrong place, will a criminal be released for this kind of inconsequential error? Valentin Georgiyevich was being devious. He knew that the people who worked for him were not accustomed to assuming the burden of proof. It is interesting, however, that this did have an impact. People in the procuracy began to worry. They began to learn how to base charges on the accumulated evidence. It is now common practice for the prosecution to start playing for time when a case is to be tried by a jury, and to initiate additional investigations of all the facts of the case.

[Sharov] This is certainly encouraging, but it is not persuasive enough. After all, it will delay trials. People will be kept in custody longer and they will be miserable.

[Pashin] Would you try to blame this on jury trials too?

[Sharov] No, but I do believe that for everything good, there is also the "other side of the coin." Here is one of the main objections: You have launched an experiment for completely noble and ethical reasons, but is it right to experiment with justice—in the ideal sense of the term? The jury trial is a government institution in only five oblasts of Russia....

[Pashin] In nine now.

[Sharov] But this still suggests that the inhabitants of other regions are second-class citizens. They do not have access to the more humane form of proceedings.

[Pashin] Let us begin with the fact that the jury trial is a constitutional institution. Therefore, it is not an experiment, but a sequential fulfillment of the requirements of the Basic Law. Furthermore, in tsarist Russia jury trials were also instituted gradually, in one province at a time. Even then, not all of Russia was "entranced" by them. By the way, the institution of this form of legal proceedings is not possible in all regions even today. After all, we have to take ethnic, historical, traditional, and cultural factors into account. The simplest thing would be to announce that jury trials will be instituted everywhere tomorrow. The idea would be completely discredited. There would be overt violations of the principle. Our judges, our procurators, and our public defenders are people from the past, whether we like it or not. Their mentality was not shaped by current events. They have seen jury trials only in foreign films, but they learned the law from books in which trial by jury was reviled in the most vehement terms. That is why regional judicial authorities were simply asked to consider the new form of trial. I cannot deny that the regions which decided to institute jury trials expected some kind of bonus in connection with this, and we gave it to them as a reward. If the Ryazan judicial officials, as OBSHCHAYA



GAZETA reported, received the magnificent Catherine Palace in place of their old shack for the institution of jury trials, more power to them! This is certainly a change for the better. Finally, I agree that people in different oblasts are not on an equal level, but it would have been much more immoral not to institute jury trials at all.

[Sharov] Another significant objection concerns the high cost of jury trials.

[Pashin] Yes, they cost money. For some reason, people believe that the judicial system is the only sphere of government activity that entails only expenditures. This is not true. Courts generate revenue by charging fees and court costs and by confiscating property. If even one-third of this income could be used for the maintenance of the courts, we might have a different judicial system, but everything goes into the budget. Anything deposited in the budget disappears, and subsequent allocations are minuscule. This gives rise to the "seditious" idea that the outrageous sums the government is spending on the renovation of the White House would be more than enough for the organization of jury trials everywhere. What more can I say? Cheap justice is...cheap justice.

[Sharov] But trial by jury is also a complicated process. Just assembling the right number of people, providing them with hotel accommodations, arranging for the selection of jurors, explaining all of their obligations and rights to them, answering their questions about legal matters.... Then you have to wait for them to arrive at a verdict. I will repeat the opinion you "deplored": There will be even longer delays in the administration of justice. There will be a long list of people choosing trial by jury. These people will have to remain in custody for years, waiting and waiting for their trials....

[Pashin] All of that is true up to a point. Only the preliminary stages will delay the proceedings slightly: the selection of the jury, the administration of the oath, the possibility of challenges, and the explanation of rights and obligations to the jurors. You know that this will not take weeks or days, but just an hour and a half or two hours. The complexity of organizing the trial will force the services responsible for the normal progression of the proceedings to act more precisely and efficiently. The prosecution will not send a case to trial when it is full of holes, but will prepare the case carefully and conscientiously, in the knowledge that no one in the court will overlook its errors. If there is the slightest error, then the defendant will be acquitted. But the prosecution is bound much more strictly by the judicial calendar and the maximum terms of confinement for suspects. The unconditional appearance of witnesses, victims, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and experts will be the rule in jury trials, and some will have to be summoned by subpoena because this kind of "complicated process," as you called it, cannot be jeopardized by the failure of one or two people to appear in court. There will also be changes in escort services. The existence of jury trials will also speed up the resolution of some old problems:

the protection of witnesses and victims, the guaranteed appearance of witnesses and victims, and the more precise functioning of escort units. Finally, there will be a new approach to the choice and use of measures to secure the appearance of the defendant. In any case, the 20 or so jury trials which have already taken place proved that local officials could begin solving these problems in earnest. There were no insurmountable obstacles.

[Sharov] But these were mainly show trials. There was so much publicity, and the press, television reporters, foreigners, and observers from higher courts were invited to attend. I am afraid that everything will go back to normal when this becomes routine.

[Pashin] This was not a publicity campaign, but the customary monitoring of a fundamentally new practice. In addition, it was propaganda. It was, you might say, a demonstration. The jury trial is not simply another form of judicial proceedings; it is a new level of legal awareness, a new mentality, even a new philosophy. We want the high standards of work which were reached in the first months to be maintained in the future and to become the routine. You object to the theatrical nature of the jury trial, but I do not see anything terrible about this. It is certainly a ceremonial proceeding, a ritual with many obligatory elements; it is only in Russia, which has been poisoned by legal nihilism, that it is seen as something superfluous or contrived. Its effectiveness and impact will not be diminished by the absence of television reporters and journalists, although I am certain that the latter will attend trials by jury much more often than ordinary trials. The main thing is that the proceedings held the interest of all of the parties involved in the trial—although this might sound cynical in reference to the accused or the victim. Something they never even dreamed of 5 or 10 years ago was coming to life before their very eyes.

[Sharov] Was it interesting for the prosecution?

[Pashin] You can imagine. Although prosecuting attorneys threatened to protest the jury verdicts after some trials, this made them look like people who wave their fists after a fight. The prosecutors felt like attorneys, instead of bureaucratic pawns making the prescribed moves. The institution of adversary procedure is a wonderful thing. It forces people to think. It involves professional risks. It was the same for the public defenders. They finally saw a way to get around the wall they kept running into at almost every trial in the past. The judge felt like an arbiter, and not a worker on an assembly line. Here it is, the new mentality we wanted. This, quite honestly, makes the job worthwhile. And just look at what happened: Igor Tsykunov's article objectively "promoted" the jury trial, because the observant reader will see that the trial in Ryazan acted like a searchlight, illuminating the true features of our wretched system of justice and revealing the road to improvement.

**Increase in Number of Generals Quantified**

944K1221A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 19, May 94 p 2

[Unattributed response to reader inquiry: "How Many Generals Do We Have?"]

[Text] I remember that in 1991 Marshal Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, stated that there were 1,939 generals for the 3.8 million servicemen in the USSR Army. How many generals are there in today's Russian Army and the countries of the CIS?

[Signed] A. Lesovets, Vorkuta

After August 1991, the Russian Federation Army was rapidly reduced in size, and by April 1993 its numbers constituted approximately 2.3 million, but the number of generals had grown to 2,218. Just prior to last year's referendum the president conferred the rank of general on 256 officers. As of today, judging by figures that have appeared in the press and that have not as yet been refuted by the Ministry of Defense, there are approximately 2,500 generals or one general per 720 servicemen for 1.8 million servicemen in the Russian Army.

There are problems with the surfeit of generals in other armies of the CIS also. Thus Georgia, for example, has been forced to increase the length of service between ranks to three years for junior officers and to five years for senior officers. The same trend has emerged in the Ukrainian Army, where, despite an appreciable reduction in troops, the number of generals has tripled.

For comparison: the U.S. Army has approximately 1,250 generals, that is, one general per 1,500 servicemen (not counting the reserve).

There were 80 more generals in the Russian Army by the time of the May holidays....

**REGIONAL AFFAIRS****'Personal Autonomy' Urged as Basis for RF Organization**

944F0679A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 30 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Georgiy Sitnyanskiy, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences: "If a Tatar Robs a Tatar, Why Should the Center Intervene? Personal Autonomy and the Buildup of Russia"]

[Text] More than a half century ago the Russian philosopher I.A. Ilin predicted that the dismemberment and weakening of Russia would lead to very dire consequences for the entire world and reduce it to chaos. And the President of the United States is already admitting that in the new world, which was formed after the destruction of the communist system, there is less order. In the work of that same Ilin we find a precedent: Having

been convinced that the weak Germany after 1945 became the gates for Soviet expansion to the West, the latter overcame its fear of the revival of a strong Germany and helped it to become a strong power again.

In brief, we are gradually gaining the understanding that on the territory of the former USSR we must create some kind of unified state formation based on the principles of democracy and a market economy, one that is economically, socially, and politically strong and stable.

The question arises: What about the numerous peoples who populate this space?

One must assume that the principle of national-territorial autonomy has not justified itself. Under the communists these autonomous entities were an utter fiction and as soon as they began to be filled with real content, blood was shed. To preserve them in the post-totalitarian society would mean endless conflicts because of disputed territories, endless Karabakhs. And, moreover, "since all the modern ethnic groups have been dispersed, national statehood does not fully satisfy the aspirations of those peoples that are actively striving for it. What, for example, can be granted to the Tatar ethnic group as a whole by Tatarstan's acquisition of independence, if only one-fourth of all the Tatars of the former USSR live on this territory? Who will represent and provide for the national interests of the 75 percent of the Tatars who live outside Tatarstan? Otto Bauer, one of the creators of the idea of personal autonomy, wrote at the beginning of the 20th century: "The purely territorial principle everywhere places the minority in the hands of the majority...to implement the territorial principle in its pure form means that each nation will swallow up the minorities of other nations taken into its body, but at the same time it sacrifices its own minorities who are scattered throughout other national areas."

All sober-minded political forces in Russia today are coming out in favor of restoring a unified state, admitting that the current principle for construction of the state, which was realized in the USSR—according to the ethnic principle, of course—will lead nowhere.

At the same time we must be aware that we will not be able to restore the province-oblast system in the same form in which it existed before 1917. The peoples have become accustomed to sovereignty and national states, and with the elimination of the national-territorial autonomous entities the question of what will replace them will inevitably arise.

What is the alternative?

The way out, in our view, consists in separating the entire sphere of interethnic relations from the notion of territory and providing ethnic-personal autonomy, whereby the bearer of ethnic sovereignty is not the territory but representatives of a given ethnic group regardless of where they may live within the boundaries of the "large" state. And the right to personal autonomy

may be exercised not only by individual peoples but also ethnic groups (for example, among Russians-Kazakhs).

The idea of personal autonomy appeared approximately 100 years ago in Austro-Hungary. In Russia by the beginning of the 20th century it enjoyed support from all liberal and left-wing parties except for the Bolsheviks.

Under the tsar the right to personal autonomy was actually enjoyed by many "nomadic foreigners," particularly Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. They had their own self-government, elected their own bolushes (district leaders), biys (judges) and had their own law (adat) by which they judged their fellow tribesmen, etc. The tsarist administration did not intervene in their internal affairs; it simply collected taxes. Naturally, the European population residing on these territories were not subject to the local "foreign" authority.

After February 1917 attempts were made to realize principles of personal autonomy in other regions of Russia—in the Muslim Volga region, Siberia, Ukraine, and in Estonia, which had seceded, this principle was established right up until 1940. But as soon as the Bolsheviks came to power, promising all peoples "the right to self-determination right up to secession," and then turned their "sovereignty" into a fiction, no further attempts were made to realize the principle of personal autonomy.

What should be the real content of the idea of personal autonomy for the peoples of modern Russia?

In the first place, every nation should have the right to the external attributes of statehood—a president, a parliament, a flag, a seal, an anthem, etc. It is no secret that for 99 percent of any people sovereignty is needed for the sake of sovereignty itself. This must be taken into account.

Let us consider the Tatar ethnic group as a concrete example. The president of Tataria should become the president of the Tatars, and all Tatars living in Russia should be under his rule, but representatives of other nationalities living in the Kazan Province would not be subject to him. Naturally, the question of whom to obey—their own personal-autonomous president or the Russian state—would have to be decided by every adult citizen for himself. Nobody would force a Tatar to be subject to the president of the Tatars if he did not wish this himself.

Each ethnic group, exercising the right to personal autonomy, should have its own press, radio, television, and also system of education in its native language right up to higher education; the forms and ways of organizing this—to create their own educational institutions or ethnic courses, departments, and faculties in general Russian ones (for example, Tatar at Kazan University)—these, naturally, must be decided by the peoples themselves. It goes without saying that they must be permitted

to create private educational institutions where the language of the training, naturally, would be determined by the owners themselves.

The peoples must also be given the right to have their own legislation and courts. If a Tatar, for example, has killed or robbed another Tatar, why should the center intervene here? We must give them the right to judge the accused for themselves (the places for incarceration, incidentally, would most likely be common). The people should decide for themselves what kind of local legislation to have.

The center would intervene only when the criminal and the victim did not belong to the same personal autonomous entity.

It goes without saying that the center should retain the right to correct local laws in cases where they allow violations of the basic human rights or the integrity of the state.

The principle of personal autonomy of peoples should be combined with provincial (oblast) division of Russia. The oblast (province) should have a certain contingent of bureaucrats headed by the governor who would be responsible for resolving statewide issues on the territory of the oblast: the deployment of military units, the collection of statewide taxes, the functioning of strategically important highways and railroads, etc.

The personal autonomous entities might also be granted the right to issue their own money while, of course, all citizens and organizations of Russia would necessarily have to accept the Russian ruble as well. There is a precedent for this—in the Russian empire many national districts have the right to print their own money.

It would be more complicated with the so-called municipal services—public transportation, water, sewerage, street cleaning, etc.—everything that should be under the jurisdiction of the local authorities (we will call them zemstvos). How would the zemstvos (provincial-oblast, district-regional, etc.) relate to the organs of power of the personally autonomous peoples? The experience of the Russian empire cannot help us here since in those oblasts and provinces where peoples with something like personal autonomy lived there were no zemstvos.

Here is one of the ways of solving this problem: proportional representation. Let us say that in Kazan Province 50 percent of the population are citizens directly under the jurisdiction of the Russian state and the other 50 percent are representatives of the Tatar personal autonomous entity. In this case both would form up to half of the deputies of the province zemstvo. Whom the Tatars would delegate—elected, appointed, or if the deputies of the personal autonomous Tatar parliament residing permanently in Kazan Province would combine this deputy work with that in the zemstvo—they would decide for themselves.



This, in my view, is briefly the content of the idea of personal autonomy as it applies to Russian reality today.

In conclusion I shall mention the most widespread objections we have heard and try to respond to them.

**1. This kind of organization of the state would be aimed at dividing the peoples.**

Excuse me, but why would there be division if the people belonging to various personal autonomous entities were living in one state, constantly communicating with each other, and learning from one another; if, for instance, a Bashkir saw that a Tatar living in Ufa had greater rights, he could suggest to his personal autonomous organs of power that it would not be a bad idea for the Bashkirs to learn from the Tatars. And if it comes to that, are the sovereign national-territorial formations not proceeding more toward separation, especially if you look at who is calling for "sovereignization" now (see above)? The "ideal" national-territorial sovereignty would entail separation and placement of peoples in various autonomous quarters. This is shifting the blame, as they say!

**2. Such a policy is apartheid since there would be different laws for different nationalities.**

No. Apartheid is when one people or another have forced upon them a way of life that is different from the others. But no one will be forcing those Tatars to have their own legislation that is different from the Russian. They will be given the right to have it, and if they want to they will take advantage of their right—that is their business. And to be frank, national-territorial autonomous entities are similar to Bantustans. Every resident, for example, of Kazan, regardless of nationality, must obey the laws of Tataria whether he wants to or not. So again it is shifting the blame.

**3. A very significant objection: The idea is not bad but the peoples who have developed a taste for territorial sovereignty will not go for it. I have also heard this: "Territorial-national autonomous entities are now hundreds of years old or maybe even thousands" (!).**

And this in our dynamic age when everything is changing almost every day, to speak about hundreds and thousands of years?! Whether or not the people will go for this will be shown in the near future. At the beginning of the article I already said that two years of sovereign life have affected the awareness of many peoples.

**Duma Discusses Urals Republic**

944F0627A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 19 Apr 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Aleksandr Batygin: "Those Who Attempted To Set Up the Urals Republic Found Themselves... Ahead of the Locomotive"]

[Text] Today the State Duma will hold parliamentary hearings on "The Idea of the Urals Republic and the Prospect of Developing Parliamentarism in Russia." The

initiative belongs to the Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy, and was supported by the Duma Council. The greatest persistence in preparation of the hearings, however, was shown by Larisa Mishustina, a deputy of the parliament's lower chamber and a former chairman of the Glasnost Commission of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet.

It would probably be appropriate to recall the chronology of events surrounding the sensational proclamation of the Urals Republic, which was characterized by the center as an onslaught of separatism on the regional front and produced the harshest measures in response.

A year ago, on 25 April, an opinion poll was conducted among Sverdlovsk Oblast residents. Of almost 2.3 million persons, 83.4 percent replied positively to the question "Do you agree that by its powers the oblast should be equated to a Russian Federation component republic?" On 1 July of the same year the oblast soviet adopted the decision "On the Status of Sverdlovsk Oblast" whereby it proclaimed itself a Russian Federation constituent republic. On 27 October the session adopted a Urals Republic constitution and set elections to its legislative assembly for 21 December. The elections did not take place, since on 9 November 1993 the president of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On Suspending the Activities of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies." On top of that, the head of the oblast administration, Eduard Rossel—the ideologist of the creation of the Urals Republic—was dismissed from his job.

Thus the "mutiny on the ship" was put down; the attempt to raise the oblast's status, treated as a manifestation of separatism, was nipped in a bud. The new national constitution does not mention the self-proclaimed republic among Russian Federation components—it still lists Sverdlovsk Oblast. And now—the somewhat unexpected parliamentary hearings; a return to an apparently closed topic. Are Urals residents persisting?

A conversation in the Duma with "troublemaker" Larisa Mishustina on the eve of the hearings brought some clarity.

"Accusations of separatism are absolutely groundless," she dismissed my doubts resolutely. "There was never a question of seceding from Russia, of our own money and customs. There is nothing in the idea of the Urals Republic that could worry Moscow. We were acting within the framework of the constitution."

Turbulent processes, which lately have shaken regions formerly removed from big politics, have brought Russia to a qualitatively new state. Decentralization of power is taking place; republics, krais, oblasts, and autonomies gradually are coming into their own—into the political arena as independent subjects. The regions want not only to decide their fate but also to actively build the future state. This desire is especially great among those who are traditionally called the backbone of the Fatherland.

There are thousands of problems emerging today in the Russian provinces which need immediate resolution at the local level, without waiting for vague and belated "directives" from the center. Quality management is only possible today at the level of the regions, where direct feedback exists between the local authorities and the population.

"Naturally at the same time economic and political equality of the regions in their relations with the center should be ensured in real terms and codified in the law," says L. Mishustina.

The proclamation of the Urals Republic, in the opinion of my interlocutor, did not pursue the goal of attaining privileges only for its region.

"We were fighting," says the deputy, "for the constitutional rights of all regions of this level—those possessing a powerful economic potential, developed internal market, and democratic traditions. Our experience in proclaiming a republic should not be forgotten—it is a contribution to the development of the idea of federalism in Russia: Sooner or later this issue would have come up in another part of the country. Yes, we were in a hurry; that is why we moved like a battering ram and we are glad that the constitution proclaimed the principle of equality of subjects. Now we can, without staging a political showdown, calmly sort out the relations between the center and the regions, analyze the pluses and minuses. Until the law on the status of Federation components is adopted. But the task of the parliament is not only to adopt laws, but also to enlighten, to try first to understand what is happening on the local level, how federal relations are developing... By the way, we do not intend to limit ourselves to parliamentary hearings; we will hold seminars, conferences."

In their new capacity as Duma deputies, Larisa Mishustina and her colleagues now have the opportunity to look at the problem from a broader viewpoint, from different angles. Academics, members of the president's administration and his advisers, and jurists have been invited to today's hearings; Eduard Rossel will be there, too. By the way, when L. Mishustina and like-minded colleagues from Russia's Choice met with the president recently, she asked Boris Nikolayevich to reconsider the fate of the former head of Sverdlovsk Oblast administration, who in her opinion had been unfairly dismissed from his job. Yeltsin did not make a decision on the spot, but took the deputy's request into consideration.

Some time in the past our president said: "Federalism is a territorial form of democracy." It appears that the time has come to implement this thesis in practice.

...In the Duma I also had a conversation with an expert—V. Yevdokimov, a chief scientific associate of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

"The Sverdlovsk Oblast administration," says Vyacheslav Borisovich, "could unilaterally announce:

Beginning such and such a date we will reduce our transfers to the state budget. Instead of pressure, they chose a different way—to do everything legally to find a legitimate way to solve the problem of achieving the economic equality of Federation components. I will repeat what Larisa Pavlovna said: There is no separatism in the proclamation of the Urals Republic—only the principle of economic equality."

In our opinion, the political-legal experiment of Sverdlovsk residents—proclaiming themselves a republic—despite being unconstitutional at the time, deserves attention. It was rejected in the best traditions of the command-administrative system, without talking things out with the authors, without a serious study of the proposal's substance. I have a persistent feeling that in the strategic development of ideas of federalism the Urals people ran "ahead of the locomotive" and therefore found themselves ruthlessly crushed by the state system of administration, which is only beginning to acquire new features.

Nevertheless, the question remains open. In a sense, I think that regardless of its outcome, today's conversation in the Duma on the role and status of regions on the basis of the Urals example should be marked as a credit to our young parliament.

#### Research on Regional Political Views Reported

944F0658A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 17, 29 Apr 94 p 7

[Article by Vladimir Petukhov and Andrey Ryabov, under rubric "Hypothesis": "Game of Duckpins as a Form of Political Mobilization"]

[Text] Which of the currents of political ideology will dominate on the Russian political Olympus? Discussions about whether the radical reformers will return to their first-place roles in the government, or whether they have definitely yielded the initiative to the moderate conservatives, or perhaps even to the more "drastic" national-patriotic opposition, are not professional exercises engaged in by political experts and journalists, but the completely normal reaction to the indefiniteness and instability of the current political situation in Russia.

Forecasting the chances of success by various parties or movements is more purposeful if one relies not upon conjectural findings, but on the analysis of the state of the Russians' public awareness and those priorities toward which that awareness is gravitating. Definite food for thought on this subject is provided by the results of a comprehensive sociological study conducted by the Russian Independent Institute of Social and National Problems in February-March 1994 (a total of 1700 respondents in 10 regions of the country were polled).

Most of the persons polled (55.7 percent) state that they are in favor of a socially oriented market economy ("the state must guarantee all citizens a social minimum, and whoever wants to get more must attempt to do so

himself"). For purposes of comparison: the ultraliberal economic model ("the state must not interfere in the life of the citizens; each individual must count only on himself") and the more moderate version of the same liberal model ("the state must help only the weak and helpless") are supported, respectively, by 4.2 percent and 13.0 percent of the respondents. A total of 22.4 percent of those polled give their preference to the orthodox communist system of social equalization. Most Russians unambiguously link their hopes of the arising of a new socioeconomic model with the development of entrepreneurship (all told, 63.8 percent of the respondents asserted that they would like personally to engage in that type of activity).

Having defined themselves with respect to socioeconomic policy, Russians demonstrate a high degree of mistrust in the authority. This, in particular, manifested itself clearly when they answered the question of what today represents the greatest danger to Russia. A total of 53.9 percent mentioned the increase in crime; 42.8 percent, the impoverishment of the population; 39.4 percent, the impotence of the political authority; and 24.4 percent, unemployment. In other words, most Russians do not believe in the ability of the political establishment to guarantee an acceptable level of social and economic stability in the country or to resolve effectively the tasks that only the state can and must resolve, and therefore they are counting only on their own strengths.

At the same time, when evaluating their personal prospects, 55.2 percent of the respondents remarked that their life in the near future will improve or, if worse comes to worst, will remain unchanged. The fairly high indicator of "personal optimism" reflects the population's ability to adapt to the complicated conditions of the current transitional period.

Yet another sign of the Russians' distrust of authority is the low rating of the political leaders. G. Yavlinskiy received the support of 23.5 percent of the respondents; B. Yeltsin, 17.2; Ye. Gaydar, 16.7; V. Zhirinovskiy, 9.2; G. Zyuganov, 8.8; S. Shakhrai, 6.7; V. Chernomyrdin, 5.9; and A. Rutskoy, 2.2 percent. Incidentally, it is completely possible to link G. Yavlinskiy's relative success with the preponderance of the votes in favor of a socially oriented market economy, because the image of that politician, who proclaimed the slogan "a different reform" is linked by the mass consciousness with his adherence specifically to that path of development. But nevertheless the number of percentage points garnered by the leader of the Yabloko [Apple] block is obviously insufficient for him to lay claim to the role of the expresser of the will of the majority of the population.

After becoming acquainted with the figures that have been given, it might seem to certain people that Russians have completely lost their interest in politics, and therefore, for the political leaders in the current situation, it does not make any sense to seek a magic formula for success. However, this is definitely not so. In the opinion of 66.2 percent of those polled, there must exist in the

country some kind of commonly held idea that is capable of uniting all segments of society—the entrepreneurs, workers, intellectuals, the military, and rural inhabitants. The results of the study do not make it possible with sufficient accuracy to understand exactly what that idea is. The range of opinions is extremely broad: 20.8 percent of the respondents feel that the democratic forces are capable of providing a better future for the country; 18.0 percent put their hopes on receiving aid from the West; and 11.5 percent, to one degree or another, are counting on the positive role of the Orthodox church. Nevertheless one is struck by the fact that, all told, more than half those polled (56.6 percent) expressed their sympathies with various public forces and the traditionalist-state orientation.

Summing up what has been stated, we take the risk of hypothesizing that in the mass consciousness there is a growing need to have a new social force or leader emerge on the political scene, a force or leader capable of combining in their activity the ideas of a socially oriented market with adherence to traditionalist political and spiritual values.

It would seem that, among the current Russian parties and movements, there are a rather large number of people who openly declare their "neoconservatism." Nevertheless, their loud and promising political declarations are not finding the proper support among Russians. The reason for this is the fact that all of them, in one way or another, are linked with the present political establishment, which is responsible, in the population's opinion, for the current woeful state of the country. Therefore, in order to lay claim to the role of a truly influential political force of the neoconservative persuasion, simply the adherence to an ideology that integrates the slogans of market social liberalism and spiritual-political conservatism is obviously insufficient. A leader who attempts to occupy a particular political niche will have to appear in the public's opinion as—in the full sense of the word—a new person in Russian politics. In addition, Russians are completely fed up with verbose discussions of ways to bring the country out of its crisis, and they currently are inclined, to a much greater degree than previously, to believe populist promises (we might recall, for example, the recent successes of V. Zhirinovskiy, who currently has already lost a considerable part of his previous popularity because of his unproductive position in the State Duma). Proceeding from this point, one can assume that the leader or party that lays claim to success, while differing only slightly on the basis of world-view position from the views expressed by the current moderate conservatives—from PRES to DPR—will attempt to achieve mass support with the aid of slogans that are simple and easy for the rank-and-file voter to understand, while also using untraditional forms of political mobilization. The example of the headlong ascent of S. Berlusconi to the political Olympus in Italy, a country which, throughout the entire twentieth century had seemingly anticipated the changing of the political climate on the European continent, apparently should be



viewed as a symptom of these kinds of changes. The catchy motto "Fozze, Italia! ("Forward, Italy!), plus the organizing of an election campaign modeled on clubs made up of fans of the Milan soccer team that is loved by millions of Italians, in addition to the criticism of the First Republic elite that had discredited itself—those are the basic components of the successful debut of the telecommunications king from the Apennines in the big political games. And, incidentally, talking about criticism. According to our research, the largest number of people polled assume that the following are to blame for Russia's current misfortunes: Communists (34.1 percent); the *nomenklatura* (26.1 percent); and the Mafia (20.0 percent). Thus, it is not difficult to predict the "critical component" in the program of the Russian Berlusconi. What might be the basis at such time of the untraditional political mobilization—a game of duck-pins, societies of amateur orchard growers or worshippers of the intoxicating amber beverage, people's walks—remains only a guess. To those, however, who will rush to reproach us for overlooking the possibility that Russian neoconservatism will become fascist, we might note that, all told, only 23.2 percent of the respondents are inclined to see in our current mess the results of intrigues by various "dark forces"—American imperialism, the Masons, international financial circles, etc. And more than half the people polled (52.2 percent) assume that Russians are the same nation as the other nations of the Russian Federation and should not play any special role.

#### Concerns of Cossack Community Reviewed

944F0671A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 28 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Andrey Serba, member of the Council of Experts for Cossack Affairs under the Ministry for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy, under the rubric "Position": "The State Duma Has Not Yet Started on the Cossacks Issue: The Cossacks Are Shifting Their Interest to Regional Power Structures"]

[Text] The Cossacks had barely asserted themselves as a public movement as they rushed to establish contacts with the legislative organs of the then USSR. This was only natural: Their desire to restore the Cossacks' use of land and the hetmens' self-rule as well as the formation of a Cossack unit in the army had to find support in the appropriate legal acts. Plans for the future included the creation of a professionally trained group of Cossack deputies who would defend the Cossacks' interests under the complicated political and ethnic situation emerging in Cossack regions, mostly in the Kuban, Terek, and North Kazakhstan.

The board of the Cossack Union, which was the first mass Cossack organization created in the USSR, set its stake on the USSR Supreme Soviet and put immense effort into its work with deputies from the Cossack regions. These attempts were not successful, however. Kuban was represented in the Supreme Soviet by the

ill-famed Ivan Polozkov; other Cossack regions were represented by just as incongruous local party leaders. The Cossack Union could not "delight" the Cossacks with any single act that would have anything to do with them, not even an act on their rehabilitation.

Hardly any more success was achieved in the highest legislative organs by another public Cossack organization, the newly restored Union of Russian Cossack Troops, which had been eliminated by the Bolsheviks. Unlike the Cossack Union, it managed to establish contacts with the Russian parliament. It used a new approach in coordinating its activities with the leaders of those political parties and deputy associations whose policy in one field or another corresponded with Cossack interests. An attempt to set up a group of Cossack deputies who would work to restore the Cossack status met with no success.

The lack of any significant results shown by the Cossack Union and the Union of Russian Cossack Troops in their work in the highest legislative organs of both the former USSR and the Russian Federation caused a certain disappointment in them among the Cossacks, who shifted their attention to the regional power structures. The 70-year-old pronouncement of Don hetman Kaledin that "The healing of Russia should start with the outlying areas" has been spread widely; whether it is appropriate or not, people keep quoting a statement by Novosiltsev, a contemporary member of the Union of Cossack Troops: "Given the current situation, it is impossible to form any state power in Russia. Power should be established in the provinces, in the oblasts, and from there it should spread to the center and then settle."

Most of the Cossack leaders came to the latest elections with this idea of creating a strong local power which would become the Cossacks' ally. As a result, the votes of many millions of Cossacks supported a large variety of parties and election blocs, from Russia's Choice to the communists. The support of the Cossack voters was quite considerable and some of the Cossack hetmen have joined regional representative bodies (some of them were even elected to the Russian State Duma). This allowed the local Cossack organizations to resolve some critical issues, mostly legal or economic in nature. However, the emergence of these "Duma Cossacks" did not do anything for the Cossack community of Russia as a whole. They were elected from various "non-Cossack" parties and blocs and, being promoted by one or another structure that financed their election, these deputies, instead of working for the Cossacks, had to "pay back" by working for those who had financed their successful election campaigns and ensured them victory over the other candidates.

Three months have passed since the State Duma started work, but nothing has been uttered from its podium yet about the situation of the Cossacks on the Terek or in North Kazakhstan, or about the threat of ethnic and social explosions in the Kuban and Don. Nothing was said

either about any mechanism allowing implementation of presidential edicts on Cossack self-administration and use of land, or about correlating these edicts with legislation on Cossacks' federal service. In order to change the situation, the Cossacks may act as an independent force at elections to all-Russian representative bodies and produce their own socioeconomic program. One must also remember that the Cossack movement is well organized and its participants are socially active and disciplined (the percentage of voting Cossacks is much higher usually than the same figure for other sections of the population). But the weakness of the Cossack movement lies in its lack of unity, in the absence of accord among its leaders. The hetmen of various Cossack units and unions cannot come to a mutual understanding, are unable to design a mutually acceptable pre-election program. Therefore, the total number of Cossacks proclaims only its potential possibilities, but not its realistic strength.

One of the strong points of the Cossack movement is the fact that it is scattered over the entire territory of Russia and represents all social strata of our society. The Cossacks enjoy more popularity with people from other locations in non-Cossack areas. The reason for this lies on the surface: Other residents of Cossack regions are concerned about violations of their rights and therefore observe the Cossack movement with apprehension; but residents of "non-Cossack" territories do not have the same emotions and view the idea of restoring the Cossack status with more objectivity. Thus, the three Cossack propagandists from the Cossack association in Moscow managed to collect more signatures in Novgorod Oblast for support of Don hetman Kaledin than the Cossacks of the Kuban and Orenburg areas taken together. The result of propaganda may be a lot more effective in other areas, for instance, the north of Russia and the subpolar region, which have large numbers of descendants of the repressed Cossacks. During the election campaign the Cossacks may move outside their traditional regions and transform the entire territory of Russia into their field of action.

But in order to achieve any success in the pre-election struggle, the ultimate goal set for the Cossack movement should be other than a fight for privileges. Only in this case can the Cossacks realistically count on the support of the Cossack population. The Cossack movement does not have any well-known leaders on the all-Russia scale. It should rely on the provisions of its program but not on the popularity of certain "leaders" who bore us on TV. It should prove that a strong Cossack movement is needed for the purpose of reviving all Russia and establishing its army.

#### **Tatarstan Deputy Premier on Development**

944F0662A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN  
in Russian 20 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Summary of report by F.G. Khamidullin, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan, at the 19th Session of the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet: "Results of

the Republic of Tatarstan's Socioeconomic Development in 1993 and the Forecast for 1994"]

#### **[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies!**

A most important event in the life of the republic was the conclusion of the treaty between Russia and Tatarstan, which affords new opportunities for the socioeconomic development of the republic. The government has drawn up and adopted an action program for realization of the treaty, which will largely determine the directions of our activity in the current year.

Permit me to dwell briefly on the progress of the economic reforms. Mention should be made briefly of being among the most important measures in this sphere in 1993 for the further development of the processes of privatization and denationalization in accordance with the republic program approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan. More than 300 enterprises with summary statutory capital of more than R427 billion have been privatized in the course of its realization. They include the Tatneft, Nizhnekainskneftekhim, and Orgsintez associations, the Kazan Engine-Building, Kazan Helicopter, and Tatmyasoprom plants and the Chistopol Watch Works, the Tatnefteprovodstroy Trust, and others. The privatized industrial enterprises manufactured more than 40 percent of the total commodity product. The privatization of housing has begun.

Work on the issue of registered privatization deposits got under way. Fifteen specialized check investment funds, which have altogether accumulated privatization checks totaling more than R10 billion, were functioning in the republic by the end of the year.

F.G. Khamidullin went on to say that as a result of the many months of work of a large group of specialists, scientists, and employees of economic departments a program of the targeted social protection of the populace, the first in the CIS in practice, had been prepared. Its realization will make it possible to protect more efficiently the needy strata of the population of the republic under the conditions of the development of market relations.

An important instrument of government regulation of the economy in 1993 was the use of the system of the preferential allocation of credit. A special commission of experts under the auspices of the State Committee for Economics and Forecasting made an expert appraisal of almost 400 specific plans presented by the enterprises, took the most efficient of them, and recommended them to the government for the preferential allocation of credit under the strict supervision of the banks and the State Committee for Economics and Forecasting.

Realization of the agrarian reform continues. Of the 884 kolkhozes and sovkhozes which underwent reregistration, 702 retained their status, and 182 farms were reorganized. More than 4,000 persons are employed at the 725 peasant (private) farms that are operating at this

time. They have been allocated 24,300 hectares of land, 642 tractors, 340 motor vehicles, 78 grain-harvesting combines, and the requisite set of agricultural equipment. Some R589 million of credit resources and R170 million from the republic budget were allocated last year for the development and formation of these farms.

The speaker then called the deputies' attention to certain negative trends causing the government particular concern. It is a question primarily of the decline in industrial production. The main reason is the nonpayments problem. The sum total of receivables from customers, the majority of whom are outside of the Republic of Tatarstan, amounted as of 1 March to approximately R2.3 trillion, of which more than one-third is past due. The economic development of our republic also will depend to a considerable extent on the measures that are adopted to resolve the problem of arrears on the scale of Russia. After all, a large part of the biggest enterprises works for the Russian market. Another problem is the enterprises' lack of preparedness for operating under the conditions of the competition that has arisen and their inadequate knowledge of market conditions.

The year of 1994 must be one of the real stimulation of the structural reorganization of the entire economy. What are the specific directions of the structural transformations? One of the main ones is a fundamental restructuring of the military-industrial complex. The transformations have begun by way of the state's selective support on the basis of a competitive seeding of the most rapidly recoupable business projects in areas of significance for the republic. Conversion problems came to be tackled more actively in 1994 with the Russian Federation Government. Specifically, measures to reduce the debt to enterprises of the republic's military-industrial complex for special products manufactured in 1993 were adopted. The enterprises have begun to obtain funds for advance payments for the defense order for 1994. This is a direct result of the treaty that has been concluded between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan. A special commission has been formed under the auspices of the State Committee for Economics and Forecasting of the Republic of Tatarstan for a fuller analysis of fulfillment of the mutual commitments in respect to the defense block.

Serious structural changes are needed in the republic's oil and petrochemical complexes. An oil-producing republic lacking extended petroleum refining for fuel and oil remains dependent on monopoly refiners. In addition, the reserves of high-grade oil are being depleted, and the wear and tear and depreciation of the petrochemical works continue. This is why a number of alternatives involving the attraction of foreign capital is being worked up and the Neftekhiminvestk holding industrial and financial group has been created in the republic.

The areas for a number of new crops—corn for grain, rape, and sunflower for oil seeds—are being increased in sectors of the agro-industrial complex. The breed is being

improved in animal husbandry. Thus we have smaller numbers of cows than in neighboring Bashkortostan, but the dairy product output is greater here. The facilities for the processing of the agricultural product are being reinforced at the same time—the sugar refineries, meat-packing plants, and milk-conversion enterprises are being modernized. The purpose of all these transformations is to improve the republic's food balance to achieve self-sufficiency in the basic food types with the simultaneous creation of a competitive market environment.

The structural transformations should also encompass other sectors, the nonproduction sphere included. Thus the market is already signaling a shortage of skilled managers, accountants, and other people capable of working under market conditions.

The entire ideology of government support for structural transformations of the economy is essentially changing. Support must be targeted exclusively at a specifically computed project. The times of support for everyone in succession have passed.

The structural transformations will produce results with simultaneous institutional changes. The development of alternative forms of property and competition and the formation of a secondary securities market will create a fundamentally new environment for all subjects of the market.

Support for enterprise should be among the priority areas in 1994. A draft of the corresponding program has with the active participation of the Trade and Industry Chamber of the Republic of Tatarstan been prepared in execution of the edict of the president of the Republic of Tatarstan. It provides for measures of support for small business and the priority areas of the economy, the granting of tax privileges and preferential credit included. The realization of this program will contribute to the further development of the infrastructure of the market and the formation of a competitive environment.

An acceleration of the pace of denationalization and privatization will contribute to a considerable extent to the development of market relations in the republic. A further 450 enterprises will be privatized in 1994. They include the Tatenergo and Zavod imeni Sergo associations, computer systems, Elekon, and others. The privatized industrial enterprises will manufacture more than three-fourths of the total commodity product in the republic as a whole.

The set task for the creation of a competitive environment in 1994 is an acceleration of the rate of privatization of trade, public catering, and consumer service facilities.

A most important task of 1994 is the privatization of housing. Only 5 percent of the apartments out of the total amount of housing subject to privatization has been privatized in the republic at the present time. It is contemplated having raised this indicator to 30 percent by the year's end.



Proceeding from the current situation, the speaker emphasized, the forecast of the economic and social development of the republic for 1994 is oriented toward support for the life-sustaining sectors of production and also selective support for the enterprises that are prepared to secure the rapid recovery of the resources invested in the interests of the republic's economy. Industrial production is to constitute R12.365 trillion, and output in comparable prices will decline 17 percent here.

The overall decline in the level of production in the republic as a whole will be influenced appreciably by fuel industry. The reason for this is the reduction in the production of oil and gas, the continued deterioration in the structure of the reserves, and the fraught environmental situation. Accordingly, a decline in production in petrochemical industry and power engineering is anticipated; a decline of 15 percent is forecast at enterprises of the defense sectors.

A number of enterprises, including the Kama Truck Plant, is forecasting an increase in the manufacture of its product in the mechanical engineering and metal-working sectors. A certain increase in production is expected in the food sectors of industry. Despite the crisis situation, a number of associations and enterprises is operating in stable fashion. They include computer system associations, the Chistopol Watchworks, and the Tochmash Plant. The Terminal Association and the Plant imeni Gorkiy, which have pretty good prospects, have begun to increase the pace of production.

The process of the conclusion of trade and economic agreements with countries of the near abroad for the supply of material and technical resources is becoming more purposeful and efficient. Agreements have been concluded at the present time with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and the Republic of Lithuania, and agreements with 37 regions of the Russian Federation have been extended.

In 1994, according to forecast estimates, the production of consumer goods will constitute 100.2 percent, including 103.4 percent for foodstuffs and 96.7 percent for nonfood commodities. An increase in the manufacture of basic consumer commodities like refrigerators, synthetic detergents, toilet soap, footwear, and knitwear is expected in the current year.

It is planned to maintain the trend of a stabilization of the production of agricultural products in 1994. Purchases of agricultural products for republic food stocks will remain practically unchanged.

It is contemplated continuing the government support for the agro-industrial complex in the current year. Budget resources will be channeled, in the main, into an increase in the fertility of the land—the compensation of expenditure on the purchase of mineral fertilizers and chemical plant-protection agents, a fundamental improvement in the land, support for pedigree breeding and elite seed growing, and scientific-personnel support.

The funding of the construction and modernization of the most important enterprises of the food and processing industry, the supply of gas and electricity to the countryside, and social and cultural amenities is planned also. It is planned allocating from the republic budget R310 billion for these areas.

It is contemplated preserving for the purpose of the social protection of the population of the republic the subsidies on animal husbandry products purchased for republic needs. Approximately 27 percent of the expenditure side of the republic budget is earmarked for the funding of the agro-industrial complex altogether, subsidies included.

Land reform will continue. The reform of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, which will to a considerable extent interest the workers of the countryside in the end results of production, will be completed. An increase in the number of peasant (private) farms is forecast. It is planned to render them government support from budget appropriations and make soft loans available in the current year.

According to the forecast estimates of enterprises of food and processing industry, an increase in the production of foodstuffs of 3.4 percent (in comparable prices, counting alcoholic beverages) is envisaged for 1994. An increase in the production of wholemilk products (in milk equivalent), macaroni products, flour, and canned fruit and vegetables is scheduled.

The forecast for 1994 as a whole in terms of all sources of funding envisages the assimilation of R2.5 trillion of capital investments with a decline compared to the 1993 level in comparable prices of 28.6 percent.

The allocation of capital investments for the construction of housing for persons demobilized from the armed forces and certain other facilities totaling R56.5 billion from the budget of the Russian Federation is contemplated.

Aside from this, a whole number of other federal targeted programs, in which enterprises and organizations of the republic may participate thanks to the treaty that has been concluded with Russia, is being drawn up. The leaders of enterprises, ministries, and departments should step up their efforts for the specific development of projects with Russian departments. The Government of the Republic of Tatarstan has performed the corresponding preparatory work.

It will be hard in the coming years to expect under the conditions of a reduction in production, the arrears crisis, and the high rate of inflation a significant increase in investments from the resources of enterprises of all forms of ownership and the republic budget. The funds of commercial banks and foreign investments could be realistic sources of an increase in investments.

In 1994 the proportion of funds channeled into construction for nonproduction purposes is forecast at the level

of 37.7 percent against the actual 1993 level of 35.2 percent; this ratio will be maintained thanks to the republic budget, in the main.

The introduction of housing with a total area of 980,000 square meters, 91,400 square meters of which will be for the movement of residents out of dilapidated and dangerous housing, is contemplated from all sources of financing in the present year. The government has adopted a decision on the supplementary allocation of funds for the construction of housing for the handicapped and participants in the Great Patriotic War. It is contemplated through the efforts of individual developers building 320,000 square meters of housing, which is 25 percent more than was introduced in 1993.

The forecast envisages the introduction of general schools for 9,900 students (101 percent of the 1993 level), preschools for 3,110 children (103.8 percent), hospitals with 749 beds (179 percent), general clinics catering for 1,720 visits per shift (116.2 percent), and clubhouses with 4,000 seats (87.7 percent).

The adoption of the laws of the Republic of Tatarstan "The Subsistence Minimum" and "The Minimum Wage" created the legislative basis for the stabilization and prevention of a decline in personal living standards. A legislative provision specifying that the minimum wage may not be lower than the subsistence minimum has for the first time been made the basis of the calculation of wage-increase indicators for 1994.

It is forecast that, despite the considerable decline in production, the average wage in 1994 will increase by a factor of 4.1 compared with 1993 and will in December 1994 be in excess of R400,000 per worker. An increase in the remuneration of the employees of publicly funded organizations also is specified in the draft budget with regard to this rate of increase in the average wage.

With a growth of consumer prices by a factor of 4.3 approximately compared with the 1993 level the increase in the price of goods and services constituting the subsistence minimum will be regulated and should not exceed the 3.8-fold level. That is, the forecast provides for a preferential growth of wages (by a factor of 4.1) compared with the value of the subsistence minimum (a factor of 3.8).

Realization of the program of targeted social protection of the population will continue. The amount of the sums of compensation to the needy strata of the populace in the form of food checks (more than 140,000 inhabitants of the republic are currently being paid a sum total of more than R5 billion a month) will increase proportionate to the increase in the value of the subsistence minimum.

It is contemplated making the subsidies for transport services, for provision of the public with fuel, and for medication specifically targeted in 1994.

A 50 percent reduction in fares on suburban motor transport will be introduced in the period from 1 May through 1 October.

A whole set of measures pertaining to the social protection of the population is envisaged by an agreement among the Cabinet of Ministers, the republic Council of Trade Unions, and the Association of State-Owned Enterprises of Tatarstan for 1994. Realization of the comprehensive "Care" program for an improvement in services for war and labor veterans, elderly single citizens, and the handicapped will continue. Funds for the organization of the summer recreation and health and fitness of children and funds for the support of the children of employees of publicly funded organizations in preschools will be allocated from the republic budget.

The forecast of the labor market for the republic for 1994 contemplates a level of unemployment that is no higher than 1.5 percent of the workforce. Financial assistance to enterprises and organizations for the creation of approximately 12,000 jobs is envisaged simultaneously within the framework of the Employment Program (2,453 jobs were created thanks to resources of the Employment Fund in 1993).

Switching to the concluding part of the report, F.G. Khamidullin emphasized that work had been under way for more than a year in the republic on a draft concept of socioeconomic development incorporating a reform of the organs of administration. The provisions of the concept are currently being specified in the light of the treaty and the agreements concluded with Russia. It will upon completion be presented to the people of the republic.

The independence and rights of Tatarstan accorded by the treaty demand increased responsibility for all business in the republic. Questions of the strictest austerity in all types of material, labor, and financial resources are particularly pertinent. The government is contemplating a number of organizational and economic measures in this direction.

On the whole, the year promises to be difficult, and the crisis has not yet been overcome, but there will in the present year be appreciable qualitative changes in the economy laying the foundations of prospects of an improvement in the general economic situation.

#### **Chechen Opposition Leader Views Situation in Republic**

944F0669A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Yaram Mamadayev, former leader of Dzhokhar Dudayev's cabinet, head of a government of national trust of the Chechen Republic in exile, by Mikhail Ivanchikov; place and date not given: "All Prophets Prefer To Live Outside Their Fatherland"]

[Text]

[Ivanchikov] Mr. Prime Minister, you were together with General Dudayev, the present president of Chechnya, at the sources of the independence of the Chechen Republic. Why did your ways part?

[Mamadayev] I would not reduce everything merely to our personal relationship. We should, perhaps, proceed from the fact that General Dudayev is unquestionably by nature an authoritarian individual. And anyone who expresses even the slightest disagreement with him automatically becomes his personal enemy. And I am no exception in this case.

I remember well my last conversation with the general last May, when I found myself in the literal sense looking down the barrels of automatic weapons in my office. Armed people had not come to see me at that time of their own free will, naturally—they had been sent by Dudayev. Although he later called me personally and said: "I swear! I sent no one." But he is not, after all, a little boy to be maintaining such things! With us Muslims the words "I swear" are sacred. Dudayev's older brother once told me, incidentally: "I would never swear for my brother on the Koran." This is a very telling remark yet again characterizing the present president of Chechnya.

[Ivanchikov] Do you have support, financial included, inside and outside of Chechnya? On what, after all, do you live, work....

[Mamadayev] I have never concealed the fact that I am given financial support by Chechen entrepreneurs in Moscow. As far as an evaluation of my activity within the Chechen Republic is concerned, we need to return to the moment when the government of national trust in exile was formed. A specific feature of Chechen society is that public opinion takes shape in the process of a dialogue between the teyns (a teyn is an ancestral clan—NYG note). Thus the Government of the Chechen Republic that I head was formed with regard to the wishes of the teyns and the opinions of religious figures, the Chechen Industrialists' Union, and the local administration chiefs. But President Dudayev, who in fact debarred this government from power, thereby flouted the will of the people. And this is in itself dangerous.

It is hard to reproach me, at least, with personal ambition. It would have given me more pleasure to have been involved in enterprise than in political activity. But I was forced to take account of the wishes of my people. As long as the population of the Chechen Republic considered me its prime minister, I was such. Nonetheless, I am looking to the future. The Caucasus Transnational Corp (KTK), whose activity is aimed entirely at the restoration of interregional economic relations and movement toward the world level, was formed to this end. As far as the latter circumstance is concerned, I can report not without pleasure that we are even today attempting to win the support of influential Western financial structures.

[Ivanchikov] You mentioned interregional cooperation, referring to certain regions of Russia also. How do you see Chechnya's future in this connection: as part of Russia or as a totally independent state?

[Mamadayev] The wishes of the Chechen were expressed unequivocally: total independence. And, I repeat once again, I am on the side of my people. If, therefore, the union of teyns ever supports membership of the Russian Federation on these terms or others, I would not object.

I would like in this connection to add the following. Those who believe that Chechnya needs Russia more than Russia needs Chechnya are wrong. And the other way about also. It is not a question of who can live without whom, and who, not. We have historically been neighbors. The situation in the Caucasus depends on Chechnya to a large extent, and the Caucasus, in turn, influences the situation in the south of Russia. As you can see, therefore, Chechnya and Russia have a mutual interest in one another.

Also fruitless, in my view, are any attempts to isolate the Chechen Republic, as were made recently by President Yeltsin, declaring an economic blockade of Chechnya, virtually. Who needs a new focal point of tension in the Caucasus, which, were it to arise, would be comparable with the Near East or Balkan conflicts? Yet the economic blockade of the Chechen Republic on the part of Russia with the virtual withdrawal from Chechnya's jurisdiction of Sunzhenskiy and Malgobenskiy Rayons is merely contributing to the appearance of such conflicts. In addition, such a situation is merely to the benefit of General Dudayev's criminal regime. The gang of looters he heads is flouting the laws and pillaging the republic and destabilizing the situation in the south of Russia. And everything is being ascribed here to the consequences of the economic blockade declared by Russia and to "the Kremlin's imperial policy."

But Moscow, unfortunately, is persisting in its desire to keep Chechnya as part of Russia at all costs. Not long ago I was speaking with Sergey Filatov, chief of staff of the president of the Russian Federation, and he confirmed yet again that the Kremlin had no intention of revising its policy of isolation in respect to Chechnya.

[Ivanchikov] The release of Ruslan Khasbulatov from Lefortovo has made certain adjustments to the alignment of political forces in Chechnya. Could he become the new leader of the Chechen Republic?

[Mamadayev] Whatever you think of him, Ruslan Khasbulatov is undoubtedly a politician of world stature. He has both weight and authority in Chechnya. In addition, Khasbulatov comes from the most influential Chechen teyn—the Kharachay. But his political views are contrary to those that have been expressed by our people.



**NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA**  
**Explanation**

Boris Yeltsin once told Russia's regions to "Take as much sovereignty as you can." Chechnya took the maximum. Everyone knows full well what this has resulted in for it. The power structures of this republic were unable to agree among themselves, and one leader was forced to give way. This was Yaram Mamadayev. The other—General Dudayev—is, in fact, both the leader and master of Chechnya, although his authority has begun to decline as of late, and he can no longer count on full support at home. To hold on to power, therefore, he will evidently have to appeal increasingly for support, primarily to Moscow.

Considering the traditions of Chechen society, it has to be observed that the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic, as a supreme and undoubted value of the republic, may be determined only in the event of all the teyns being able to agree on this score. In addition, it is essential also to take account of the opinion of the Russians who live in Chechnya and who belong to no teyn.

Reflecting on the subject of the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic, the sociologist Abdurakhman Avtokhranov, another prominent representative of the Chechen people, observes: "Our people have never known statehood and have for this reason acted regardless of all states. They have always been intrepid for their self-preservation. Consequently, the self-preservation of the Chechen people is not made directly dependent on the acquisition of sovereignty and statehood. And the present Chechen politicians, in the republic or in exile, should take account of this fact also."

**Kabardino-Balkaria Agrarian Party Chief on Current Tasks**

944F0673A Nalchik KABARDINO-BALKARSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 94 p 5

[Interview with Chamal Mashevich Beslaneyev, chairman of the governing board of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic Organization of the Agrarian Party of Russia and past head of the Shalushkinskiy Sovkhoz, conducted by Z. Asin; date and place not given]

[Text] The Kabardino-Balkaria Republic Organization of the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) was created at the founding meeting in Nalchik recently. The party's Program and Rules were approved and appropriate corrections to account for the specifics of the region and the republic were made in these documents. The party was registered on 25 March. The new party's governing board was elected and its members included Z. Kh. Balkizov, chairman of the Germenchik Kolkhoz, M. M. Klevtsov, chairman of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkar Republic] State Land Committee, C. Z. Shavayev, his deputy, A. T. Kushkhov, the minister of agriculture and food, Z. M. Taov, the head of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food kolkhoz organizing department, K. S. Kuchmenov,

chairman of Agrosnab [Agricultural Supply System], V. I. Punarzh, chairman of the KBR Agrarian Union, and Z. Kh. Shogenov, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin in Chegemskiy Rayon. Ch. M. Beslaneyev, who headed the Shalushkinskiy Sovkhoz for the last several years, was elected chairman of the governing board.

**Our interview is about the motives for creating the new party and its goals and tasks.**

[Asin] Chamal Mashevich, the Agrarian Party headed by Lapshin is one of the most influential in Russia. As I understand it, you are a part of the all-Russian party of agrarians. What are the motives for creating this republic party?

[Beslaneyev] Yes, we are the republic, Kabardino-Balkaria Organization of the APR.

As for the second part of the question, I will say right away that we do not intend to "plug" the gaps in the political vacuum which once formed. It is now so overflowing with so many parties and movements of the most varied persuasions and all colors of the rainbow that not even a small niche left for another can be found in that space. The people are confused not only about their program documents but even their names. Fortunately, this boom has not hit our republic so hard.

The essence of the motives. The economic, political, and social standing of agriculture has been reduced to a critical point. The state has not implemented the so-called shock therapy as such in even one sector of the economy. If it were conducted in a decisive, well-considered, and sober manner, the state and the entire economy would have wakened and gotten going long ago.

In 1991 state social programs in rural areas were supported with budget financing at a level of 22 percent for housing construction, 31 percent for social-domestic objects, and 67 percent for roads. In 1992 less than half as much money was directed to the social sphere as in 1991. This past year the volume of capital investments in rural areas declined again by half as compared to 1992.

Because of the price "crunch" and the enormous state debts to kolkhozes and sovkhozes, rural residents, and they account for 26 percent of the entire population, live in extremely tough economic and domestic conditions. Proceeds for the output of fields and farms received by the treasuries of kolkhozes and sovkhozes fell short by more than 1.5 trillion rubles [R] and R800 billion worth of budget allocations. The state is buying agricultural output abroad while 35 percent of the rye from the harvest grown in Russia remains unsold, 67 percent of the vegetables, 76 percent of the long-stemmed flax, 24 percent of the animal fat, and 59 percent of the wool. It has become difficult to sell all types of grain, meat, and meat products in many regions.

[Asin] In our republic too, in my opinion. I have information on unsold meat at the meat combine and unclaimed first generation hybrid seeds in the republic's grain elevators.

[Beslaneyev] You are absolutely right. Here is one more example of how the peasant is really being robbed. Only 28 percent of the earnings from the sale of grain are left for the grain producers, while one-fifth goes to trade and 40 percent to grain receivers. The list of examples of excess being created in the agricultural complex would take up a great deal of time. Suffice it to mention that as a result of all this, a foundation has been laid for further degradation of agriculture. As of today, Agroprom [Agroindustry] is unable to ensure simple reproduction using its own resources.

So in these conditions, it has become urgently necessary to create a strong political party able to keep agriculture from breaking down for good.

[Asin] The appearance of such a political party which sets such goals is a gratifying thing. What ways do you see to achieve them?

[Beslaneyev] This would be the most reliable path: the diversity and equality of various forms of ownership and economic activity on land must be achieved and commercial reforms based on long-term scientific programs must be conducted on the state level. We support the priorities of development of the agroindustrial complex.

The primary task is overcoming the opinion which has become fixed in social consciousness that the peasantry is conservative and politically backward. They must take a proper place in society.

[Asin] What methods do you intend to use to achieve your goals?

[Beslaneyev] Only constitutional means and political methods. We intend to participate actively in elections to the state organs of power. We realize very clearly that only those who truly express the will of the majority can count on success and have this moral right. People have had enough populist slogans and unfulfilled and deliberately unfeasible promises. The rural laborer is tired of them.

In our work we will cooperate with other political parties, trade unions, and public movements and organizations.

[Asin] What will be the foundations of this cooperation?

[Beslaneyev] Cooperating with organizations and movements whose goals and tasks are close to ours as well as with power structures does not mean abandoning our program goals and tasks. We will follow them strictly. But we will begin from the need to unite the efforts of political parties, structures of parliament and executive power, and the healthy forces of society in the cause of uplifting and strengthening the agrarian sector and restoring the traditional way of life in the countryside.

We also take into account that our republic is largely an agrarian one and most of the population has rural roots. The countryside has been and continues to be the keeper of the national culture and traditions of the Kabardins, Balkars, and Cossacks.

[Asin] What do you consider the most important position, the most important question?

[Beslaneyev] There is perhaps no tougher or more fundamental question in our work than the question of land. The approach to resolving it cannot be the same even in conditions of different rayons within the republic itself. Even less acceptable is a mechanical transfer to Kabardino-Balkaria of models developed somewhere else. Our party supports the outright transfer of land parcels to ownership with the right of lifetime possession and bequest. But only to those who live and work on it or want to obtain it exclusively for production of agricultural output, horticulture, or gardening.

But at the same time, we are against haste in resolving the question of the free buying and selling of land. In the republic's conditions, this may lead to redistribution of land in favor of persons who have nothing to do with agricultural production and to unpredictable consequences. We must not allow land to become an object of speculation and enrichment of rich people. Yes, we are for the equality of multistructural forms of economic activity on the land. We believe that private farming must not be "under the thumb." But we must not go to extremes. For development of peasant (private) farms does not presuppose the mandatory suffocation of collective forms of economic activity on the land. But it is clear that in the present stage of the reforms in Agroprom, private farmers still cannot, as they say, feed the country. There are many reasons for this: we do not have the small equipment needed for small farms, the tax system is imperfect, and private farmers' relations with the processing enterprises are becoming extremely difficult. We must understand that the development of private farming, especially given the shortage of arable land, is the longest, most capital intensive, and most inefficient way. There are, of course, barriers of a psychological and professional nature. Already the first experiments have shown how the peasant farmer must be trained in many things. By no means is everyone ready for this now. If excesses triumph here, we risk sliding down the path of the inefficient, subsistence form of economic activity typical of underdeveloped countries.

[Asin] But is there other experience?

[Beslaneyev] We usually like to refer to the United States. In fact, the American agrarian sector is oriented to large market agricultural enterprises. This type of economic activity can be created on the base of kolkhozes and sovkhozes without large additional expenditures. I want to be understood correctly: There will be no obstacles to those private farmers who want to and in fact do everything necessary to use the land efficiently or to those for whom this difficult job is not a sideline but

their life's work. They can and will successfully coexist with other forms of labor organization. Large commodity producers will be no obstacle to them.

[Asin] Chamal Mashevich, what organizational plans does the party's governing board have?

[Beslaneyev] Anyone who is even a little tempted by this work understands that in the future we cannot do without a precise organizational structure. We are going to create our own cells in the villages from people who understand and sympathize with our ideas and program. Then will follow their joining into rayon organizations. It would probably be appropriate to stipulate that we do not plan to revive a communist-oriented party. We have precise practical goals where the economic and social orientation predominates.

But for now we face the work of explaining our Rules and Program. I believe that we have already taken the first step in this direction with this conversation. We see clearly that without detailed knowledge and a sense of the problems bothering rural residents we will not rally people around us.

The Agrarian Party will work hard to preserve the republic's integrity and indoctrinate the rising generation in the best traditions of our peoples. We are not striving for self-isolation; our program includes close cooperation with all branches of power, with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, and with elected and management organs. In defending the interests of rural commodity producers, we will rely on solid knowledge of the state of affairs in local areas.

[Asin] To judge from the makeup of the APR governing board, there is good potential for this. In my opinion, a solid "team" has been chosen, one able to create a party which in terms of size is a mass party and in terms of quality a competent one. I sincerely wish you well, may you have success in your work, and thank you for the interview.

### **Krasnodar Takes Extraordinary Measures To Fight Crime**

944F0649B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
29 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Andrey Aderekhin, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "Extraordinary Measures for Combatting Crime Introduced in Kuban"]

[Text] The decree of the head of administration, "On Extraordinary Measures for Combatting Crime," has been introduced into operation in Krasnodar Kray. The preamble of the document states that the criminal situation which has arisen in the kray creates a real threat to political, economic and social transformations.

By coincidence, on the eve of the appearance of the decree, Krasnodar had buried four victims of crime. Two

men in masks had broken into the jewelry store "Zhemchug," and shot the salesgirl, a customer and the duty militiaman with an automatic weapon. Another woman was wounded by a stray bullet. During the ensuing chase and gun battles which took place in crowded places, one more militia worker was killed. Later, during the capture of the robbers, one of them was killed... According to the decree, the internal affairs agencies must significantly increase the density and mobility of units of the militia patrol-duty service.

Among the measures introduced were operations for preventing and curtailing the activity of armed groups, as well as a set of measures for maintaining the safety of citizens in places of possible inter-ethnic conflicts.

The document devoted much attention to outsiders. Those who violate the public order will be deported outside the boundaries of the kray. Anyone who is not carrying documents shall be detained and placed in receiving-distributing centers until their identity can be established.

Some measures are extraordinary. Thus, the agencies of the tax police, if they are unable to collect taxes due to the budget and other mandatory payments, receive the right to impose administrative arrest (seizure) of the property of legal persons and individuals and to later sell it through auctions.

Juveniles are also not overlooked. It has been decided "to limit the presence of minors under 16 years of age in public places after 10:00 p.m. without their parents or persons acting in lieu of them."

One of the points of the decree is an innovation, although the mechanism of its realization has not yet been explained. "In necessary cases, to provide for the allocation of facilities for the temporary residence of persons who have become victims of domestic violence, to create publicly funded counselling centers for provision of legal and other aid to citizens in the resolution of social-domestic conflicts."

Aside from the internal affairs agencies, military servicemen of the internal troops and Cossack social organizations will also be involved in the fight against crime. The heads of the law enforcement agencies have been told to implement organizational measures for utilizing the capacities the kray's radio and television broadcasting network for emergency transmission of current announcements.

Citizens who report the whereabouts of especially dangerous criminals who have committed or are planning to commit serious crimes will be given a monetary reward in the amount of up to 5 million rubles (R).

The extraordinary measures, the need for which Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin pointed out during his recent visit to Kuban, shall remain in effect up until 1 October of this year.



**Bryansk Oblast Duma Begins Work**

944F0660A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
27 Apr 94 p 2

[Report by Petr Polonitskiy under the rubric "Provinces": "Bryansk Oblast Duma Began Its Work: Seats Divided Between Agrarians and Local Authorities"]

[Text] Bryansk—On a second attempt, the Bryansk Oblast Duma has convened its first session. Elections to the new representative body took place in six out of nine three-mandate districts in the Bryansk region. There were 150 contenders for 27 seats in the oblast duma. The greatest activism was shown by voters in rural districts—it was thanks to them that 18 candidates got their mandates. Voters in the three districts in the oblast center did not turn out in the numbers needed to make up the required 25 percent that would make the elections valid, and have lost their representation in the duma.

Of those elected, 50 percent are agrarians, and the rest are members of the executive branch from a rayon to oblast level. The statute on elections to the oblast duma envisages that one-third of the deputies will work full-time; however, so far not a single deputy of the current term has dared to leave his administrative or directive job and become a professional politician. Deputies will consider the question of temporary rules for the oblast duma, elect a chairman and his deputy, and form permanent committees.

**Bryansk Oblast Notes Rise in Cancer Cases**

944F0660B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
28 Apr 94 p 9

[Report by Petr Polonitskiy: "The Catastrophe Reminds of Itself: The Incidence of Cancer Is on the Rise in Bryansk Oblast"]

[Text] Bryansk—Over the eight years since Chernobyl, there had been an increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer in Bryansk Oblast. Over seven years before the accident, 111 cases of thyroid cancer had been registered in the oblast. Today the statistics show 546 cases. The incidence of this disease increased annually at a rate of 70 percent, while for other types of cancer this indicator was only 1.5-2.0 percent. Specialists associate the onslaught of thyroid cancer with the radiation the population had been subjected to during the first days of the catastrophe, when information about the tragedy was carefully kept under wraps and local party bosses led the people out to the May Day demonstration. Workers solidarity has cost the Bryansk region residents dearly: The radiation background in some areas of Bryansk Oblast reached 200 microrentgen an hour.

Currently the oblast administration takes steps to provide social protection for those who were affected during the catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. However, it is also time for the federal authorities to pay their debts, which currently amount to about R50 billion.

**Sverdlovsk Approves Demonopolization Program**

944F0649A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
22 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Irina Vladykina: "Monopolists Are Told to Restructure; Program for Demonopolization of the Economy Adopted in Central Urals"]

[Text] The list of monopolist enterprises of Sverdlovsk Oblast includes around 300 names, and continues to be replenished with new enterprises in those spheres of economics and business to which the Sverdlovsk territorial administration of the State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support of New Economic Structures has cast its glance. The railroad, electrical power production and communications occupy the leading and strongest place in this register. The oblast anti-monopoly administration has recently filed four claims in court against just the Sverdlovsk Railroad and its sections.

The program of demonopolization adopted at the meeting of the Sverdlovsk Oblast government is called upon to stop unfair competition, limit monopolistic activity, and protect consumer rights. It is intended for a period of two years. But, as the chief of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Anti-Monopoly Administration, Nikolay Uzhegov, noted, demonopolization, judging by all, will be a more prolonged process.

Such criteria as scientific and legal justification, socio-economic effectiveness of enterprises and their controllability and manageability were selected as basis of the program. Democracy, openness and a consideration of public opinion were proclaimed as the principles for the program's realization.

The program on demonopolization of the economy of Sverdlovsk Oblast includes numerous measures, which are grouped into nine blocks. Particular attention is focused on developing competition on the commodity markets in the sphere of scientific-technical progress, in trade, public catering, and consumer services. The program also defines its priorities—provision for the development of commodity markets in the sector, support of small and medium-sized enterprise, control and regulation of state monopolies, prevention of the emergence of various subjects which occupy a dominant position in the economy, as well as the deconsolidation of such monopolist enterprises, if this is economically justified and expedient.

Aside from the territorial administration, a special commission has been formed in Yekaterinburg in order to implement control over the realization of the program on demonopolization of the economy. It will include various representatives of the administrative agencies, entrepreneurial structures, scientists and specialists. The commission will not have authoritative powers and authorities. Its activity must have an advisory character.

### Parliamentary Assassination Suspect Held

944F0660C Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
28 Apr 94 p 2

[Report by Dmitriy Lukashov under the rubric "Terrorism": "One of the Murderers of the Deputy Chairman of Bashkiria's Supreme Soviet Detained: He Is a Republic Parliament Deputy"]

[Text] Kazan—At a session of the Bashkiria Supreme Soviet that took place on 26 April in Ufa, deputies stripped their colleague—Valerik Talipov—from immunity from prosecution.

The Bashkiria Procuracy suspects him of murdering Ravil Musin, head of the city of Dyurtyul and Dyurtyulinskiy rayon administrations, who also served as a volunteer deputy chairman of the republic parliament; he died some time ago from the explosion of a grenade attached to a wicket at his home.

After Musin's death, Talipov assumed the former's duties. Some time later he was dismissed for "shortcomings in his work" and went on to become the director of Dyurtyulinskiy meat combine, where he worked until lately.

According to a version of the investigation, Talipov participated in a criminal conspiracy to kill Musin by hiring a contract killer. The suspect is under arrest. Investigation continues.

### Chelyabinsk Acquires New Communications Network

944F0661A Chelyabinsk *CHELYABINSKIY RABOCHIY* in Russian 14 Mar 94 p 5

[Article by V. Kosolapov, Chelyabinsk: "My Radio Telephone Started Ringing: a Modern Communications Network System Has Been Created in Chelyabinsk"]

[Text] "If you want to, we can call a foreign country. Would you like to call Germany, for example?" My conversational partner picked up a touch-tone telephone with a short antenna, and quickly ran his fingers over the keyboard: about twenty seconds later, I could hear coming from the other end of the line the voice of a woman who was speaking in German. The audibility was excellent, just as though we were not thousands of kilometers apart: there was no interference, no noise, or crackling.

"The automatic international responder," it was explained to me, "tells whom to call, how to call him, where to go for advice or the necessary information.."

Possibly for a businessman in Hamburg or North Rhine-Westphalia this is an everyday occurrence—communication with a subscriber located even a tremen-

dous distance away, almost instantaneously—but I, a person unspoiled by domestically produced communications equipment, perceived everything that happened as a minor technical miracle. Obviously I had seen radio telephones, which practically every militiaman carries nowadays, and, in addition, important managers have been installing them for many years in their official cars, but I myself did not have any contact with this kind of progress.

"Now everyone who concludes a contract with our organization will have the opportunity to become a subscriber to the mobile radio telephone system," A. B. Blinov, technical director of the Radiotelefon AO [joint-stock company] says. "Today I signed an official order concerning the completion of preliminary tests, and a week or two will go into bringing the entire complex to a steady, stable state, and in late April we shall begin working at full strength."

But how does the mobile radio telephone communications system operate? The Chelyabinsk system has two main centers: one is situated in the oblast radio teletransmitting center, and the other in Metallurgicheskii Rayon, in the ATS-21 [dial telephone station No. 21] building. Relay communications have been installed between them. Both centers are switched into the city, long-distance, and international automatic-dialing system. Therefore there will be no problems in reaching a subscriber located anywhere on the planet. Calls have already been made to the United States, Finland, and even Australia, without any problems. And I myself could talk to Germany, if there was anyone I wanted to talk to.

Incidentally, the city network is not limited for the radio telephone to the territory of Chelyabinsk. The signal extends to a radius of 30 kilometers from the telecommunications tower and gets as far as Kopeysk and many suburban settlements and villages. Simultaneously with this, the telephone can be extremely selective. It can connect with just one mobile-communications subscriber, if that is what you want. Provision has also been made for other services, which we previously have not even dreamed of: you can indicate the number of a subscriber from whom you do not want to get calls, and he will not be able to connect with you. If what you need is only one-sided communication, you can make the call, or if not, there is nothing complicated about this—that is how it will be. If you are talking too long, the telephone will indicate to you at the proper time that your money is running out...

Chelyabinsk is the fourth city in Russia where a mobile radio telephone system has been created. A year ago the system was activated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, then, quite recently, in Nizhniy Novgorod. The fact that our city proved to be among the pioneers in the communications sphere is definitely not accidental. For many years the oblast center has housed the Scientific-Research Institute of Measurement Technology (NIIT)

previously was kept extremely classified and which specialized in developing electronic systems for the navy, aviation, and space travel. Hence the high proficiency level of its workers, and their initiative and ability to make contact with their partners. The basis of the Radiotelefon AO, which is headed by V. O. Lenkevich, is made up of people from NIIIT. Also, many production orders for the manufacture of equipment are also executed by former work associates.

However, the main supplier of the modern technology is the Swedish Ericson company. The first consignment of equipment was delivered from Scandinavia in January. A month later five more tons of freight arrived. Simultaneously, the installation workers arrived, and, incidentally, not all of them are necessarily Swedes. Currently, for example, two people are working here: one is from Malaysia, and the other is from Mexico. They have not yet become fluent in Russian, but they have watched the "Simply Mariya" television series and have suffered through a lot with the characters.

The first phase of the system is planned for 2000 subscribers, and the maximum capacity is 12,000. The experience gained by foreign countries indicates that, on the average, in an ordinary city one percent of the people use mobile telephone communications. The capacities that the Radiotelefon AO is proposing for Chelyabinsk are apparently completely adequate. Although it is difficult to know: in Finland, the country in the world that is most densely saturated with radio telephone communications, three percent of the population prefer mobile communications.

In our oblast the new system, it seems to me, has rather good prospects: currently the NIIIT specialists are working on the introduction of radio telephone service in Miass. The telecommunications tower possibilities have been studied, and contracts have been concluded with enterprises, including such an important one as UralAZ. According to the plan, the installation of the equipment will begin at the end of the second quarter. The reception zone will include the city of Chebarkul, and all the sanatoriums situated in its environs. In parallel with this, preparatory work is under way to introduce mobile communications in Magnitogorsk. Whoever possesses modern communications, possesses the world...

#### **Novokuznetsk 1993 Socioeconomic Figures Cited**

944F0661B Novokuznetsk KUZNETSKIY RABOCHIY  
in Russian 29 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by S. Pautova, under rubric "Economic Survey":  
"Cut Your Coat According to the Cloth..."]

[Text] Today we are publishing the latest in a series of articles based on data provided in the "Memorandum Concerning the Basic Results of the Economic and Social Development of the City of Novokuznetsk in 1993," which was prepared by T. B. Balakirev, chief of the Department

#### **of Forecasts For the Development of the City, of the Novokuznetsk city administration's Committee for the Economy.**

The results of the work performed by enterprises in the services sphere largely formed the components of the concept "cost of life" in our city. The volume of personal services in comparable prices constituted 35-40 percent of the 1992 level.

The increase in the prices of thermal and electrical power and the rental of spaces, and the high taxes and credit rates, led to a situation in which, out of 41 enterprises in the personal services sphere, almost one-third operated at a loss. In order to survive, they engaged in commercial activity and rented out their spaces.

The cost of paid services in our city during the past year rose considerably. This is how the dynamics of the increase in the payment for services looked for various types of them: the cost of repairing a television set rose, as compared with 1992, by a factor of 8; a refrigerator, a factor of 14; a watch, a factor of 11; and furniture, also by a factor of 11. The services involved in making custom-made clothing became definitely inaccessible for many people. Whereas the cost of making a woman's dress in January 1993 in our city was 4100 rubles, in December that cost was 39,708 rubles, and the cost of making an overcoat was, respectively, 11,596 and 87,600 rubles.

The section "Foreign-Economic Activity" evokes interest. Five percent of the output produced by the city's enterprises was used by the administration to satisfy citywide needs. This is how the currency proceeds were distributed during the year that elapsed. The city, jointly with the coal workers, purchased medicines with a total value of \$100,000. An additional \$5000 was spent to purchase seven motor buses in Hamburg (West Germany).

The city spent some of the funds on communications equipment: telex equipment, an information network for law-enforcement agencies, and for equipment for a new telephone system with 20,000 numbers (a contract dealing with its construction has been signed with the Italian Italtel company). A total of \$417,000 and 580,000 marks were spent for these purposes.

A machine to remove the asphalt surface of roads cost \$342,000. A \$200,000 contract will make it possible to open at the Novokuznetsk Bread Products Combine a shop for producing vegetable oil.

We shall end this article with information about social policy, with figures and facts pertaining to this section of the work that was carried out in 1993.

The administration's Committee on Social Policy worked in such basic areas as the execution of measures in the program entitled "The Social Protection of the Population of the City of Novokuznetsk in 1993"; the decentralization of pensions and grants in aid in the city;



and the creation of a system of social assistance centers and structures carrying out the social support of the population.

The committee expended a total of 915.2 million rubles during the year to execute the program entitled "The Social Protection of the Population of the City of Kuznetsk in 1993." On what items was this money spent? It was spent on the work performed by the center for social assistance to the public; the decentralization of the payment of pensions; meals for schoolchildren; additional payments to children up to the age of one year for food (milk kitchens); additional payments for municipal services, radio, the payment of preferential trip tickets to rest homes; the conducting of holiday celebrations; the maintenance of the nursing care home and the social hospital; and the maintenance of the orphanage.

More than 18,000 city dwellers received material assistance last year: from retirees to children in single-parent homes. In addition to direct material assistance, the system of welfare payments is widespread: welfare payments for apartment rent and services, for medical treatment and rest, to purchase fuel in the private sector, and to pay for radio services.

In 1993 the city opened institutions for the rendering of emergency social assistance. Those institutions include a social shelter for children from 3 to 14 years of age who need shelter before being returned to their family or being admitted at children's institutions for permanent residence. Throughout the year, more than 200 children were taken in at the shelter.

There appeared a social hotel for women, single mothers with children, and refugees with children. The hotel accepted more than 50 persons.

Social assistance centers appeared in the city's rayons (effective 1 August 1993, they were put into a separate structure). The "Telephone of Trust" social-psychological telephone hot line was in operation. The need for that hot line is attested to by the number of calls: more than 200 a month.

Only one item in the city's social program remained unfulfilled: because of a lack of nonbudgetary funds, retirees from budget-financed and eliminated organizations did not receive their lump-sum grant in aid.

#### **Novokuznetsk 1993 Demographic, Health Figures Cited**

944F0661C *Novokuznetsk KUZNETSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 29 Mar 94 p 2*

[Article by S. Pautova, under rubric "City Life in Facts and Figures": "We Have Not Begun Hurting Less"]

[Text] Today we are continuing the series of articles based on data provided in the "Memorandum Concerning the Basic Results of the Economic and Social Development of the City of Novokuznetsk in 1993," which was prepared

by T. B. Balakirev, chief of the Department of Forecasts For the Development of the City, of the Committee for the Economy.

It is necessary to begin by stating that the indicators pertaining to the health level for the city's population are unsatisfactory and have a tendency toward further worsening. Wherein does this manifest itself?

Last year the mortality rate in our city was 15.5 cases per 1000 inhabitants. As compared with 1992, that indicator rose by 26.6 percent. The average age of persons who died was 54 years among men and 66 years among women. In Zavodskoy Rayon those indicators are, respectively, 51 and 63 years. Our men die 15 years earlier than the average life expectancy for the country as a whole, and women die 5 years earlier.

Among those who died, one-third were persons of working age. For a number of reasons, the disorders that take first place among the deaths are cardiovascular diseases; in second place, traumas and poisonings; and in third place, neoplasms (that is, cancer diseases). Among the second category of causes of deaths, murders and suicides constitute a considerable percentage (40 percent of the people who died underwent an autopsy).

The indicator for the infant mortality rate rose last year, as compared with 1992, by 6 percent, and constituted 19.9 cases out of 1000 live births. But the birth rate indicator dropped to 8.09 per 1000 women of child-bearing age. The negative natural increase in the population increased to 14 percent.

An additional problem is the disability rate. In 1993 the VTEK [Medical Commission for Determination of Disability] certified 5364 persons (almost 300 more than in 1992), and recognized 5292 persons as being disabled; this is 11 percent more than the previous year. Out of every 10,000 persons, 33 retire on disability for the first time. In Kuznetskiy Rayon that indicator is equal to 34.7.

Among the reasons why people retire on disability, diseases are in first place; in second place, disability since childhood; and in third place, occupational diseases and industrial injuries. One observes a tendency toward an increase in the degree of severity of the disability: there has been an increasing number of persons in Group I and II.

The number of recorded disorders, both primary and chronic, in connection with which the city dwellers sought medical assistance in 1993 remained at practically the same level. However, the indicator of the overall disease rate increased, and constitutes 772.5 cases out of 1000 persons in the population (as compared with 1992, the increase constitutes 10.5 percent). Consequently, many persons with chronic disorders do not seek assistance.

The rate of diseases and disorders among children increased.

As for the structure of the disorder rate among adults, one continues to note an increase in disorders of the cardiovascular system, traumas, diseases of the osteo-muscular system, and the respiratory organs. Pathology of the respiratory organs is in first place percentage-wise.

It must be noted that, in addition to everything else, the city dwellers sought assistance at cooperatives and from physicians in private practice. This information was not taken into consideration during the analysis.

As for the rate of disorders among workers at industrial enterprises, one noted an increase in it: by 5.2 percent in the number of cases, and by 8.19 in the number of days. The highest level of the disorder rate was noted in the coal industry. In general, however, workers in the city's enterprises most frequently suffered from colds, traumas, and diseases of the osteomuscular system.

The imagination is staggered by the number of visits to clinics: 6.5 million. On average, each city dweller has 10.5 visits a year (in 1992, there were 10.39).

More than 144,000 residents of the city and the oblast received inpatient treatment at hospitals in the city of Novokuznetsk (which is almost 6000 more than in 1992); and 48,134 surgical interventions were carried out.

The Medical First-Aid and Emergency Station operated under more strained conditions than in 1992, responding to 192,794 calls, or 18,500 more than in 1992. The structure of the calls made there continues to be the same: 73 percent were calls involving diseases; 11 percent of the calls dealt with accidents; and 1.3 percent of the calls dealt with childbirth.

## **Tyumen Oblast Duma Holds Plenary Session**

### **Chairman, Deputies Elected**

944F0688A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 7 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by V. Snisarenko: "Tyumen Oblast Gets Its Duma"]

[Text] It is specifically a duma, since according to the proposal of the organizational committee the deputies were offered two names for the supreme representative body of state power in Tyumen Oblast—the oblast duma or the legislative assembly. The deputies chose the oblast duma by a majority of votes.

And now let us proceed in order. The meeting of the oblast supreme body was called to order by the chairman of the organizational committee, A. Kayumov. All 17 elected deputies were present, along with the head of the oblast administration L. Roketskiy, his deputies, representatives of the Yamalo-Nenetsk and Khanty-Mansi Okrugs, the representative of the RF [Russian Federation] President, G. Shcherbakov, members of the former

oblast Minor Soviet, and representatives of the mass media and the trade union organs.

Prior to the election of the chairman of the Tyumen Oblast Duma, the meeting was conducted by Deputy S. Kirichuk.

On its first day of work, the duma heard the report of A. Zhikharev, chairman of the oblast electoral commission.

The duma ratified the temporary regulations of the representative body of state power for Tyumen Oblast, the Statute on the Representative Body of Oblast Power—the Oblast Duma.

After the recess, the deputies undertook a review of the most interesting question on the agenda—the election of the oblast duma chairman and his deputies.

We must note that the proposal presented by Deputy A. Korelyakov to elect the duma chairman on a non-fulftime basis and to reduce the technical apparatus of the oblast duma to a proportion of one to one, with the number of apparatus workers equalling the number of deputies, was rejected.

However, another proposal presented by this same deputy was passed—that of introducing an amendment to Article 4 of the Statute on the Representative Body of State Power in Tyumen Oblast—the Oblast Duma. This amendment stated that a deputy has the right to obtain any information in the oblast and federal organs of executive power and the ability to bring this information to his voters.

By the results of the fourth round of voting, Nikolay Pavlovich Baryshnikov, the deputy head of administration of Khanty-Mansi Okrug, was elected chairman of the Tyumen Oblast Duma.

At the suggestion of the new chairman of the oblast duma, Vladimir Nikolayevich Tretyakov was elected as his deputy.

A detailed account of the first day's work will be presented in the next issue.

### **Work of Duma Detailed**

944F0688B Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 8 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Snisarenko: "Potential of the Duma Is High: The Paramount Question: 'How To Realize It?'" ]

[Text] As we have already reported, the first plenary meeting of the representative body of state power in Tyumen Oblast was held, and the deputies chose to call themselves the "oblast duma" (only 5 of the 17 deputies voted for the name "legislative assembly").

I believe that the motivation of Deputy V. Yudin regarding unity of the Russian land was well argued: There is a state duma in the capital of the

Russian Federation, so then why should every oblast or kray think up its own specific name?!

I also believe that Tyumen residents who are southerners should not react painfully to the election of northerners as the duma chairman and his deputy—N. Baryshnikov and V. Tretyakov. They are not northerners above all, but rather they are Tyumen residents first and foremost. In their very first brief speeches, both spoke primarily about unity of the oblast and about those pressing problems which the oblast duma is capable of solving only by being united.

The speech "on results of work," presented by the head of administration of Tyumen Oblast was also in the same vein. Specifically, L. Roketskiy synonymously emphasized that he sees the new duma as the main body of state power in the oblast, and that it is necessary to speak not so much about the natural and necessary separation of powers as about the parity of responsibility for the fate of the oblast's present and future.

"You have been elected from the entire territory, and this in itself is a guarantee of its unity. Let us serve Tyumen Oblast together!", said the governor.

We should mention also the farewell speech of the ex-speaker of our former soviet, V. Ulyanov, in which he noted most correctly that Tyumen Oblast was that region of Russia where, fortunately, the transfer of power from the "old" soviets to the new duma took place painlessly and in a civilized manner.

And now allow me to express certain strictly matter-of-fact and specific notions about what I expect from our duma and... what can be expected of it. At the same time, returning to the headline of the present material, I will emphasize once again that I believe the domestic potential of our oblast parliament to be really high. And it is not at all frightening that we see there a rather multi-layered "administrative stratification." Just as strong is another stratification—"first hand" economic managers, and next to them are teachers and doctors (I only regret once again that no representatives of higher education were elected to the duma).

Yes! One could sense that at its first session, some of the regional heads in the duma "looked askance" in the direction of their chief to whom they were directly subordinate. But I will also say that L. Roketskiy himself immediately and in rather strict form put a stop to their efforts at "consulting" and "sharing opinions."

Yes! One could sense that the economic managers who had won their relative independence tried already at the first meeting to stage a cavalry charge against the executive power. That happened too...

But I believe—and hope!—that this is merely the price of development and growth. Our duma members must realize the main thing: They must not follow the lead of the executive power in trying to patch up the holes in our

badly torn coat. Rather, they must think about how to sew a new strong one which will last a long time—that is their task!

And this task is not an easy one. It is tremendously difficult. Especially since very little time has been left for it—some year-and-a-half or two. And if the "first convocation" of the duma proves unable to cope with the main task of waging a mental attack on the slogan, "For our bright future!", then it will not be able to break the ground for those who come to replace it in 1996, when we—well, we simply must!—will have to not simply follow the path of reform, but will finally have to see its positive results.

A colossal weight of responsibility is being placed today on the "full-time" leaders of the duma, N. Baryshnikov and V. Tretyakov. We do not envy them. God forbid that they become regular stately bureaucrats of a new model! It is they who will determine today how strongly and effectively the work regimen of duma activity will be organized, and I stress this last word. It is they who must reorganize the technical apparatus which we have inherited from yesterday's soviet into a highly productive instrument for the realization of the thoughts and ideas of the deputies, or more precisely, the members of the new duma.

I am not speaking now of trifles, such as when at the first meeting "every and all" were crowded, perspiring, into a little hall, where it was difficult to hear some of the speeches because there were not enough microphones.

We are speaking of something else. What we need are not blind executors, but a system of analysts which most fruitfully organizes and realizes the ideas and thoughts of the duma members. I may even be so bold as to equate these two forces—the duma itself and its new apparatus. If this does not happen, then the duma will spin its wheels in place...

It is enough to give at least a cursory review of the plan for the duma's standard-setting activity: Here we have that very same draft of the Tyumen Oblast Charter and its Administrative Code, other codes—land and water and statutes on the national settlement and local self-government. We cannot list them all, but these questions may be resolved only in a creative manner, and with a scrupulously pragmatic and rational approach.

After all, that same "administrator" V. Bugayev was correct in his "farewell" criticism of V. Ulyanov, when he cited the latter's lack of preparation in regard to the totally unclear mechanism for realization of the last message of the Minor Soviet addressed to the RF Federal Assembly. Let us consider this criticism as the first sign of efficiency in the work of our Tyumen Oblast Duma which has just begun.



**Northwestern Russian Cities' Union Petitions Yeltsin**

944F0670A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 23 Apr 94 p 1

[Open Letter to the Russian Federation President, adopted in Kirov at a meeting of the Union of Cities of Northwest Russia, carried under the headline: "Oh, the Governors Are Stern!"; date of letter not given]

[Text] Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich!

In the past three-four months the heads of administration of such big Russian cities as Omsk, Saratov, Vladivostok and Nizhniy Novgorod have been removed from office. The circumstances of their removal were various, but in every case it took place under pressure from the oblast governor. A standard set of accusations was made against practically every one of them: attacks on the oblast administration, the collapse of Russian statehood, links with the opponents of reform, corruption, a one-time flagrant violation of job duties, etc.

The same sort of situation is emerging today in a number of other cities.

We are very much concerned by the fact that the people leaving their work are honest, decent people who are deeply concerned over the interests of their cities and have actively defended the rights of local government established by the Russian Constitution and guaranteed by your edicts.

The main thing is that the dismissals were not preceded by objective checkups on the work of the heads of city administrations, they received no written explanations, the grounds for their removal were not examined in any commissions, and some of them were denied the right to the personal meeting with the Russian president that is guaranteed by your edicts.

Today most governors are doing everything they can to subordinate local government to themselves, which is directly contrary with Article 12 and Chapter 8 of the Russian Constitution. Those who resist this are either dismissed or leave on their own accord.

One gets the impression that local government is a fiction and is not needed by the federal authorities, although we are convinced that local government is, in an objective sense, an ally of the Russian president and the central authorities in the political and economic reform of our country and protection of the public's interests.

Esteemed president! We propose that you:

1. Take local government under your protection and guardianship.
2. Meet with the representatives of the unions and associations of Russia's cities.

3. Speed up the drafting of normative acts delimiting the jurisdiction of the bodies of state authority of the Federation's components, on the one hand, and of local government, on the other.
4. When heads of administration are removed from office, schedule elections for heads of local government with multiple-candidates.
5. On the basis of petitions by heads of administration who have been removed from office, carry out checkups and publish their results.

Adopted at a meeting of the Union of Cities of Northwest Russia in Kirov.

**From the Editors**

V. Pyshkin, executive director of the Union of Cities of Northwest Russia, asked us to publish this letter to the RF president. In satisfying his request, we refrain from any commentary on the positions of the letter's authors and their assessment of the cases of the removal of the heads of administration of big Russian cities, which really have become more frequent. Here it is necessary, as the saying goes, to look into each specific case. We would like only to recall the article of the Constitution that is cited by the participants in the meeting of the cities of Northwest Russia: "... Local government is autonomous within the limits of its powers. Bodies of local government do not belong to the system of bodies of state authority." And while it is in the embryonic stage, as it were, it would probably make a lot of sense for the president to take it "under his protection and guardianship."

**Chuvash Government Works Out 'Program of People's Reform'**

944F0670B Moscow *KOMMERSANT-DAILY*  
in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Afrikan Solovyev and Galina Pechilina: "President of Chuvashia Does Not Get Into Conflict With the Agrarian Lobby"]

[Text] After the federal center got over the fever of drawing up economic programs at the beginning of 1990, the Russian provinces fell ill with program-creating. Lately *KOMMERSANT* experts have been predicting a sharp increase in the activeness of local authorities in seeking various options for getting out of the economic crisis. In this connection, the question of the powers of local political elites will be raised anew. This past weekend Chuvashia, where the local press published the theses of a "Program of Popular Reform," made itself known.

Interest in the program has to do with the identity of the consultants who took part in drafting it. In addition to the president's economic advisers, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov and Sergey Glazyev, head of the parliamentary Committee on Economic Policy, as well as

Viktor Kisin, the former minister of industry in Ivan Silayev's government (and now Chuvashia's representative to Russia's highest bodies of state administration), the program was prepared by specialists from the Russian government's Center for Informational and Social Technologies (its director Yevgeniy Saburov became the "main reformer" in Crimea's government), and the Export-Import Bank, which is the Chuvash government's financial agent.

Noting the complexity of the republic's socioeconomic situation, Nikolay Fedorov (former minister of justice in the governments of Ivan Silayev and Yegor Gaydar) wrote an item in the press on behalf of the authors and attributed this complexity not only to reasons that are typical of Russia—inflation, the decline in production, the shortage of working capital—but also to distinctive features of Chuvashia that have deepened its economic crisis. Among these he included the lack of a clearly defined economic specialization, a sizeable proportion of production facilities that are subject to defense-industry conversion, a labor surplus, agrarian overpopulation, the high unit-cost of production, and the underdevelopment of the market infrastructure. Fedorov defined his objective somewhat uniquely: "The coming years will be years of gathering money in order that afterwards there will really be something to give out." Many people believe that hidden behind these words lies an announcement of the introduction of a regime of strict economy in the republic. The financial creed of the Chuvash government has been announced more candidly: "Not to give in to pressure from the people that is irresponsible in terms of the future."

As for relations with Moscow, Fedorov did not show any particular originality in noting the need to renovate them, which was supposed to have been provided for in the treaty with Russia on the delimitation of powers and subjects of jurisdiction.

Implementation of the program will be carried out on the basis of individual subprograms. In particular, there is a proposal for joint actions among Russia's republics and the CIS countries to establish an international bank and clearing system, as well as several joint concerns in the form of financial and industrial groups. In addition, it is planned to establish, on the basis of Chuvashia's enterprises, five or six model concerns that will be assigned the role of being the locomotive of a fundamentally new economic system in the republic—"an industrial-agrarian type in combination with small and medium-sized private enterprises." The partners of participants in this program will be determined through international, federal and republic investment competitions. An incentive for successful implementation of the idea will be the condition that after two or three years of effective work a firm's original property and newly created property, including land, will be transferred to collective or private ownership. Touching on issues of privatization, Fedorov expressed a rather populist support for making active adjustments in it: "We cannot be pleased by a practice of privatization as the result of which we

get, in place of monopolistic prices, supermonopolistic prices; instead of an increase in the efficiency of production, a decline or total collapse of production; and instead of an increase in budget revenues, a drastic decrease in revenues." As a matter of fact, the "privatization" part of the program is limited to that.

It is interesting that, against a backdrop of rather liberal statements, the program declares that, under the conditions of a republic that is small in terms of land, private farming is not promising; reliance is being placed on well-organized collective farms. Thus, through the example of Chuvashia, we can see the vanity of any attempts to smash the colossus of the agrarian lobby, which opposes the least disturbance of the status quo in land relations.

#### **Economic, Social Problems of Arctic Region Small Nations Viewed**

944F0674A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 May 94 p 2

[Article by Irina Pirogova: "Drums Are Pounding in My Heart: Future of Small Ethnic Groups of the North Endangered"]

[Text] Anadir-Uzlen-Buktha Provideniya- Moscow—Not so long ago I caught sight of an issue of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS which contained an article by the writer Valeriy Povolyayev entitled "Why Do the Chukchi Have Russian Names?" I read it carefully because I spent my school years on Chukotka and I have been there on business trips. This opus left me with a wild impression. The former Soviet writer, ex-secretary of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR and an activist in the Komsomol-Youth and other widespread publications, retells from the words of his dinner partner a couple of old anecdotes about residents of the North. For instance, about the fact that a representative of the local authorities when filling out passports, not being terribly bright, filled in all of them with names like Ivan Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov, etc., and a photographer who was no better pasted photographs of one person in all the documents—he said they all looked the same.

Funny, is it not? Especially when you find out that the writer's friend was talking about Koryaks, who live, as we know, on Kamchatka, while the article made no mention at all of Chukchi. Is it worthwhile to waste paper and ink on such a "myth"? The answer, which is simple for any self-respecting writer, is not only not acceptable to Povolyayev but, on the contrary, he tries to capitalize on other people's anecdotes, as it were, cutting himself a piece of ham from the overall swinishness. Hence the attempt to appear as one who tells "pretty tales" about international friendship supposedly generated by the "empire of evil," from which Povolyayev broke away, after being treated extremely well there, again in the name of the triumph of democracy.

I was inclined to remain silent. Let God be his judge. But my pain over the fate of that wonderful land to which I had come so close, its small and adult children, would

not leave me in peace all this time. As for the friendship of peoples, which is now threatening to become anathema, we would do better to listen to the writer Yuriy Rytkeu.

"I recall a case from my childhood," said Rytkeu. "In 1940 an unprecedented flu epidemic broke out among us in Uzlen, and at that time the Northern peoples were not so protected. We were all in bed in our tepees. There was nobody to go hunting. And we had nothing with which to buy food. We were already eating cooked strips of leather, pieces of walrus hide. And suddenly some incredible news spread through our tepees: Everyone could go to the store and take food, whatever he needed and however much he wanted. Absolutely free of charge. At first nobody believed this, and then somebody decided to go and see. I went too. It all turned out to be true. To this day I get a lump in my throat when I recall this.

"The country was at war. Leningrad, besieged by the enemy, was under a blockade. The entire working rear was on a starvation ration, and suddenly the store in Uzlen was opened wide and we were taking bread baked by the Russian baker Uncle Kolya from an unmanned store, without a salesman. Perhaps it was this bread that saved my compatriot Anna Ntutetegryne, who later became chairman of the Chukotka district ispolkom [executive committee] and a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And my sister Galya, who is working as an animal breeder. And myself, whose first teacher of literature was Aleksandr Tvardovskiy. And many others of my countrymen... Yuriy and Galina Rytkeu, Antonina Kytytval, Anna Ntutetegryne, Zoya Nenlyumkina, Nina Akukyn, Vladislav Rintegin—Russian first names, Chukchi and Eskimo last names. These were their parents' names.

"And as for certain difficulties with the pronunciation and writing, perhaps our state which is zealously striving to be democratic should take the path of Western 'civilized' countries. Yuriy Sergeyevich told me about the only Eskimo student in Canada, Mary Carpenter, from the University of Western Ontario. She gave him a brochure published by the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada which said Canadians spend on average per year: \$500 million on travel abroad, \$1 billion—on alcoholic beverages, \$200 million—on confectionery items, and \$30 million—on food for dogs and cats. And reading on in this brochure one could learn that out of every thousand newborn Eskimos almost one-fifth die in childhood—10 times more than among the white residents of Ontario. During past years the standard of living of white Canadians has risen higher and higher, but as for Eskimos...."

In parting Rytkeu asked Mary to write her address down in his notebook. After her name Mary wrote W-3-244.

"Is that your postal address?" Yuriy Sergeyevich tried to clarify.

"No," answered Mary, "that is my number." It turned out that, for purposes of government statistics, Eskimos of Canada do not have first names. This is explained by the fact that Eskimo names are too difficult to pronounce and write. Therefore they have decided to assign each Eskimo a number.

"Western Eskimos have the letter W in front of their name, just as I do, and Eastern ones have E. It is easy and simple. We in Tiyuktoyuk have carved these numbers on a wooden chip and every Eskimo wears this chip on a chain around his neck, next to the cross," Mary explained.

Some 40,000 people, a whole nation, have been numbered like a herd of reindeer or a crowd of prisoners in a concentration camp. Indeed: "What is in a name?" But here in Leningrad back in the 1930's the only faculty of peoples of the Far North in the world was opened at the Pedagogical Institute imeni A.I. Gertsen, and dozens of generations of humanities specialists have trained there, making up the basis of a new national intelligentsia.

Since the beginning of "perestroyka" this process has slowed up considerably as, incidentally, have all the other processes related to the socioeconomic position of indigenous and immigrant residents of Chukotka. And the apogee of plundering has been reached. The prolonged illness of this region's economy is threatening to come to an abrupt end. The more gold, fish, pelts, and other assets the state structures and private entrepreneurs take out of this land, the worse the life of its inhabitants become, year after year.

Back four years ago the shortage of goods from Magadan Oblast, and hence above all from Chukotka, amounted to 54 million rubles [R] (not the present "wooden" ones, but the former full-value "Union" ones), of which R42 million were for food. Each year here they obtain practically no meat, potatoes, vegetables, or fruits. During the last navigation period they shipped in barely 20 percent of the Northern "food basket." And what else can be expected when a state, torn apart by political and ethnic conflicts, bled dry by hyperinflation and a catastrophic drop in production, is not able to feed its own citizens even on the Mainland.

Everything extracted on Chukotka goes for export—to be sold. And what is received in exchange? Coupons for sugar, alcohol, and condensed milk. Do you want more food products and of better quality? Go to the commercial stores where, what with the higher costs of fuel, payment for energy sources, and the disappearance of the paper ruble, prices are such that you would not dream about them in a terrible nightmare. And these mountain hicks can now take anything they want from commerce. Oranges, tangerines, raisins, unlimited alcohol....

"How do they get there," I naively asked the people with whom I was talking, "if this is a special zone and even someone on a business trip has to present a special



permit from the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in their place of residence?"

"Very simple. At some point a person has gone to vacation in the Caucasus, he has been discovered by local merchants and offered a deal: You send me an invitation to be a guest and I will pay you with both money and goods when I arrive. How can you resist the temptation when things are as scarce as they are today?"—they explained to me.

For a certain amount of time the local authorities were still hoping for state credit. Today, now that through the efforts of the "shock therapists," food prices have shot out of sight, there are no hopes for credit. The all-Russian conference on problems of survival of the Northern peoples held recently in Krasnoyarsk could only sum up the sad results of the current destructive credit policy of the powers that be in these regions.

"The money that is being allotted is several times less than what is needed. The credit moves to the recipients at such rates that during this time because of inflation and the complete destabilization of the price policy it almost turns into a heap of ashes. In some places the navigation period lasts only 10-25 days. Nobody needs the money arriving on the 26th day—after all there are simply no other ways of bringing in supplies."

Thus the residents of Chukotka of all nationalities—Chukchi, Eskimos, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who at one time were representatives of the unified Soviet brotherhood of peoples and now do not know what their citizenship is or who needs them—have only one solution: to go begging to their relatives in Alaska and its state authorities and ask for help or engage in underground barter and recall the good old days when the Soviets were still in power here. Perhaps in general they should follow the example of Alaska and sell Chukotka to Clinton along with Magadan so that they will not bother Moscow, the Kremlin, and the White House with their long-standing complaints and requests like this?

When I was still a child I read a remarkable book by Tikhon Semushkin entitled "Alitet Goes to the Mountains," which discusses the first years of Soviet power on Chukotka.

And he is not the only person whose creative work was linked to the Far North and pointed out the path of great Russian literature to its talented sons. Semushkin discussed this in a conversation with Yuriy Rytkeu: "It seems to me that you and Grigoriy Khodzher, and Vladimir Sangi, and Yuvan Shestakov, and many others seem to come from the books written by Vatslav Serashevskiy, Vladimir Bogoraztan, Vladimir Arsenyev, Gennadiy Gor, Nikolay Shudin...."

With their help and support during the forties and fifties they formed the spiritual environment in which the local intelligentsia grew up. Yuriy Rytkeu himself, having become a student at the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute

imeni A.I. Gertsen, began his literary activity with a translation into his native language of the works of Russian and Soviet writers, received the blessing of A. Tvardovskiy on the pages of NOVYY MIR and published more than 30 books with 8 million copies translated into 17 languages, not counting the languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Reflecting on this creative process of mutual enrichment of cultures, Yuriy Rytkeu then writes: "It is interesting that during those years we did not even think about receiving the wealth of another people. It seemed to me at that time that it was quite natural and legitimate that the wealth of one people belonged to another."

It seems to me that a people's cultural wealth essentially does not depend on numbers although, on the other hand, it lives and develops only as long as its creator thrives in the land.

I recall my last meeting in Anadyr with participants in the Eskimo people's ensemble "Atasikun." The women take along their tambourines and drums and they sing. The pounding of the drums and the singing that penetrates to the heart took me back to somewhere in ancient times and I got the feeling that I was on a seacoast at sunrise. Two boys were dancing and their smooth, rhythmic movements told me visually about the awakening of the polar night. Then it turned out that I was not mistaken: This dance, "Our Land," was handed down from generation to generation, and in general everything I saw that evening was not simply a concert. People of kindred spirit had gathered here and they spoke the language of song and dance and recalled something very distant and dear. And along with respect for them and delight in their art, in my heart there grew a feeling of sadness: Why are there so few of them?

Are you alive, "Atasikun?" How are things going for you in this time of trouble when the laws of our friendship have been trampled into the dirt by highly placed Ivans who do not recall their heritage?

#### **New Head of Karelia Government Profiled**

*94P50135A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Apr 94 p C2*

[Article by Kaija Virta: "Karelia Leader Stepanov Continues With New Title"]

[Text] With his new title, Karelia's president, the communist Viktor Stepanov, from now on will be deriving his power from direct election by the voters in acting as leader of the Republic.

According to preliminary results in Monday's election, the 47-year old Stepanov garnered 68 percent of votes cast in the race for chairman of the Karelian government. He was the only candidate whose powers correspond to those of other republics' leaders. Until now, Stepanov's title has been speaker of the Karelian Supreme Soviet, or parliament.

**Reformers Not Able To Put Up Candidate**

Karelia's venerable Prime Minister Sergei Blinnikov likewise politically a man of the old guard, was originally a candidate running against Stepanov, but pulled out of the campaign a month before the election. Pro-reform forces tried in vain to push a young generation democrat, Petroskoi University Professor Sergei Belozertseveya, to become a third candidate.

Stepanov's behind-the-scene forces, the Karelian Communist League and the Veterans Association, in his election campaign charged the breakup of the Soviet Union as a mistake, and demanded those responsible for it—thus also President Boris Yeltsin—be brought to justice.

Stepanov himself, however, apparently would prefer a face-to-face meeting with Yeltsin, and to appear as the man whose good relations with the central government will produce tangible advantages for Karelia.

The Moscow paper NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in its latest monthly rating of political figures ["political stock exchange"] placed Stepanov 88th on the list of Russia's one-hundred most influential politicians.

**New Name for the Parliament**

Karelian voters on Sunday [17 April] elected a group of local government bodies, as well as a new 61-member, bicameral parliament. Its name will no longer be the Supreme Soviet, but the Lawmaking Assembly.

The election outcome will be more clear later. Definite power relationships of the type seen in West Europe are out of the question, since many representatives have not revealed their affiliations, and because identification with a party is in practice far less binding than is in the case in the Finnish parliament.

For Finns this was hardly a real election, since less than 35 percent of eligible voters cast their ballot in the city of Kostamus and in the Petroskoi election district. For the entire Republic the figure was 42 percent. In elections held last December and in voting on the constitution 54 percent of Karelians still bothered to vote.

**Novosibirsk, Tomsk Environmental Update**

944F0678A *Novosibirsk SIBIRSKAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 18, 6-12 May 94 p 1

[Article by Zoya Makmatova, chief engineer of the information department of the West Siberian Administration for Territorial Monitoring of the Environment: "Ecological Monitoring: On the Ice—Oil, in the Water—Arsenic, in the Air—Ammonia. Although It Could Have Been Worse"]

[Text] According to data of the West Siberian territorial center for hydrometeorology and monitoring environmental pollution, several emergency situations were observed at the end of March and in April.

On the night of 29 March in Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, while discharges from the worsted cloth combine were being pumped, electric power was cut off in the second microrayon, as a result of which the sewerage pumping station went out of operation. The disposal of household fecal wastes into the Meret River (a tributary of the Ina) amounted to 1,800 cubic meters a day. It was not until the evening of 4 April that the sewerage pumping station was brought back into operation.

On 30 March 12 tonnes of crude oil were poured onto the ice of the Ob River, five miles below Kolpashevo (the pollution area totaled 3,800 square meters). Part of the oil was pumped out, and the rest was burned on the ice. The Tomskiy Geophysical Trust was guilty of the pollution.

On 22 March an observer of the hydrometeorological post of Shelabolikha (Ob River) noticed a yellow foam across the whole river. Water analysis tests conducted in the rayon of Kamen-na-Ob showed increased content of petroleum products (39 PDK [maximum permissible concentration], arsenic (14 PDK), and synthetic surface substances (10-12 PDK)). The Altay Kray Ecology Committee believes that the arsenic got into the water along with pesticides that were washed off from the fields.

In April three incidents of high pollution (above 5 PDK) of the atmosphere by nitrogen dioxide was observed in Novosibirsk. One of the incidents (8.5 PDK) occurred as a result of waste from the refinery plant Atoll.

Four incidents of atmospheric pollution by nitrogen dioxide and one incident of methanol were registered in April in Tomsk. The source of the pollution were the petroleum combine and TETs-3 [thermal electric power plant].

The plant rayon industrial center and the coke and chemical plant were the source of pollution of the atmosphere in Kemerovo with ammonia (5.5 PDK) and carbon disulfide (24 PDK).

**Novosibirsk's Standard of Living Viewed**

944F0678B *Novosibirsk SIBIRSKAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 18, 6-12 May 94 p 3

[Article by Tatyana Kirshina: "The Elevator Is Plunging. But We Are Still Alive..."]

[Text] The picture of a broken and rapidly falling elevator as a reflection of Russia's present condition is no longer a novelty to anyone. When I visualize this picture, the question that comes to mind for me personally is: Does this mean that we will inevitably crash (after all, an elevator is not repaired while it is falling), and only then will we be able to begin to repair it? But is there a landing pad on which the elevator can plop down with passengers who can still think after the dizzying drop?..

A third of the residents of Novosibirsk Oblast are below the poverty line—this is a statistical fact. Sociologists

give other figures: Only 9-12 percent of the respondents they polled believe that they are living normally, and the rest, in their personal opinion, are living in poverty. An interesting fact, people are starting to bake bread not only in the village but also in the city, and they are eating it now far more—alas, they cannot afford many other food products. The residents of Novosibirsk now consume half as much sugar and fish. But what can be said about vegetables, fruit, and meat! Do not be upset, food specialists console us, meat is generally harmful. In 1991, for example, they issued this recommendation: For an adult, 20.9 kilograms of meat per year is quite enough. One would like very much to believe them, if a year earlier these very same specialists had not cited an entirely different figure—they recommended that we eat 80.3 kilograms of meat in a year. How cleverly this turns out for us—we can adjust the “scientific” recommendation to current life. At present, however, there are no recommendations at all about what and how much we should eat. Obviously, there is only this advice: Whatever one can get...

It seems that not one bright spot was seen in the stream of unpalatable information that the participants in the social policy section passed out in their speeches at the Novosibirsk scientific-practical conference “Strategy for Stabilization of the Region’s Economy.”

But the fact itself, albeit not of a very equal partnership of the problems being discussed—economic and social—probably was the bright spot at a conference with a technocratically dominant idea.

If we do not now make a decisive turn to the individual, and if, as before, we are fixated on searching for a resolution of the problem of “pure” economics, then within 25 years the economic mechanism will chew up the population, rendering it childless and sick. This is the forecast of Academician Vlai Kaznacheyev—it is by no means just an image, it is supported by sound calculations.

Kaznacheyev said that a person also has his own KPD [efficiency factor]—the realization of his creative potential. How will society claim from each of us what is embedded by nature? In Russia, this KPD is 3-5 percent (out of 100 persons, only three to five do the work they were meant to do). The KPD of individuals in developed countries is four times higher. Will we catch up to the West in this indicator some day? For the time being, we are showing the world another phenomenon—not only a quantitative but also a qualitative demographic shock that is unprecedented in world history.

An understanding of the fact that the time has come to change priorities and to rank the individual higher than the economy seems to be taking shape among Novosibirsk Oblast authorities—a specific social program has been established in the oblast, responsibility for whose implementation has been entrusted to the first deputy governor for the economy. At the conference, incidentally, it was proposed that the deputy governor

for social problems be given the status of first deputy. That is the way it is in Yaroslavl, for example. However, for the time being the Novosibirsk governor...does not have a deputy on social questions at all—the position is vacant.

“We came to this conference not with fresh innovations,” Kaznacheyev explained, “they have been in preparation for many years. About 100 practical proposals were contained in the recommendations that our section developed. But we think that it is necessary to make the section itself a permanent operation. So that we will be heard at more than just conferences.”

Novosibirsk Oblast has almost 600,000 families: With children (58 percent), and childless, two-parent, and single parent families (10 percent). It is on the basis of family policy that various socioeconomic problems can be resolved. But in each sphere it is difficult to resolve them in isolation. What can the Novosibirsk social assistance service do when for each insufficiently provided-for person (there are 482,000 of them in the oblast), it is able to allocate from its budget only 1,260 rubles [R] each per year, but the subsistence minimum is R55,250. The government proposes to feed the poor exclusively at the expense of the local budget. Maybe the law on the subsistence minimum, the possibility of the adoption of which was recently discussed in the State Duma, will somehow help set priorities?

Meanwhile, the law and its normative documents on employment are far from being completed. But what if the problems of unemployment, migration, and social policy were all tied together in a common program of all of the CIS republics. After all, refugees continue to come to Siberia, but the number of jobs is being cut here as before...

According to rumors, albeit not officially verified, as one of the speakers at the conference recounted, a modern Raskolnikov has appeared in Novosibirsk Oblast. He killed an elderly woman who, it appears, made loans at high interest rates to impoverished fellow-villagers. Village pensioners here and there now live better than those who work in agricultural joint-stock companies of machine operators and cattlebreeders, whose monthly earnings fluctuate in the range of R7-12,000 rubles.

Will our elevator have to plunge downward much more? It is time to repair it.

#### **Maritime Kray's Nazdratenko on Economy**

944F0653A Moscow *KULTURA* in Russian

No 13, 9 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yevgeniy Ivanovich Nazdratenko, head of administration of Maritime Kray and Federation Council deputy, by Natalya Vstovskaya; place and date not given: “Yevgeniy Nazdratenko: ‘For Me, the Kray Is a Big Economy’”]



[Text] His name flashed across the pages of the kray's press, and soon, at the end of the 1980's, beyond its boundaries as well. Starting from scratch, with 17 kindred spirits, he established a mining company in Dalnegorsk—in a city in the northern Maritime area. For a certain time the enthusiasts worked at their business, specifically "their own," without losing courage, literally "working for nothing." They did not divide the first profit of 25,000 among themselves and, with patient agreement, the wives invested in the production. After a certain number of such turnovers this was a unique enterprise in which everything became beautiful a la Chekhov: the work, the life of the worker, and the amazing harmony with work-giving nature. In May 1993 Yevgeniy Ivanovich Nazdratenko was entrusted to manage Maritime Kray. And in December 80 percent of Maritimers voted for him as a deputy of the Federation Council.

[Nazdratenko] I could have improved things more in my mining business. But concern for the future, at least for my children, did not permit me to continue to live in an oasis, when there is devastation all around. This is what led me to today's post—anguish over how my countrymen are forced to live. And I am confident that my team shares it completely.

[Vstovskaya] The inheritance that fell to your lot, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, is not enviable. The time has come to shovel aside the obstructions of the Maritime economy...

[Nazdratenko] Not even local obstructions, but the consequences of the breakdown—the financial system of the country and nonpayments. On one hand the kray has very rich resource capabilities and very valuable experience in interbranch cooperation, and on the other, there is a euphoria of permissiveness and absence of control, pilfering of state property, and a transfer of raw materials abroad.

Many know how at one time I fought for the idea of joint-stock companies. I was one of the first to establish an enterprise with a nonstate form of ownership, which the communists did not like. At that time there was no talk yet about conversion to joint-stock companies and privatization. But now the democrats are accusing me of conservatism, calling me a partocrat and an opponent of progress. But I am not against the processes themselves, I am against the methodology of conducting conversion to joint-stock companies. Who in the country needs this conversion to joint-stock companies, when all of our industry has "died." Who becomes the owner, and the owner of what? The owner of the graveyard of industry, perhaps? Or is the situation similar to that of the Bor association. If the subscription for stocks brings with it a 30-40 percent reduction in the number of workers, and the people under the conditions of a single-industry village or a single-industry city cannot find work anywhere, then, tell me, who needs such conversion to joint-stock companies? Directors should not blindly carry out directives from the top, but, with a sense of responsibility for the people in the creation of state programs, should proceed from local conditions. If you

cannot find an optimal solution with the record and progress of production and the interests of the people, then it is better that you leave and not taint yourself with sin! Therefore, it is all the same to me what I will be called—a democrat, a communist, or a Bolshevik—the main thing is that I am confident that I am acting in the interests of the people. Now the question has been raised: to give complete authority to convert to joint-stock companies on the territory, taking local conditions into account. It was necessary to have three years of such savage and snarling privatization to understand just what we have piled up. But now they are letting the localities unravel it. Did I not say turn to conversion to joint-stock companies, but in the direction of the people?!

[Vstovskaya] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, at the same time, industry has used up the energy requisitions. Nonetheless, it was possible to live through the winter and not freeze, and not to be in debt to the Federation.

[Nazdratenko] My team and I are frequently accused of going to Moscow to scrounge for money. But we demand only that which is our due. In what way, for example, is the single-industry city Bolshoy Kamen, with its Zvezda plant that repairs submarines, guilty? What—is it asking for subsidies? No—it has a positive balance sheet. In what way is the aircraft-building city of Arsenyev to blame? Is it asking for subsidies? It has a positive balance sheet. How is the group of plants, including Dalzavod, guilty? They fulfilled their duties to the government. I am not asking for subsidies. I am asking them to pay for produced products. Pay them! They will then receive their wages, they will pay taxes, they will pay for electric power, we will pay for fuel—to the krays and regions of Russia—and everything will take its normal course. Therefore, when the state law on bankruptcy is being prepared, it is not entirely understandable to me in this situation. After all, the bankrupt is now the state, which does not pay the plants, and they become bankrupt. How can such a law be implemented? First pay, and then it will be clear who is a bankrupt and who is not. It is necessary first to become familiar with the credit-financial system in the country.

Now, as for energy requisitions. If we use the terminology of Gaydar's doctrine—everyone under market conditions should have equal conditions for getting started... Excuse me, what kind of starting positions does the Maritime area have? When, for example, the energy surplus in the chain of the Siberian GES [Hydroelectric Power Station] puts the cost of a kilowatt-hour at 9 rubles [R]. On Kamchatka it is R230, Sakhalin—R170, Khabarovsk—R87, and Magadan—R90. In Maritime Kray it is R40, the lowest of the Far East cities, but this is owing to the fact that in August it was possible, together with the government, to work out the wonderful Decree No. 1001 on stabilization of the economy of the kray, which guaranteed Maritime Kray special help from Russia, which is being implemented in the part of the subsidy to the fuel-energy complex. After all, Maritime

Kray is the main eastern gateway and the transport back of Russia, and carries a huge load.

The energy crisis of budget enterprises practically does not affect defense industries. What difference does it make to a defense enterprise how much a kilowatt-hour costs, it makes no difference, it is paid for out of the state budget. But for the rest of the enterprises—commercial, fish processing, mining, lumber, and building branches—after all, these same figures stifle every kind of production. I think that average tariffs should be adopted for the entire territory of the Russian Federation. Whether for the Kola Peninsula, where there is a surplus of nuclear electric power stations, or Siberia, where there is a chain of Siberian electric power stations, or for the Maritime area, which has very little energy of its own production.

We did not live this winter—we survived. I am so grateful to all the people for their patience! There truly was a frontline situation. It was even necessary to evacuate whole villages in some regions of Russia. Thank God it did not reach this point here. The absolutely helpless people were covered in this terrifying situation. Pensioners and invalids. In a word, it was easy to control the money that was released for these purposes.

To resolve the question of energy supply for the Maritime area, the Ussuriysk TETs [thermal electric power station] has to be completed. But the question arises: How is it to be fed? It will be necessary to develop new open-pit coal mines. And to have our own coal, and not depend on the central part of the country. For the reason that after tariffs on electrical energy, the second hitch is railroad tariffs, which cut off the oxygen for the railroaders themselves: 37 percent of the freight was not shipped, and they remained out of work. But if we have our own coal, which will not have to be conveyed from far off, the cost of electric power will become cheaper, and the enterprises will be able to take a deep breath of air. And we will solve the problem for a minimum of 10 years. But this will require the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The present railroad tariffs do not permit the kray to either import or export anything. When you pay R120 million for one rail car from Vladivostok to Moscow, what can be carried in it? It is unprofitable. Therefore, we are correct in already buying grain abroad this year, and bringing it in by sea. And meat, and macaroni products...

An edict of the president on support for Russian grain producers was being prepared. This edict established huge duties so that we would not import grain from abroad. In principle and in logic—yes, all rural residents should welcome this. But in the Maritime area, which is oriented on the defense industry, and where the terrain is mountainous and not much grain is grown, this is unacceptable. We talked about this in the government. We had numerous proposals and were able to convince the president and the government, and they passed a

decree according to which there is no duty on imported grain, and there is a differentiated approach to other products. Consider—an ocean liner takes 12 days from Canada and carries 10,000 tonnes of wheat at one time, at an acceptable price. A tonne of Canadian wheat costs us R100,000, while a tonne of Altay wheat costs R270,000. Which is better?

Incidentally, the government treated us with complete understanding, and exempted us from customs duties with respect to grain. And we will without fail find how to support our own grain producers and other agricultural products.

[Vstovskaya] The government also heard the appeals of the administration regarding fair export quotas and duties for enterprises that were glutted!

[Nazdratenko] I also consider this to be a victory of common sense. Six enterprises of the mining industry of Maritime Kray for whom duties were removed will be able to sell part of their concentrate and its production abroad. The enterprises have once again begun to work at full capacity, and people have gone back to their jobs. Previously some of the most profitable enterprises—Dalnepolymetall, Bor, and the well-known Spassktsement, although it was idle all winter, are beginning to work at full speed. And now orders have come in for cement.

Only Khrustal'nskiy GOK [mine processing combine] is not part of such enterprises. Its position is more complicated, inasmuch as the central mine there ran out, and it is being closed down. But this combine makes up the town: It is the only large employer in the village of Kavalerovo. Therefore we are concerned for it and the whole village. We are now working on an agreement with Kamchatka where there are a number of gold, nickel, and sulfur deposits. Part of the resources will be moved there, and work will be conducted on the watch method. This, probably, is right.

[Vstovskaya] All this is extremely necessary and appreciable, but it is unskilled labor. Is it already possible to construct a building on a level platform?

[Nazdratenko] We have already started to draft an important decree, and we are coming to an agreement with the government on a concept of the status of Maritime Kray and its development. I think that this will be a working document, if the government accepts it. It has gotten an "OK" from Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government-Council of Ministers. Only scientists of the Far Eastern Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences are involved. No one from abroad will be brought in—only with our own mentality! Whatever we come up with is what we will live with. There will be nobody to accuse of leading us down the wrong path. Of course, the prologue was Decree No. 1001. A lot of good things are outlined there. Our latest document that is being prepared on the status of the kray in light of the new constitution, according to which we all became components of the Federation (that is, everyone worries

about his own territory) with a unified constitution and a unified political system, will make it possible to take into account the economic interests of the Maritime area as a part of Russia and the Far Eastern Region. To determine in what directions and how its economy will exist independently.

Part of this big concept for the development of the Maritime area is the outlook of the kray under conditions of a transfer to the market in light of the geostrategic and economic interests of Russia is being developed on resources from the budget of Russia.

[Vstovskaya] How do you see Maritime area relations with other territories of the Far East?

[Nazdratenko] The problems of the Maritime area, Kamchatka, Magadan, Sakhalin, and Khabarovsk could be resolved in one idea. Apparently, the tsar who did not divide these krais and oblasts, but simply named a governor-general, was not stupid. I think that the time will come when we will have to unite. I, at least, am taking big steps toward this. We must integrate; otherwise, each will be selling its resources abroad for a song. I would see such cooperation here. Although there are a lot of differences internally as well.

In a word, I am an industrialist, and I treat our Maritime area as one big economy. We lived through the winter. And although it was very difficult (but, in addition, endless audits and dirty tricks were distracting), I am not disappointed in the work. And concern for the next winter is already pushing people into action. Because we did not succeed in developing open-pit mines, we did not succeed in developing coal supplies. We did not succeed in completing the construction of the Ussuriysk TETs. We need state money—there is none. There are many problems. One thing is left: For us, Maritimers, to continue to work, rolling up our sleeves, together with other Far Easterners. To work in a good way with the government and to resolve tasks that life presents us logically and not simply to put forth slogans.

#### **Moscow Oblast Social-Economic Indicators Noted**

944F0675A Moscow *NARODNAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 13 Apr 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Main Indicators Characterizing the Social-Economic Situation in the Oblast in January-March 1994"]

[Text] According to data of the **Moscow Oblast Statistical Committee**, state and private enterprises, joint-stock companies, and associations produced industrial products amounting to 2 trillion rubles [R] in current prices. By comparison with the corresponding period in 1993, the volume of production fell by 33.6 percent. Industrial labor productivity amounted to 74.2 percent of last year's level.

The output of consumer commodities amounted to R638.1 billion, including food commodities—R157.9

billion, and nonfood commodities—R480.2. With regard to January-March the production of consumer commodities was reduced by 24.4 percent.

Owing to all sources of financing, R454 billion of capital investments were acquired. Construction-assembly work was implemented in the amount of R343.6 billion. The following were put into operation: 220.3 thousand square meters of housing, a school for 400 pupils, and a 170-bed hospital. Eleven percent more dwelling units were built than a year ago.

Agricultural enterprises of the oblast produced about 49,000 tonnes of meat, 208,000 tonnes of milk, and more than 739 million eggs, which amounts to 97.5, 85, and 94 percent, respectively, of the level for January-March of last year.

By 1 April the overdue indebtedness of industrial enterprises and organizations, construction, and agriculture for paying wages to their workers reached R24.7 billion. Workers in industrial enterprises did not receive R19.2 billion on time, in construction—R3.4 billion, and in agriculture—more than R2 billion.

The total volume of retail goods turnover for January-March of this year was about R737 billion in current prices, exceeding the turnover of the corresponding period of last year by a factor of 8.6. The population realized R101.4 billion for paid services, which in comparable prices is about 51 percent of the volume of the first quarter of 1993.

The continuing increase in prices for commodities and service rates in March was characterized by a summary index of consumer prices of 109 percent relative to February and 141.3 percent relative to December of last year. Consumer expenditures, calculating for one family, exceeded R141,000 on the average.

The average wage of workers and employees in February increased in comparison with January by 10 percent and amounted to R131,500.

#### **Problems Faced by Uncontrollable Refugee Migration to Moscow Viewed**

944F0675B *MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian  
22 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by K. Gorbato, researcher at the Center for Socioeconomic Research of the Youth Institute: "Refugees—Moscow Is a Big Railway Station"]

[Text] Logic suggests: Before talking about a problem, and especially before intending to solve it, it is necessary to picture the scale of it. As for refugees, objective statistics are lacking, both for all of Russia and for the Moscow region. At first glance the reasons are simple: There is no control over movement across the border from former Union republics (except for the Baltics), and there are no clear-cut legal norms. According to the law of the Russian Federation on the status of refugees,



adopted in the summer of last year, only citizens of other states can be considered as such. This means that persons who arrive in Central Russia from zones of ethnic conflict, which are within the boundaries of the territory of the Russian Federation (Chechnya, Ossetia, Ingushetia, and others), cannot obtain the status of refugee. They are called either resettlers or displaced persons, but the essence does not change because of this. It turns out that there are many more refugees than recorded.

Although, strictly speaking, the figures are still terrifying. According to data of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Russian Federation, more than 9,000 refugees were counted at the end of 1993 in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, of which 3,600 are concentrated right in our city, and 5,500 in the oblast. This figure does not include those who are living here in an "illegal" status. Expert estimates in this regard are rather contradictory, and vary from several to hundreds of thousands. They cannot be used as objective information for an analysis of the economic status of refugees. Therefore, the data cited further apply only to persons who officially have the status of refugees.

The Moscow region, fortunately for its residents, was never "open" to migrants, rather strict restrictions existed associated with residence permits. Nevertheless, the population of the capital has grown steadily from year to year precisely owing to migrants. Now, despite the decree of the Government of Moscow concerning toughening passport control and the introduction of duties on the right to stay in the city, the number of refugees and displaced persons on its territory is increasing. In 1992, 2,500 refugees were counted here, and now the number is significantly higher. We are talking only about people who use official channels to acquire the right to live in Moscow.

Why is the capital so attractive? For a majority of those who arrive in the Moscow region (61.7 percent), the presence here of institutions and organizations that can solve their problems is important. Thirty-seven percent of this group declare that they would like to get authorization to go abroad. So, for a large part of the arriving refugees Moscow represents a kind of transshipment point. In addition, it should be noted that there is quite a large number of commercially inclined persons for whom the presence of conflict on interethnic grounds is only a reason for legal resettlement from regions with an unstable political and economic situation in a city, which for them is a "gold mine" (15 percent on average).

But on the whole the economic situation of the refugees in the Moscow region, really, like everywhere, is unenviable. Many (24.6 percent) live in crowded material conditions. The main official sources of their existence are state allowances and assistance from relatives (26.8 percent, on the average). Only 22.7 percent have stable earnings. Fewer have permanent work—only 3 percent of them, and 32 percent of the able-bodied do not work at all. However paradoxical, their misfortune is that they do have...a higher and secondary special education (up

to 33 percent). In Moscow they encounter an already developed infrastructure that is characterized by a great oversaturation of this kind of specialist (four-fifths of all employees). This problem has especially worsened now under conditions of increased unemployment. At best, those who arrive can count on work that is "not prestigious" to the local residents. Despite the significant share of those who would like to change specialties so that they could find work in the Moscow region (up to 38 percent), there are also those who under no circumstances (18.5 percent) want to engage in work that is "not according to their specialization," and, as a rule, this is the intelligentsia (80 percent from this group).

But, in addition to work and obtaining the means for existence, the problem of housing is becoming even more critical. At the present time 28 percent of them are forced to rent housing, and 650 [as published] percent take shelter with relatives. The housing situation for 40.5 percent of the refugees is simply intolerable. Of course, it is necessary to feel sorry for them. But in our region hundreds of thousands "of our own" families are standing in line to receive housing. But not many people (2 percent) can allow themselves to buy an apartment, given today's high prices. So, the question stands this way: Either leave the region, or buy housing. Therefore, many of them (43 percent) plan to sell their apartment in their previous place of residence and acquire one within the boundaries of the Moscow region. However, not everyone by far has something to sell (20 percent, on average). It is even more difficult with residence permits. But it is what makes it possible to use the social benefits (acquiring a free education, material allowances, etc.). It is practically impossible to get a residence permit without acquiring housing in Moscow. The percentage of those without residence permits in Moscow, and this means in many ways "people without social rights," is the highest in Russia (48.3 percent of the refugees living on its territory).

The most vulnerable people in this situation are children and pensioners. A majority of families, of course, need material assistance for the children on the part of the local authorities and the state. There is not enough money for clothes and normal nourishment. Pensioners cannot get pensions and other benefits due them because of difficulties in transferring documents from their previous place of residence. The loss of documents complicates the situation in many ways, and a search for them is hampered or impossible because of the tense political situation between Russia and a number of republics. Without residence permits it is also difficult to use medical services, which very tangibly hits an already meager budget.

A lot has been written about the difficult economic situation of the refugees, but the issue of ways to resolve the problem remains open to the present time. This in many ways depends on the presence in the state of a good national program of resettling refugees on the territory of the country. Such an attempt was undertaken at the end of 1991 by the Government of Russia—the "Migration"

program was adopted. But...it remained mainly on paper. It appears that it is aimed more at the resolution of questions of providing cheap manpower and developing the regions of the non-Chernozem, Siberia, and the Far East. Alas, the interests of the state, and not the refugees, emerged as the priority. A serious review is needed of the principal provisions of the program. After all, besides everything else, its implementation in its previous form requires large material resources, whose allocation, based on the difficult economic conditions, does not seem possible. But despite all this, uncontrolled migration pressure on the European region of Russia, including on the Moscow region, continues to increase.

The attempts of the Government of Moscow to protect its region from such pressure, using old methods (toughening the rules of passport control), have an unhealthy effect on Russian refugees most of all. After all, persons of other nationalities who come to Moscow can count on the assistance of various friendly associations of their own people that exist here (Azerbaijani Chechen, Armenian, etc.), which help their fellow-countrymen overcome the "barrier" of residence registration legally as well as illegally. Therefore, only the Russians are thrown to the whims of fate. It is no accident that Russian refugees are experiencing the greatest economic difficulties in their own "historic motherland."

It is apparent that previous experience in the regulation of migratory streams cannot be used to resolve refugee problems. While their appearance in Russia is in many ways a new phenomenon (we have not had refugees since 1924), it is not new as such to many countries of West Europe and America. They have accumulated a wealth of multifaceted experience in this regard, and it would not be out of place to utilize it. The more so in that under conditions of a threat of mass migration from the former USSR to the countries of West Europe (30 percent owing to refugees), they are eagerly ready to help.

There is a special decree of a parliamentary meeting of the European Community adopted in February 1993 "Concerning the Migratory Movement of the Population between the States of the Former USSR," and recommendations attached to it, according to which Russia can count on the rendering of assistance to refugees and displaced persons on its territory. Of course, now the problem lies not so much in money as in necessary meaningful aspects of the national program for rendering assistance to refugees and forced migrants. The creation of a network of nonstate social services, aimed at refugees, can be viewed as a promising direction in the resolution of this problem. These organizations, which are not dependent on state structures and not subordinate to them, whose source of existence will become not budgetary resources but subsidies from various charitable funds, including international, should work on those questions that state services refuse to work on (offering juridical services, searching for housing, retraining, searching for employment, etc.). They will be able organically to supplement the work of state services. There are already quite a few of them in the countries of

Western Europe. For example, there are about 60 in Great Britain alone (of these, four work on a nationwide scale and 56 are small local organizations). Seventy percent of the total number of these organizations are concentrated in London, which is very similar to Moscow in the nature of the problem in this respect. Now the employees of our center, together with colleagues from Great Britain, are conducting work on a joint project whose purpose is to accumulate British experience in work with refugees and use it in a plan to develop nonstate social services in Russia (including in Moscow).

In our opinion, another no less promising direction in the resolution of the refugee problem could be the establishment of a network of centers for refugee professional retraining, taking into account the requirements of regional labor markets. The specific nature of the work with refugees and forced migrants lies in the fact that the status of "refugee" is itself temporary. Many of those who were questioned would like to go back and continue to work in their former specialty, given a stabilization of the situation in the region of their former residence. Therefore, the content of the programs for the retraining of refugees should reflect universality and differentiation. In acquiring a new specialty, the previous one should not be lost. Ignoring the previous work experience of refugees is an unnecessary loss of time and resources. At the same time, the experience of Germany, France, and Great Britain is being used widely.

#### **New Prefect of Moscow's Southwestern District Interviewed**

944F0687A Moscow KURANTY in Russian  
27 Apr 94 p 4

[Interview with Petr Aksenov, prefect of Moscow's Southwestern District, by unidentified KURANTY correspondent; place and date not given: "What Gives the Authorities a Headache"]

[Text] Petr Nikolayevich Aksenov was born in 1946 in Lipetsk Oblast. Upon graduating from school he went to work in construction. Worker; foreman; supervisor; construction administration chief; trust director; chairman of the Sovetskiy Rayon Executive Committee; first deputy prefect of the Southwestern district; and, finally, prefect—this is his resume. Married. Two children.

[KURANTY] Petr Nikolayevich, your first 200 days on the job are behind you now. How was it?

[Aksenov] I am not new to the prefecture; I know the specifics of the district, the existing problems, the "bottlenecks" in the work of district services and units. The task is to strengthen the work of local administration, and first of all of its lower tier—municipal district administrations headed by subprefects. Because they are the ones carrying the main burden of working with the population, resolving the daily problems of life support for the territory. Therefore I have set a goal for myself: Give subprefects the opportunity to demonstrate their

abilities most fully. Not guide them by the hand, not tell them what to do in municipal districts and how, but give them the freedom to show initiative, to experiment, at the same time not forgetting that we are at the service of district citizens who will be the main judges of the local authorities' work.

What concerns district residents? Warm homes and clean streets, and the ability to buy everything they need. The prefecture staff must do everything possible—and sometimes impossible—to make it so.

How do we arrange for the timely removal of household trash; how to perform quality road repairs; how to provide heat for residential buildings? These should be our "headaches," not the residents'.

[KURANTY] When you agreed to become a prefect, did you have a maximum and minimum program?

[Aksenov] Of course. Let us start with the maximum program. First, we have an ambitious plan to change the situation with respect to road repairs. The Southwestern district is the only one that does not have its own asphalt-and concrete-making plant. We have allocated a site for its construction. The money the city appropriates for capital repairs and maintenance of roads clearly is not enough. At the same time the volume of work is growing. Which means that we have to attract nonbudget means, organizations-investors.

The second acute issue is trash. The state of the services responsible for cleaning and trash removal is such that much effort has to be devoted to strengthening their material and technical base and selection of cadres. In addition, in order to put an end to monopolism and create competition to already existing road-maintenance organizations, we have organized two new alternative services. We are bringing various commercial organizations into the business of keeping order in the district on a large scale.

Although the state of cleaning and trash removal on the territory of the district is far from ideal, the situation has improved to a considerable extent.

[KURANTY] Petr Nikolayevich, does your maximum program include solving the housing problem?

[Aksenov] Of course. First, housing in the district varies greatly. We have five-story buildings—in the famous Cheremushki, Kotlovka, and Zyuzino municipal districts; we have areas with standard prefabricated panel nine-story buildings—in the Gagarinskiy and Konkovo municipal districts; and we have modern high-rise buildings in Yasenevo, Tyoplyy Stan, and Butovo. Therefore, along with new construction we will devote much effort to reconstruction of old quarters, increasing the density of existing housing. The concept of socioeconomic and city planning development of the Southwestern district, approved by the Government of Moscow, envisages a

large program of housing reconstruction, and not at the expense of the city budget but through investor financing.

Despite active construction and reconstruction, however, the housing problem in the district remains quite acute. In the end of 1993, 26,810 families were on the waiting list for improvement of housing conditions.

So we do have a lot of work to do in this direction. We have outlined the following ways of solving this problem.

First, we will increase control over which housing is being vacated; for this purpose we will first and foremost arrange for a mechanism to receive timely information from housing utilization offices about vacated rooms and apartments.

Second, we will take the necessary steps to implement the mayor of Moscow's order regarding stricter controls over the use of privatized housing, preventing the use of privatized apartments and rooms for purposes other than intended. Such things do occur—this housing is being used as office space for various commercial organizations, and as illegal hotels and dormitories.

Third, we will work more actively with the courts, since we disagree with the practice that has become widespread lately—families that are not in acute need of housing improvement get extra rooms as the latter become vacated in their communal apartments.

[KURANTY] One of the main problems of concern to everyone is trade. A lot of hopes were pinned on the privatization of trade enterprises; however, such phenomena as cheating customers and rudeness persist in privatized stores anyway. How do you feel about this?

[Aksenov] You can look at this problem from different angles. From the standpoint of market saturation with goods, privatization has done a lot, of course, and we all can feel it today. The old distributive system does not exist anymore. You can buy anything today. There is a great selection of goods in the stores. As to rudeness—what can one say? This is a question of a person's culture.

[KURANTY] Can the authorities help; who should the offended customer turn to?

[Aksenov] He can turn to the prefecture's consumer market administration, or to the relevant department in the administration of the municipal district on whose territory some or other point of sale is located. Depending on the nature of the complaint, the local administration will take necessary steps—either through its administrative or trade inspectorate, or through the organs of sanitary-epidemiologic oversight. I would like to emphasize that in the new economic conditions local authorities still have real levers to enforce trade enterprises' unconditional compliance with established rules and norms.



The analysis of complaints and petitions we receive shows that the greatest number of them are about street-stand and kiosk trade. We have put together a program for getting small retail trade in order on the territory of the district.

About 250 kiosks already have been removed from the district's territory. They were kiosks that had either been illegally set up or did not have licenses or cash registers, did not meet merchandise assortment requirements, did not maintain the adjacent territory in proper order, and so on. In addition, we have tightened the procedures for issuing permits to conduct trading from stands, vehicles, and small retail outlets.

We do not have such complaints with respect to large trade establishments—such as “Moscow,” “Leipzig,” or “Bucharest” (we have about 40 such stores).

[KURANTY] Petr Nikolayevich, which line of prefecture work do you consider most important?

[Aksenov] Absolutely everything is important—construction, repairs, improvements, trade, transportation, social security, and many other things. Only a comprehensive solution to all these issues will allow us to carry out the task that is the responsibility of the bodies of local authority—ensuring normal living on the district territory and satisfying the needs and demands of the population.

## 2d Round of Petersburg Elections Viewed

944F0636A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian 5 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Viktoriya Rabotnova: “Second Round of Elections to the City Assembly: Its Future Either Vacant or Murky”]

[Text] Results of the second round of elections, held 3 April in half of the districts, seem to come as a complete surprise to most politicians. The chief sensational aspect is the defeat of the electoral bloc Democratic Unity of Petersburg. Democratic Unity led 19 candidates to the finish line—more than all the remaining electoral associations combined, but only three of the candidates nominated by the Belyayev bloc will get seats.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich himself, destined by many to become chairman of the coming assembly, was not among the victors. After the first round of voting, Belyayev outdistanced his rival—Aleksandr Shchelkanov, former chairman of the city executive committee, by an almost twofold lead. Several days prior to the runoff election, Shchelkanov assessed the directive of the mayor on extending the 20 March voting as illegal, and proposed to Belyayev that they mutually withdraw their candidacies. Judging from the response of the Belyayev team, this proposal was seen as an attempt to avoid the inevitable defeat of “a politician who had not fulfilled himself.” One can today assert that Shchelkanov—who

wrote “In the event this is rejected, I will be forced to prolong my fight and will be victorious”—assessed the situation more sensibly...

Turning now to other electoral associations. The bloc All Petersburg passed through the second round with minimal losses, gaining four seats. The blocs Our City—Our Home and Unity for the Sake of Progress had one victor each. But Beloved City achieved the greatest success—all five candidates in this association who underwent the second round of voting were victorious over their rivals. Independent candidates will get the remaining seats.

As before, however, the results are not entirely conclusive. The dispute on legality of the first round is not yet over. We know that the majority of electoral associations are disputing the mayor's decision to extend the voting time frame. Only Democratic Unity and Business Petersburg supported the decision. It cannot be ruled out that they will now change their opinion and join others seeking to attain acknowledgment of the spring elections as invalid.

It should be stated that a great many “oddities” took place prior to the second round as well. At one of the polling stations in District No. 9, for example, oranges were distributed from a Mercedes to voters, along with an appeal to vote for Yuriy Novolodskiy. The team of the respected chief of the justice administration interpreted this fact as provocation (albeit only after his competitor's authorized agents submitted a complaint to the Central Electoral Commission). The provocation story would be quite convincing had not a Novolodskiy overseer reminded prisoners during the voting at Kresty—“Did you get the free cigarettes? They are from us...”

Gifts were also promised to the voters at District No. 23. True, not to all—only to those who supported Shukhrat Sayfullayev, president of the joint-stock company Peter the Great, in the second round of voting. They were promised monthly sponsored assistance out of the company's specially established assistance fund. True, it is not entirely clear how people swallowing this bait could prove they voted for him—it is hardly likely that precinct commissions would release their certified documentation. It cannot be ruled out that Sayfullayev's recent rival, Boris Pustyntsev, will contest the voting results—such campaigning is entirely too similar to outright graft.

The campaign in District No. 11 was also waged “freestyle.” One of the candidates, Valeriy Selivanov, was forced to apologize to the voters during a radio presentation for the fact that he was unable to respond to their questions during television debates. The fact of the matter is that for some reason it was not the presiding official, and not the chairman of the electoral commission who sorted out the questions—but rather Democratic Unity leader Aleksandr Belyayev, who came to the studio to support the candidate of his bloc. Only after the television debates were over was Valeriy Nikolayevich

able to find out what indeed his voters had asked. The effect of the Selivanov radio broadcast was unanticipated. He received phone calls recommending that he not make idle chatter about it—or what would then happen would be his fault. If this was a joke—it was not all that funny. After all, during the election campaign two of Selivanov's authorized agents were subjected to attack.

Disputes as to how honest the election was in one district or another and how legal the election was overall will go

on much longer than one month. Especially since the new Assembly will still not be able to get down to work. Until such time as three-fourths of the deputies are elected, the elections are not valid. It is foolish to be guessing today what awaits us in the fall—by-elections or a new campaign which will clearly take place under different rules. In any event, political experts and the leaders of political parties have time to analyze the frame of mind of St. Petersburg residents. It is entirely evident that the defeat of Democratic Unity candidates in the majority of districts cannot be just a coincidence.

### St Petersburg Election Winners

944F0636B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 5 Apr 94 p 1

["List of Candidates Defeating Rivals After the Second Round of Voting"]

[Text]

Electoral District	Last name, first name, patronymic	Year of birth	Professional Activity	Nominated By	Number of votes
2.	Golubev, Valeriy Aleksandrovich	1952	head of administration, Vasileostrovskiy Rayon administration	All Petersburg	61.85
3.	Liverovskiy, Aleksey Alekseyevich	1947	docent, St. Petersburg Electrical Engineering University	district voters, All Petersburg	45.41
4.	Romankov, Leonid Petrovich	1937	senior research associate, Institute of Analytical Sciences	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	52.71
8.	Golman, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	1934	general director, Lenstroyzhil- servis joint-stock company	district voters	46.44
9.	Kravtsov, Yuriy Anatolyevich	1953	director, the law firm Konvent	Beloved City	48.48
10.	Amosov, Mikhail Ivanovich	1959	assistant, St. Petersburg State University	Beloved City	52.57
11.	Selivanov, Valeriy Nikolayevich	1939	instructor, St. Petersburg Nakhimov Naval Institute	Beloved City	63.69
14.	Nikeshin, Sergey Nikolayevich	1958	president, the corporation XX Trust	All Petersburg	56.22
16.	Andreyev, Sergey Yuryevich	1954	chairman, the For Justice citizens' association	Our City—Our Home	48.91
17.	Shchelkanov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	1939	director, the public noncommercial Mission for Alternative Proposals	district voters	44.97
20.	Rochev, Nikolay Anisimovich	1935	director, State Pedigree Livestock Farm Lesnoye	district voters	43.45
21.	Pirogov, Mikhail Ivanovich	1945	assistant, St. Petersburg Architecture and Construction University	Beloved City	44.57
22.	Karlin, Lev Nikolayevich	1947	director, State Hydrometeorological Institute	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	46.26
23.	Sayfullayev, Shukhrat Raufovich	1947	president, Peter the Great joint-stock company	district voters	43.51
25.	Gladkikh, Boris Vasilyevich	1939	chief research associate, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute Transmash	district voters	52.83
26.	Gladkov, Yuriy Pavlovich	1949	president, Fund for Financial Support of Small Enterprises	Democratic Unity of Petersburg	46.02
28.	Krivenchenko, Anatoliy Nikolayevich	1952	chief legal adviser, the social philanthropic organization Era	district voters	48.26

Electoral District	Last name, first name, patronymic	Year of birth	Professional Activity	Nominated By	Number of votes
31.	Novoselov, Viktor Semenovich	1947	director, St. Petersburg Federal Migration Service	district voters	63.07
32.	Yagya, Vatanar Saidovich	1938	professor, St. Petersburg State University	district voters	62.63
33.	Kolovay, Vladimir Grigoryevich	1950	president, the Lenvest limited-liability company	All Petersburg	49.68
42.	Istomin, Yevgeniy Petrovich	1953	head of administration, Petrodvoretskiy Rayon administration	district voters	52.06
43.	Shcherbakov, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich	1940	deputy mayor, St. Petersburg	Beloved City	64.87
44.	Gardymov, German Petrovich	1941	general director, the Lensevzavod production association	district voters	63.57
48.	Petrov, Leonid Nikolayevich	1943	doctor, State Hygiene and Epidemiology Inspectorate	Unity for the Sake of Progress	52.20

### Vladivostok Newspaper Resumes Publication

944F0676A Vladivostok *UTRO ROSSII* in Russian  
6 May 94 p 1

["Address to the Reader": "We Are With You Again"]

[Text] Hello, dear readers. After a month-and-a-half-long absence, *UTRO* finally has found its way into your mail box. The interruption was hard for both you and us. Our telephones rang off the hook: What has happened to the newspaper? We once heard crying on the other end of the line: "I am recovering from a heart attack... You are all I have. And now the box is empty—so I do not have you anymore either, do I?..." Most calls, however, ended with the sentence: "Hold on, we are with you!"

The cause of the protracted silence hardly needs any comment. We are not living in a desert, and everybody hears about stoppages of giant enterprises, the bankruptcy of entire industrial sectors, and delinquency files. We have also been unable to escape this fate—no paper or money. It is doubly disappointing that the oxygen vent was closed at the time the subscription campaign began... But even on the brink of disaster we found out once again that there are enough good people in the world for whom the notion "credit of confidence" is not an empty sound. They believe in the newspaper's vitality, and this is why we are with you today.

We are still struggling with tremendous hardships. But we want to assure our loyal readers, like-minded in spirit, that the newspaper will try to not let you down in your expectations. It will honestly inform you about everything that is happening in the kray. We will continue to delve into such topics as economics and politics, social protection and ecology, culture and science, spirituality and human rights. Such notions as work and morality, honor and conscience, love for the Motherland and duty—everything that makes the nation that preaches them great—will never get rusty or lose their value in the eyes of our authors. Neither will we ignore the shoots of healthy entrepreneurship, the reforms taking root, and the normal market, as well the as

strengthening ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. There is only one item that is banned here—dirt. In every sense of this word—whether it is distorting the substance of the issue in published materials or catering to unhealthy instincts—in short, catering to the "consumer."

With the right of a friend, the newspaper expects of its allies-readers one thing—patience and tolerance. Initially we will not be able to publish five times a week—we will somewhat reduce the periodicity and will have an issue on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. And let the reader not be offended by some excessive advertising—we cannot survive without it economically. Moreover, we invite the active business cooperation of businessmen, entrepreneurs, and economic managers. We will gladly publish any private advertisement for a moderate price.

In short, let us shake hands for friendship. Stay with us, friends, for the second half of the year. Our index is 53402.

### Armavir Admin Chief on Current Tasks

944F0647A Moscow *ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI* in Russian  
26 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with G. Troitskiy, Armavir administration chief, by Irina Goryunova, Armavir-Moscow: "G. Troitskiy: There Must Be Just One Authority: Responsibly Executive"]

[Text] Georgiy Konstantinovich Troitskiy is in love with his work and with his city. This is obvious immediately, after one hour's acquaintance. The Armavir administration chief, chairman of the Association of Administration Chiefs of East Kuban, champion of Russia, and captain of the Russian combined team for all-round sports loves to walk, is an excellent dancer, and can talk very interestingly about former Politburo members with whom he worked and about someone else from his hometown, the former USSR President... But today the thing that excites him more than anything else in the world is life in



**Armavir, this particle of Kuban, particle of the Caucasus, and particle of our common Homeland, a city that is ethnically diverse, filled with springtime beauty, and rich in good people and fertile land.**

[Goryunova] Georgiy Konstantinovich, your biography, your ties with our country's prominent figures, your successes in the management field, and a number of high positions have not prevented from returning once again to the city where your career began. Why?

[Troitskiy] The bulk of my activity has been linked with Armavir. I began here. For about five years I was the deputy chairman of an executive committee. Here in Armavir I became a deputy to the city and kray soviet. For nine years I worked as the chairman of the city soviet. That experience and that baggage have been extremely helpful for me in my current work. In addition, experience that proved to be beneficial for me was my work in Stavropol Kray, and later in Rostov, where I worked closely with Mingasprom [Ministry of the Gas Industry], which was administered by Chernomyrdin, who was the customer for my main administration. So more than two years ago I decided to return to my city.

[Goryunova] For many years you worked in the system of an authority that is now called an administrative-fiat system. Although you were always closely linked with the economy, the gas industry, and construction. Today you are working in the system of another authority. Do you make comparisons frequently, and to whose advantage are those comparisons?

[Troitskiy] Every authority has its negative and positive sides. Practically every authority is not to people's liking sometimes. And a person who is on his way to power must take that into consideration in his practice. During the days before perestroyka things were easier on the job. For many reasons. Including the fact that there was discipline. It used to be possible to resolve many questions more quickly. But the negative aspects of party leadership, and in particular the equalization policy and the lack of talent among many leaders, immediately manifested themselves in the collapse of the CPSU. The system of allocations by fiat precluded not only creativity, but also taught people how to live with ready-made decisions. The individual's sense of being a property owner was completely destroyed. For example, I repeatedly asked the party agencies the question: why, while protecting merchants' homes as monuments of urban construction, did you categorically ban the construction even of buildings with one and a half stories? The city was filled with sheds and hovels. Today we are having to live with much of our past inheritance.

I am alarmed by the lack of a mechanism for interrelationships between the authority and the enterprises. The executive authority today senses this problem in an especially acute way. A number of laws also are not particularly gratifying. For example, the law that has already been enacted by the old Supreme Soviet, to the effect that only the first person has the right to apply his

signature. This not only puts an additional workload on me, but also deprives my deputies of their responsibility and initiative.

[Goryunova] Armavir is an ethnically diverse city. Under the conditions of the current aggravation of the ethnic conflicts and taking into consideration the especially complicated situation in the Caucasus, how are you coping with the problems that arise?

[Troitskiy] People of 79 nationalities live in our city. Of them, 15 percent are Armenians, more than half of whom are old indigenous residents. The general directness in their life and the language that they use are Russian. The segment of the Armenian population that is in conflict and that emigrated to our area from Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorny Karabakh, is actually creating the difficulties. Although, for the time being, the situation is being regulated. The Krasnodar Kray leadership is taking strict measures and is monitoring the registration process strictly.

I grew up in the Caucasus. I have worked in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. I survived the Armenian earthquake and participated in the restoration of the republic. I know this region very well. And I also know that there are no poor nationalities. There are only poor people. That has always been my position.

[Goryunova] What is the political role of the Cossack population in your region?

[Troitskiy] The Labinskiy section was created in Armavir as long ago as the tsarist days. It includes representatives of the Cossack population from six or seven areas, including Stavropol and Karachayevo-Cherkessia. So one can say that we have a Cossack center. The Cossacks have sufficient authority. When they operate within the confines of legislation, the administration helps and supports them. But it also happens that they operate from a position of strength and attempt to force their decisions and ideas on people. Inasmuch as the Cossacks are an emotional people, disputes occur, and they are not simple ones. Their program openly proclaims a fight for power: within a two-year period, the changing over to ataman rule.

[Goryunova] As the administration chief, are you opposed to this?

[Troitskiy] If this is done by election, in the legislative, parliamentary way, they have my blessing. But they are attempting to operate from a position of strength. And that is a violation of legislation.

[Goryunova] Can you give any examples?

[Troitskiy] One does not have to go far. A sovkhos hires workers of various nationalities. The people are working on a long-term basis, and working conscientiously. A Cossack raid is carried out, and they are driven out. This is interference in the economic activity of the sovkhos, the inflicting of psychological, economic, and political damage. I have repeatedly said that you cannot establish

power with a lash. Everyone does not like a lash. It is possible to seize power. Power is not a joy. So making life better for people, while being in power, is a task that is a bit more complicated.

[Goryunova] Judged on the basis of economic importance, your city is the second one in Krasnodar Kray. Everyone realizes that the recession throughout the country has also affected you. How are you combatting this situation?

[Troitskiy] We are all tied up into the same bundle. In my opinion, nobody won from the destruction of the Union. And that includes our city. Nevertheless, whereas in 1992 the recession for Russia as a whole and for Krasnodar Kray was approximately 20 percent, in our city it was 4-5 percent lower, and the same situation prevailed in 1993. This is linked with the fact that Armavir is surrounded by large-scale agricultural areas. The peasants spend less time at rallies. They do not have time for them. The cow wants something to eat, and the land needs care. Therefore the peasants still work the way they used to. We have a considerable branch for processing agricultural produce. We have one of the largest meat-packing plants in Russia, and a large oil and fats combine. These branches were practically untouched by the recession. But the metal-processing industry really was hit badly. Such large-scale associations as Tochmashpribor and Elektrotekhnicheskii Zavod today have a production slump of more than 50 percent.

Of course, the thing that largely saves us is the fact that Armavir is one of a few cities in Russia that have their own land totaling more than 200,000 hectares.

[Goryunova] Is the privatization of the land in progress?

[Troitskiy] We are not speeding up this process. It is a pity that even today, as used to be the case in previous times, much is being done by the fiat method. Including privatization. In a few places people want to be privatized, and in a few places they do not want to be. Certain people want to work the way that they used to. So the sovkhoses have been practically preserved. It is simply that now they are called associations. Nevertheless we already have 47 individually owned farms. Every city dweller has either a vegetable garden, or a plot where he lives, and some people have two or three each. Approximately 10-12 hundredths per resident. For purposes of comparison: in the Netherlands, it is 3 hundredths per capita. Moreover, half is for export. That is the low effectiveness of land use that we have.

[Goryunova] You have worked in various branches of authority—representative and executive. What is your attitude toward the present system of authority? What do you think is hindering its normal functioning?

[Troitskiy] I am absolutely convinced that there should be no representative authority. What we need is a legislative agency. My entire vast experience proves this. The authority must be responsibly executive. But we do

not have a single monitoring agency that is responsible for anything. Therefore the process of the struggle between the two branches is endless. The representative agencies want to direct the executive authority and want to shift the errors and responsibility to it. The authority, I repeat, must be just one. It must bear the legislative responsibility. But in our area the court does not operate! So the representative authority assumes the allocational and monitoring functions. So long as that exists, we shall not live any better.

If one speaks about today's Government, I would begin with the major consideration. Until it turns its head toward the commodity producer, and as long as the banks enrich themselves at the expense of the producer, the strained economic and political atmosphere will be preserved. And, secondly: the executive, economic authority must not engage in politics. But our Government, by delving into politics, is ignoring economic matters. It is necessary immediately to begin thinking about the producer, and to remove those stifling taxes—the strangle holds of the banking system. Then the people will begin to breathe again, I assure you, and the rallies will end. Thirdly: it is necessary urgently to reduce the apparatus. It is expensive and uncontrollable.

[Goryunova] Today there is a holiday in your city. The home-museum of your hometown writer Savva Dan-gulov is being opened, with an exhibition of his second collection "The Artist and the Muse"...

[Troitskiy] Savva Artemyevich was a remarkable person who ardently loved our city. We were friends. I helped to implement his idea and dream of creating an art gallery in the downtown children's library. The home-museum is finally opening, and I hope that it will become the cultural center of Armavir. The creative intellectuals will gather here. I am absolutely convinced that, without the development of culture or its preservation, it is impossible to build anything. Today the lack of culture is pulling us toward the West. It is necessary for culture to be the property of everyone, not just a matter for the intellectuals.

#### **Nizhniy Novgorod Housing Construction Success Detailed**

944F0647B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian  
28 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent Valeriy Orlov, Nizhniy Novgorod, under rubric "Response": "People Want To Create a Construction Boom in Nizhniy Novgorod"]

[Text] The article "House-Warmings in Nizhniy Novgorod" in the 12 April issue of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has received a large response. The newspaper's correspondent center in Nizhniy Novgorod has already received a large number of telephone calls and letters. The readers ask whether, during a period of economic instability, it is really possible without state support to engage

**successfully in such an expensive matter as the construction of housing. And who is this Vyacheslav Rasteryayev?**

I admit that, prior to my acquaintance with the affairs of the Nizhegorodskiy Dom company, I myself was a big skeptic in this regard. But now I am convinced that such structures have a real future. It is precisely these structures that will create a healthy and massive housing market.

The creator, brains, and chief motivating force of Nizhegorodskiy Dom is Vyacheslav Rasteryayev. He is 43 years old. Born in Tver. After graduation from the Moscow Motor Roads Institute, went to Gorkiy. And he has been working there for more than 20 years. He was a foreman and chief of an SMU [construction-installation administration], managed the city's water canal, and worked as the deputy chairman of the rayon and city Soviet.

**Why did he undertake not the trading of Snickers, but the erecting of housing?**

"The construction conveyor belt began to fall apart as a result of the sharp slump in centralized investments," Vyacheslav Alekseyevich says. "The collectives that had become accustomed to sensing the constant concern 'from the top' were left without work. But I had communicated with construction workers for my entire life, and I was convinced that I could rectify the situation. But at first I decided that it was necessary to seek new approaches to the formation of sources of construction. Namely, to work with the population, because people do have money."

Having proved by deeds its probity, Nizhegorodskiy Dom acted as the initiator of the construction of the first municipal bank in Russia, which would operate only with the population, but would direct the attracted monetary amounts to the construction complex. The idea was supported by the city administration, which also acquired the controlling block of several large-scale enterprises. That is how the Nizhegorodskiy Kredit municipal investment bank appeared, and Vyacheslav Rasteryayev was elected, ex officio, chairman of its board of directors.

The new bank immediately became the most popular one with the people of Nizhniy Novgorod. First, because people had become accustomed to trusting their authorities. And, secondly, it is simply advantageous to deal with it! The Nizhegorodskiy Kredit bank has approximately 20 types of deposits, and they all operate for the benefit of the local residents.

Take, for example, the housing-accumulation deposit. By using it, it is possible without hurrying, over a 15-year period, to accumulate enough money for an apartment. It is aimed basically at parents who are thinking about their children's future. After concluding a contract with the bank, the depositor of the housing-accumulation deposit, through his accounting office, transfers two to

three minimum wages every month. Today the minimum wage is approximately 15,000 rubles. For a family in which everyone is working, it is not difficult to pay 30,000-40,000 rubles a month. Then, when the child is grown, he is assured of having housing. Incidentally, whoever wants to can transfer even more, and then, naturally, he will get the apartment more quickly.

Figures give convincing evidence of the popularity of the municipal bank among the people living along the Volga. During the past four months more than 4 billion rubles were attracted from the population. And the monetary stream is building up. Currently the bank takes in from the people of Nizhniy Novgorod 120-140 million rubles a day. All this money will soon be converted into comfortable apartments.

"Currently we are beginning to carry out a new idea," V. Rasteryayev says. "It is the housing municipal loan. Its bonds, of three types, are planned for a three-year period. The first is at a rate of 700,000 rubles per square meter of housing space. If, for example, you want to purchase a one-room apartment over a one-year period, you purchase the necessary number of bonds that correspond to the metric area at that price. But if you need an apartment the next year, that bond will cost 550,000 rubles. If, however, someone is in too much of a hurry and he can be patient for three years, then he must pay for each bond, and, consequently, for each square meter of his future housings, not 700,000 rubles, but only 480,000. The bonds in this loan will also participate simultaneously in the drawing of apartments."

**"But what about inflation?"**

"We have gotten away from this insidious concomitant of our day reducing the construction periods. Whereas the 'usual' construction workers will erect homes in two years, we will build them in six months. We achieve this by working in two or three shifts, with the smooth operation of the entire construction conveyor belt. There is also no problem with materials. We always have them on hand. And any kind that is needed, whether they come from Finland or Italy, or even from Chuvashia."

Chuvashia was mentioned, of course, not accidentally. It turns out that it is more advantageous to bring in and install reinforced concrete from the neighboring republic than it is to buy it from the nearby Nizhniy Novgorod enterprises. The quality of the shipped-in concrete is better, and the concrete costs less. But many of the local suppliers of building materials continue to operate the old way: the more metal and concrete they bang around, the better.

Rasteryayev has a different principle: reduce the amounts of metal, the expenditures of electrical power, cement, and other materials; reduce the construction periods; and take a serious attitude toward cost accountability. Because most of the construction builders have gotten so close to this line that people will no longer be able to buy housing because it is so expensive.



Rasteryayev was nominated as a candidate in the recent election to the Nizhniy Novgorod city Duma.

"At first I had my doubts about whether I needed this," he recalls, "but, after thinking that, instead of me, the person elected to the Duma might be some sweet-talking temporary person who would not help the city in any way, I gave my consent to run."

And he won, as the expression goes, with a clear advantage. At the first organizational meeting of the Duma, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich was elected chairman of the commission for construction, architecture, and land relations.

Rasteryayev has already proven to his constituents that he had good reason for becoming a deputy. He proposed a unique self-reproducing mortgage scheme. The city will allocate, for example, to its municipal bank 14 billion rubles. By using that money it can build 500 apartments this year. Naturally, the expended money will not return rapidly to the city treasury. Rasteryayev proposed doing this: these 14 billion "work" in the bank and grow to 40 billion. From that amount the city will get back its 14 billion, and with the remaining 26 billion it will be possible to build, with a consideration of inflation, 350 apartments. The city will distribute these apartments—to doctors, teachers, people in the military—and will transfer the lists to Nizhegorodskiy Dom. The company will offer the potential tenants the opportunity to buy those apartments by installment payments, for example, over a 25-year period, with a payment of one to two minimum wages a month. The average cost of an apartment is currently approximately 40 million rubles. Over a 25-year period that amount will be converted to a negligible amount.

At the same time the mortgage fund will be constantly augmented by the tenants' payments, guaranteeing a stable work order for the construction workers. And there is monitoring, since the bank is a municipal one. Thus, by investing the money once, it is possible to force it to work for a long time.

Rasteryayev's scheme was reviewed and approved by the city administration. Now it is up to the Nizhniy Novgorod Duma to have its say.

This is a matter for the near future. But Nizhegorodskiy Dom already has something with which to please its fellow city dwellers during the current half-year. In a month a 200-apartment building will be able to accept new tenants. In June the largest recuperation center in the Volga region, and perhaps in all of Russia, will be turned over. It has a swimming pool, saunas, practice rooms, and medical offices. The doors of several bank branches are also opening. Work is actively continuing to build three major housing projects simultaneously.

"In order to break through the dam of the depression, it is necessary to create a building boom in the country," Vyacheslav Rasteryayev states. "Only a construction flywheel can get the country's economy moving again."

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### Duma Hearings on Ex-Yugoslavia Previewed

944Q0355A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
5 May 94 p 3

[Article by Aleksey Kirpichnikov: "The Duma Will Support the Serbs on 11 May: The Delegation Will Report on Its Trip to the Former Yugoslavia"]

[Text] As we all know, having returned from its trip to the former Yugoslavia, the official State Duma delegation intended to report immediately, but the assassination of Deputy Aydzersis and the Duma's move to Okhotnyy ryad prevented this. The report was postponed until the first day after the holidays. The two-week delay has changed the context of the Yugoslav "show-down": both in consequence of the dynamic situation in the Balkans and on account of the Accord Treaty. Chapter One of the document contains clause 6, which was absent from the drafts of 20 and 26 April: "The subscribers to the treaty undertake to contribute in every possible way... to implementation of a unified national foreign policy course."

The set goal of the delegation was to visit the territories of the parties to the conflict and to conduct an impartial investigation. Representatives of all registered factions headed by General Nikolay Bezborodov, from the communists, set out for the Balkans. There was piquancy in the fact that Deputy Bezborodov, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee, being a member of the Communist Party, is part of Sergey Baburin's Russian Way group of deputies. And reporting on his trip to the Balkans, the latter had back on 8 April not only advocated the abandonment of sanctions but also proposed how this be done, spitting in the face of the world community: delivering commodities by ship along the Danube, and if Bulgaria or Romania "order us to stop, we are not required to do so." Considering the supremacy of the "railroad engineer"-general and the presence of the Zhirinovskiyite Vyacheslav Marychev, whose position, like that of his faction boss also, is a whole lot worse than that of Mr. Baburin, there were serious doubts as to future impartiality. This would in jury selection have sufficed for rejection, here, however, it remained to hope that those on the assignment would overcome the actual stereotype.

A rough idea of the course of the future discussion was provided by the news conference given by the delegation, already described in SEGODNYA, which was held on the Duma's final day of business on Novyy Arbat. The first conclusion was that, contrary to Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, vice speaker from the LDPR—Zhirinovskiy Party—the trip was not "political tourism": Thanks to the Foreign Ministry and the embassies in Yugoslavia and Croatia, the members of the Duma were able to visit Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia, and the republics of Serbia

and Serbian Krajina and to meet with their top leaders and also with the representative of the UN secretary general and the commander of the UN force in Bosnia.

The second was based on the communique on the preliminary results, which affirmed four positions: the anti-Serb information campaign and violation of the principle of equal responsibility, the need for the lifting of sanctions and preservation of the embargo on arms supplies, a weakening of the role of the United Nations thanks to the delegation of a number of functions to the North Atlantic bloc, and mistakes of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the diplomatic recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the approval of sanctions. It was proposed that the efforts for their cancellation be made exclusively within the framework of the United Nations here.

The third conclusion concerned the members of the delegation. General Bezborodov was a pleasant surprise. He approached the problem in military fashion: If an objective investigation is needed, investigate objectively we will. And the other members of the delegation, while supporting their Yugoslav and Serbian brothers, did not go beyond the framework of the communique and did not propose exotic means of a lifting of the blockade like the said breakthrough along the Danube or the basing of the Russian Navy on the Adriatic coast (the suggestion of that same Vice Speaker Vengerovskiy). Mr. Marychev was, naturally, the exception: To SEGODNYA's question as to who "the geopolitical forces of evil" in the region visited actually are, the deputy named NATO and only NATO. Indeed, it followed from the news conference that the NATO people are suffering from "Captain Tushin's disease" and that the UN representatives are having difficulty keeping them from pulling the trigger of the "hanging gun." And that in tactical ability General Mladic has repeatedly gotten the better of General Rose and that the latter is annoyed at this. But it was not NATO that began the war in the Balkans and slaughtered peaceful inhabitants, and General Mladic is more significant than Yeruslan and, judging by his conduct and his relations with Mr. Karadzic and his remarks about NATO, bears a striking resemblance to the words of Mr. Marychev. The fact that the latter remained in the minority at the news conference permits the hope of the similar location of his faction on 11 May.

The day promises to be, if not sensational, then tumultuous. The first three points of the communique, although they could arouse the deputies' ardor, will for all that most likely be approved by the Duma. But discussion of the fourth point—charges leveled at the Foreign Ministry—promises to be serious. Andrey Kozyrev is a member of the Russia's Choice faction, and it was not fortuitous that it was only the Russia's Choice representative who failed to sign the communique as a whole. It was he, Aleksey Sarychev, incidentally, who raised at the news conference the question of the need for a closed sitting on 11 May. Why so open a discussion would inflame passions in the Balkans, whether such will be the opinion of the faction and whether it would be

approved by the Duma, and, finally, whether it would not be better to follow the words and styles than take umbrage at journalists getting information by the "tainted telephone" from the garrulous members of parliament remained unclear.

One thing, however, is clear: The discussion will lead to recommendations for a change in Russia's Balkan policy, and possibly to demands for personnel reinforcement of the Foreign Ministry also. And whereas the Duma lacks the constitutional license for the latter, as the Mr. Yerin incident shows, it could make recommendations, as mentioned at the news conference, law. It could, if turned down by the Federation Council or the president, be approved, all the same, by the Duma by a two-thirds vote—and, judging by the news conference, it has this.

I believe, however, that following the Accord Treaty the president would not go against the Duma, especially since movements at the Foreign Ministry are obvious. In addition, the two-week breathing-space has most likely been used for active consultations between members of the delegation and the Duma leadership and Russian diplomats. Of course, observance of the clause concerning a "unified foreign policy course" could be impeded—if the Duma devotes its first sitting to a discussion not of Yugoslavia but of the methods by which Ivan Rybkin won from the lower house the right to sign the treaty and if this treaty signature is disavowed. But such a development of events is unlikely and constitutes a different subject, what is more.

#### UN Criticized for 'Distortions' in Bosnia Peacekeeping Mission

944Q0343A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 16, 17-24 Apr 94 p A5

[Article by Viktor Kremenyuk, professor, deputy director of the Institute for the United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences: "The UN in Bosnia: Strange Peacemaking"]

[Text] Something strange is taking place regarding the existing concepts of peace and war, law and policy, objectives and means of attaining them. Over the many years of UN operations in support of peace, a fairly stable concept of their principles and tasks has taken shape: disengagement of the warring sides, complete neutrality, avoidance of political assessments of the actions of one side or another, the use of force in exceptional instances, on a limited scale, and only in self-defense. The rules are fairly rigid but dictated by a need for the United Nations to observe a genuine role as peacemaker.

In recent times this noble role has undergone an especially acute and in no way harmless distortion. In the name of the United Nations, squadrons of bombers and armadas of ships are massed. In the name of the United Nations, one party to a conflict is loudly accused while the other is indulged. In the name of the United Nations,

plans for a settlement are drawn up which often do not even manage to ask the consent of those who would be bound by these plans.

The results are plain to see, as they say. How disgraceful the result of the UN peacemaking effort in Somalia has been! The people are starving just as they starved in the past. General Aidid—whom the "peacemakers" hunted so zealously—is prospering. While the "peacemakers" themselves, having spent tremendous amounts of money—that could have been used to feed half of Africa—have vanished. No less incredible are their actions in Rwanda, from which they managed to extricate Europeans and Americans with difficulty and are now swiftly retreating, while suffering significant casualties.

A direct example of distortion of the peacemaking role of the United Nations can be seen in Bosnia. In developing the anti-Serbian resolution of the Security Council, clearly aimed at strangling Yugoslavia with an embargo (this resolution has never yielded anything positive), the creators of UN policy in Bosnia applied the theory of "Serbian aggression" to carry out a policy openly hostile to one of the sides in conflict. For a long time ignoring reports on atrocities by Muslims or Croats, they did everything they could to blow up testimony on Serbian atrocities. Ignoring the deep historical roots and causes of the conflict, thereby ignoring its exceptional complexity, they kept reiterating that everything could be resolved in one fell swoop. As a result, a distorted picture of the conflict was established in the minds of many people along with unjustified confidence in the possibility of settling it. It was alleged that the entire affair revolved around "Serbian greed," that the Serbs must be stopped, and that the best way to do this was by inflicting massive combat strikes against their positions.

So now when this very simple thesis was foisted on the Western public, the NATO bloc came upon the scene—out of work and lacking any goal following the Cold War. From all appearances the NATO Council and its secretary general saw Bosnia as a chance to save the bloc and an opportunity to fill the military-strategic vacuum that had formed between Italy and Greece. Yugoslavia was suddenly, and entirely arbitrarily, proclaimed a "zone of responsibility" of NATO. The bloc itself is becoming the "tool of the United Nations" and is prepared to offer the organization its services.

Russia, initially voting in favor of the anti-Serbian resolution of the Security Council (the first major mistake of its foreign policy in the Yugoslavia crisis), is becoming a coparticipant, against its will, in this game which is fraught with tragedy. We can now attempt to clarify who issued the order to begin the bombing in Bosnia and why. We can deplore the disgraceful result of the "Churkin mission" that began with such success. We can take offense at the fact that—you see, "they did not consult Russia." We can and must accuse the Serbs of obstinacy and stubbornness, and of causing the latest collapse in the negotiations process.

But we cannot close our eyes here to the nature of the political actions of the West in Bosnia. These actions, culminating in the recent NATO bombings, do not facilitate a peaceful settlement, but rather impede it. And the United Nations, which must of course be given its due for the organization of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia, bears its share of responsibility for the breakdown of the negotiations.

It would be useful for the UN leadership to remember the original objectives of its organization. These do not consist of encouraging NATO attempts to resolve all the problems with bomb strikes. That is clearly a dead end. On the contrary, the United Nations must return to its mission of peace, not turn into a warring party in the Bosnian conflict. Otherwise the United Nations risks getting entangled in its own Vietnam.

### **Palestinians Thought To Be Seeking Closer Ties to Washington**

944Q0361A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 6 May 94 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Gornostayev, Cairo-Moscow, under rubric "Near East": "Moscow as a Diplomatic Regulator: The Two Sides Are Turning to Washington for Economic Support"]

[Text] Just yesterday, the next day after the signing of agreements concerning the introduction of partial Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, experts began consultative work on the forces of the Palestinian police. The participants in the training of the new ministers of law and order will also include Moscow, but to a rather small degree: 45 future Palestinian policemen will undergo training in Russia, and, in addition, Moscow will provide certain equipment to the PLO. On the part of Israel there are no obstacles to this kind of apportionment. The main problem is to carry out the pledges promptly. But it is difficult to do this without a good economic base. The lack of this base also largely influences the placement of the foreign forces in the Near East, where one currently senses to a greater and greater extent the dominance of the United States. Naturally, a rather large part of the financial and economic support for developing Palestinian autonomy directly or indirectly—by way of Israel—comes specifically from there. Tel Aviv has traditionally gravitated toward Washington, but now that tendency is also typical, to a certain degree, of the PLO. Understandably, Yasir 'Arafat currently, after the attainment of peace, has a self-interest primarily in economic support, in order to demonstrate to his people the fruits of peace and to prove to them all the practical advantages of goodneighborly coexistence with Israel.

The appeal was made to Moscow when Israel and the PLO were confronted by questions with regard to which they did not trust one another, and it was difficult to manage without Russia. Evidence of this is provided by the recent visits to Moscow made one after the other by



Yasir 'Arafat and Yitchaq Rabin. Judging from the fact that the agreement of autonomy was signed two weeks after the visits to Russia by the Near East grandees, Moscow succeeded in playing its role in this matter, by speeding up the settlement process. It would seem that no small role has been played here also by the traditional ties: Palestine-Russia (in the past, the USSR) and Israel-United States. Trust does exist along these lines. It also exists along the US-Russia line, especially since both these countries are acting as cosponsors of the Near East settlement. The fact that the two sides of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could not talk to one another face to face was transmitted until recently along the chain PLO-Russia-United States-Israel, or in the reverse order, or even without the third link. Now, however, the Palestinians are seeking greater trust and ties on the part of Washington.

There was also a clarification of the details of why Rabin and 'Arafat signed the agreement twice. The PLO leader, while viewing the so-called Blue Folder—the detailed appendix to the agreement—at first did not want to sign it, and appended a statement to the part pertaining to questions of security, with demands for additional guarantees from the cosponsors—Russia and the United States. During the urgently announced break they were given to him, and the agreement was consolidated by signatures a second time.

Speaking about peace in the Palestinian sector, Shim'on Peres, Israeli minister of foreign affairs, stated that his country would strive for the same resolution with respect to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.

As for the first of these states, it is assumed that here Russia has certain levers for exerting pressure on the Arab side, confirmation of which will be provided by the definite results of the visit to Damascus by a delegation headed by Oleg Soskovets, RF first vice-premier. Most probably, the direct contacts between Israel and Syria will proceed secretly, as was the case with the PLO.

### **Russian 'Monroe Doctrine' in Former USSR Decried**

944Q0348A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 Apr 94 p 4

[Article by Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economic and Political Studies: "The Twists and Turns of Russian Foreign Policy Thinking"]

[Text] A certain member of the Presidential Council came out in favor of creating a new Russian foreign policy concept in a very ambitious and direct manner: "In a number of articles in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA I first formulated the central idea that has subsequently become crucial to the perception of Russia's role in the post-Soviet space by all of Russia's leading politicians from the president down to minister of foreign affairs Kozyrev. The gist of it is that the entire geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union falls within Russia's

sphere of vital interests. So that no one would have any doubt as to what was meant by vital interests, I drew a parallel with the Monroe Doctrine. To a certain extent an effort was made by me to formulate a Russian 'Monroe Doctrine' that would be applicable to the situation that has existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union."

As you are aware, the Monroe Doctrine, which proclaimed the principle of "America for Americans," has often been used to justify flagrant U.S. intervention in the affairs of the other countries in the Americas and the imposition of dictates from Washington. Figuratively speaking, the doctrine could be termed an American version of the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

A. Migranyan is incorrect in his presumption that he was the first to put forward the idea of applying the Monroe Doctrine to other circumstances, in this case Russia's. This was done by fascist Germany to justify its struggle for dominance over Europe. On 1 March 1940 Ribbentrop, speaking with Welles, the American president's personal representative, said: "Germany does not wish to have anything more in Europe than the United States has achieved in the Western Hemisphere with the aid of the Monroe Doctrine" (see: S. Welles, "A Time for Decision," New York, 1944, p 95). Hitler made a similar statement on 9 June 1940 in an interview intended for the American press. ("Monatshefte fuer auswaertige Politik," Berlin, 1944, p. 533). Thus a German "Monroe Doctrine" emerged at the height of Nazi Germany's struggle for the European continent.

Now a Russian "Monroe Doctrine" is being imposed on us, but with the slight difference that its "applicability" is restricted to the scale of the former Soviet Union's geopolitical space. Of course, writers of newspaper articles and even presidential advisors are not making policy yet. It is a long way from an idea to its realization. But neither President B. Yeltsin nor minister of foreign affairs A. Kozyrev have distanced themselves from the aforementioned statement by A. Migranyan. Moreover, the Russian minister of foreign affairs himself supports the creation of a sphere of Russian vital interests in the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union and maintenance of a Russian military presence there. Naturally that prompts some suspicion about whether today's Russia might not be heir to great power expansionism.

It seems that first we created difficulties for ourselves by "destroying" the Soviet Union "to its very foundations" without any need to do so, and now we are beginning to overcome those difficulties, which have become a disaster, by reestablishing at the very least a "sphere of special interests" including Russia and the former Soviet—and now sovereign—republics. Now it has become clear even to the uninformed how much more painless, simpler and more reasonable it would be to continue the gradual process of turning the country into a modern democratic community of states that was begun at Novo-Ogarevo. But thirst for power has

dimmed the reason of politicians, and the worst has happened: a catastrophic collapse of the country, with the most severe consequences for its citizens.

Now Zhirinovskiy and his ilk, demagogically playing on Russians' wounded sense of national pride, are threatening to restore the Soviet empire by force of arms. Attempts are even being made to provide a theoretical justification for the manifest destiny of Russian imperial policy. In the article "Imperial Russia Will Live Yet," Viktor Gushchin put it approximately like this: "Those who favored the dismantling of the Union, since they could not comprehend it before, are now compelled to admit that following the collapse of the USSR they will inevitably have in Russia an imperial 'sovereign' in place of the 'elder brother,' with all the consequences that involves. Because Russia simply has no other means of self-determination in the current world structure. Its great power interests already extend too far (by virtue of objective reasons), and too many of its sources of life support (by virtue of the same reasons) now lie beyond Russia's national borders. In short, either imperial Russia or Russia's self-destruction" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 17 September 1993).

We should recall that Hitler convinced the Germans that a "people without space" and without possession of external sources of life support was doomed to perish. Under the slogan of winning that space for a "Greater Germany" he unleashed a world war and plunged the Germans into a national catastrophe. What actually happened was that the FRG, with only about one-half of Nazi Germany's territory and lacking its own natural resources to support it, became the leading industrial power in the world and gain a very high standard of living within four decades after the end of the war, thanks to an efficient economic system and a rational economic policy. Russia has incomparably greater opportunities to do so than Germany does. So why is it once again being prodded onto the fateful path of empire?

It seems to me that the reason behind the resurrection of great power ways of a dubious nature lies not only with Russians' fractured national pride. A major role in this regard has been played by the collapse of Russia's economy and state structure, the corrupted morals of the political elite and society as a whole, the upsurge in crime and mafia penetration of every nook and cranny of the social organism, mafia plundering of the people's property, the transfusion of Russia's national wealth abroad and—most important—the impoverishment and profound disillusionment of the broad masses of the public with post-August reforms by the Yeltsin-Gaydar government. The country's difficult situation and misery are increasingly, and rightly so, associated in Russians' minds with that course and with the American advisors that are behind it. This has resulted in an increase in anti-Western, particularly anti-American, sentiments. The seeds of suspicion have been sown in people's minds: have American advisors intentionally been so persistent in imposing monetarist theory on the Russian

Government as a basis for reform of the Russian economy, a theory which the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank officially rejected over a year ago as unfounded? Is this not a secret plot by the United States to destroy Russia's economic and scientific-technical potential, reduce it to the rank of a third-rate power and turn it into a vassal of American policy? The way post-August economic reforms have been carried out looks very irrational and not at all in line with Russian conditions.

Of course, one could debate the motives behind official and unofficial Russia policy in the United States. This issue requires a very thorough treatment so that we will not, God forbid, go to extremes and subordinate our foreign policy to the wrong guidelines, as was the case in the past. Be that as it may, the fact remains: a new social and psychological atmosphere has emerged in this country as a result of the failures of the post-August course.

Nationalistic great-power extremism from the left and the right has begun to feed parasitically—and successfully—on this new political and psychological situation. This turnabout in the country's political sentiments gave birth to the monstrous Zhirinovskiy phenomenon. Under pressure from the "great power" crowd, who have been making political hay off of anti-government discontent, Yeltsin's inner circle has been forced to restructure its policy, sharply increasing the nationalistic emphases therein and demonstrating with great diligence, appropriately and inappropriately, its enthusiasm for the traditional "special" national interests of Russia as a great power in the Eurasian space.

Another important task facing the president's council is to dispel the impression of it, widely held by the Russian public, as blindly obedient to Western foreign policy, particularly American foreign policy, on many international issues. It is clear that even Washington has realized that the White House's focus exclusively on ordering Yeltsin around could turn against it if opinions such as these continue to win proponents in Russia and cause a further decline in the Russian president's approval rating and threaten his hold on power. In this regard money will not help. Intentional creation of friction in Russian-American relations and a slight reduction in their level would seem to be a more effective approach. Both sides' interests coincide on this point, and some reciprocal efforts have been observed. The NATO decision on the shelling of Sarajevo, which in and of itself looked like political and military insanity, since it would drag the West into a pointless war in Yugoslavia, was countered by Yeltsin's categorical: "We will not permit it!" Then came the sensational Ames case (involving the arrest of Russian spies in the United States), the arrest of an American spy in Russia, mutual expulsions of intelligence officers from Moscow and Washington, and finally Yeltsin's rude refusal to meet with ex-U.S. President Nixon.

It remains a mystery what is the correlation in this shift by the president's inner circle toward great power politics between domestic power struggle considerations, on

the one hand, and inherited great power aspirations, on the other. In any event, continuation and intensification of this practice will inevitably result in the vector of Russian foreign policy deviating substantially from the normal course that would be in keeping with its national interests, and the country will once again be held hostage by the destructive dynamics of imperial policy. That historical lesson is an especially timely one for us at this juncture, considering the situation that now exists in Russia favorable to such a return to the past, as well as the confrontational nature of our president's personality and the clumsiness with which he and the new nomenklatura are striding across the slippery parquet floor of politics.

The time of empires, creation of spheres of influence and filling of political and military vacuums has disappeared irretrievably into the past. They have been replaced by regionally integrating communities of sovereign states. Those communities are not bound together either by the dominance and the authority of a strong individual or by bureaucratic centralism, but rather by processes of economic convergence and mutual penetration. That is the trend around the world. And it is one that cannot be avoided.

The Soviet Union achieved a high level of internal integration, and not just in the economy, though that integration did rest on state-sponsored monopolistic measures by the center, was artificial in nature and therefore folded up like a house of cards in December 1991 as a result of an arbitrary decision by the "troika" to dissolve the USSR. But Russia still has vital interests in the former Soviet republics, just as those republics still have vital interests in Russia. Therefore unilateral proclamation of the near abroad as a sphere of special Russian interests is fundamentally wrong and could have great destructive potential. The only way the issue should be framed is as a concept of interdependence as a basis for development of the CIS. Russia's national interest lies in helping establish an integrating community within the CIS space that will be founded on a socially-oriented market economy and democratic values and will be similar in type to the European Community. This alone can make the CIS viable. A "Monroe Doctrine" will doom it. No one will tolerate Russian dominance and dictates. The joint statement by Kravchuk and Nazarbayev sharply condemning Kozyrev's proclamation of the near abroad as a sphere of Russian vital interests clearly demonstrates that. The initiative by Kazakhstan's president to create a Eurasian Union fits in very well with the concept of interdependence.

The Russian "Monroe Doctrine" is nothing more nor less than a resurrection of the "policy of making enemies" not only in the near abroad but also in the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The current "Drang nach Westen" by the Eastern European countries and their efforts to be admitted to NATO can be attributed to their fear of a revival of traditional Soviet

and Russian hegemonism and expansionism. That is a fairly typical perception of Russian policy among countries in the region.

So what is our policy doing? Instead of dispelling these fears, the president's inner circle is constantly heightening them. How can those countries have confidence in the policy of the Yeltsin administration when, in addition to the Monroe Doctrine, it has also armed itself with a Russian version of Dulles' "massive retaliation doctrine," which envisions Russian first use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on its territory or that of its allies, i.e. the states within the Russian sphere of interests, as follows from an assertion by the president in "Fundamental Principles of Russian Federation Military Doctrine"?

When declaring Russia the successor state to the USSR, Russia's leaders did not even deem it necessary to state that there would be no succession with regard to the Soviet regime's expansionist policy, or to express their sincere apologies to the peoples of Eastern Europe who were the victims of that policy. It is clear that in more than two years' time Russian policy has not succeeded in establishing relations of confidence with the countries of the near abroad and Eastern Europe. Those relations are greatly burdened by the old perceptions of political circles in those countries regarding Russia's imperial aspirations. Those perceptions have been reinforced by the use of outdated means of economic and military pressure against those countries and by a lack of tact and political finesse in relations with them.

According to the laws of action and reaction, the response to growing Russian neo-imperialist tendencies has been symptoms of a Western return to the old "containment policy." The difference from the past is that this containment does not begin along the perimeter of the former USSR's sphere of influence, but rather along the current borders between Russia and the CIS countries, and under circumstances of economic ruin and political instability in Russia, i.e. on very unfavorable terms for Russia. Have the proponents of a Russian "Monroe Doctrine" stopped to consider this?

The current situation with regard to the shaping of Russian foreign policy is in some ways reminiscent of early 1946, at which time the overall orientation of the Soviet Union's postwar foreign policy strategy was determined. It was then that at Stalin's request the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and World Policy developed a concept which suggested that all efforts be focused on reinforcing the country domestically and that the country refrain from expanding the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe and also avoid a confrontation with the West, which the Soviet Union could not sustain. When Stalin read this concept he ordered the institute dissolved and its director, Academician Varga, arrested, along with a number of his colleagues who helped develop the ideas. But in the end it was Varga who was proved correct, not Stalin.



Today it would be a disaster for Russia to slip once again into a state of "cold war" or even lower-level confrontation with the West as a result of returning to an imperialist policy. In that case the United States and its allies would attempt to create a *cordon sanitaire* against Russia in the near abroad. There have been plenty of calls for that already.

Russia's national interests do not require that it pit itself against the West, particularly with an imperialist policy, a Russian "Monroe Doctrine," appeals to countries to remain outside the "Partnership for Peace" or other such twists and turns of Russian foreign policy thinking. What they do require is the country's further progress along the path of political, economic and cultural integration in the family of civilized states from which it was isolated by more than 70 years of totalitarian communist domination. Only on that path can Russia achieve true greatness and prosperity.

### U.S. Debates Over Russian Role Within Former USSR

944Q0349A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
29 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Pavel Podlesnyy, candidate of historical sciences, RAN (Russian Academy of Sciences) Institute of Europe: "Washington Searches for a New Formula for Relations with Russia—The Idea of 'Pragmatic Partnership' Is Moving to the Fore"]

[Text] The question of the foundations on which relations with the present Russian state can and should be constructed occupies virtually the central place in the unusually sharp debate that has developed in U.S. political and academic circles, the American Congress, and in press material concerned with foreign policy. The essence of the issues was stated with exceptional precision in a recent article, entitled "Premature Partnership," by well-known American political expert Zbigniew Brzezinski: "If Russia is no longer our enemy, then what is it—an ally already, or a client, or simply a defeated enemy? What should be the objectives and content of major U.S. strategy after the 'cold war' in relation to the country which, one way or another, is destined to be a force in all world affairs regardless of its present sickened condition?" At the same time rightist conservative figures, above all those closely tied to the Republican Party, reproach the Clinton administration because its proclaimed policy of "partnership with democratic Russia" errs in its exaggerated assessments of Russian reforms, focuses excessive attention on Russia to the detriment of developing U.S. relations with other post-Soviet republics, and prevents the immediate admission of a number of countries of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO. This leads them to demand a rethinking of the whole set of relations with Russia.

The causes of such attitudes are obvious. In the first place, there is the anxiety of a significant part of the American establishment over the future pace and direction of the Russian reforms, the continuing danger of

major social upheavals, and the unprecedented growth of crime in the country. It is noteworthy that during the recent Senate hearings CIA director James Woolsey expressed alarm at the scale of organized crime in Russia, emphasizing that this not only threatens the reforms and undermines the authority of the Russian leadership, but is even beginning to make it more difficult to fight international crime and creates a danger that nuclear materials will be exported from the former USSR. The administration too has begun to show a more restrained view of the future Russian reforms. And while some of its representatives (Talbot) call for recognition of the first positive results of the transformations despite all the difficulties, others (W. Perry) do not preclude the possibility that reforms will break down and an authoritarian regime hostile to the West will appear in Russia, with the resulting return to some form of "cold war."

In the second place, the United States is carefully observing the unending struggle in Russia over foreign policy issues, including relations with the West. An example of this was the debate about the wisdom of Russian participation in the well-known NATO program, Partners for Peace. And special attention is being focused on Russia's relations with the countries of the near abroad. It is perfectly clear that the United States and the West as a whole fear the restoration (in one form or another) of a significant part of the USSR (or Russian Empire) and the elimination of the geopolitical counterweights to Russia, above all Ukraine.

In the third place, the real scale of Russian-American cooperation in a number of areas, above all economic, is still very modest. For example, of the 3.2 billion dollars appropriated by the U.S. Congress since 1992 for assistance to CIS countries, as of March of this year (according to American figures) 282 million had been spent, and 141 million of this went to Russia. One of the reasons for this is bureaucratic and other delays in the action of the American state apparatus. In this connection Congressman L. Hamilton said, "The Russians have a right to complain. Congress is appropriating large amounts of money, which are not being used."

At the present time the main struggle is unfolding between advocates of so-called "consolidation of geopolitical pluralism" in the territory of the former USSR (Z. Brzezinski, H. Kissinger, R. Zelik, and others) and supporters of the idea of "pragmatic partnership," which has recently been stated by U.S. Secretary of Defense W. Perry and represents a modification of Clinton administration policy in relation to Russia.

As for the idea of "consolidation of geopolitical pluralism" in post-Soviet space, it aims at a new isolation of Russia by creating a kind of "buffer zone" of states along Russia's borders. "Only then" argues Mr. Brzezinski, "when an appropriate milieu has been firmly established for Russia so that it can define itself as Russia, will the foundation be laid for strong, true American-Russian partnership."

But even with a quick glance at this idea it is obvious that its realization, or more accurately attempts to realize it, would lead Russian-American relations in exactly the opposite direction and would undermine the foundations of stability on the European continent.

Least convincing of all are the attempts to reduce all Russia's actions toward the other CIS countries to manifestations of, if not openly imperial, then "protoimperial" policy. Russia has more than enough vitally important interests in the territory of the former USSR, and it cannot be said that its new neighbors always given them proper consideration. This is not to mention the fact that the Western states are not showing real willingness to share even a part of the burden of maintaining stability in the territory of the former USSR, with the exception of actions to eliminate nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Belorussia, and Ukraine. And finally, the initiatives relating to various forms of reintegration of some of the former Union republics do not originate solely or even mainly from Russian politicians.

The idea of "consolidation of geopolitical pluralism" within the boundaries of the former USSR assigns Ukraine the role of primary counterweight to Russia's neoimperial aspirations. For this purpose it is proposed to greatly increase economic aid to Ukraine, step up pressure on its leaders to push them toward economic reforms, and offer American political guarantees of Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity. It is true that they do not answer the question: Where will the United States and the West get the tens of billions of dollars needed to save the ruined Ukrainian economy, which is barely staying afloat—and that is largely thanks to the Russian reforms. And finally, the main thing—what does the West intend to do if the Ukrainian state disintegrates and what actions does it expect from Russia in such an extremely dangerous turn of events?

An important role in assuring "geopolitical pluralism" is assigned also to "broadening the scale and perimeter of European security," or more precisely, admitting a number of Central European countries to NATO, which could be done concurrently with conclusion of a treaty on alliance and cooperation between NATO and Russia. The question immediately arises: Why not conclude such a treaty or some kind of major agreement without enlarging NATO? Is such an enlargement really the only option to ensure stability and security in Europe?

The above permits us to draw the conclusion that "consolidation of geopolitical pluralism" is nothing more than an attempt to pursue the policy of "containing" Russia, ignoring the changes taking place in it and in the whole world, especially in European space.

We also must not overlook the fact that although the views described above do not exert a determining influence on Washington's actual policy at the present time, they make their mark in public consciousness and are one of the factors that is forcing the administration to modify its policy somewhat in relation to the Russian

state. This found expression in advancement of the idea of a "pragmatic partnership" with Russia, which presupposes the existence of contradictions and differences in the national interests of the two countries, but also recognized the need for cooperation in many spheres, above all elimination of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, settlement of international crises, and development of contacts between the military establishments. Such cooperation, important in itself, is less subject to domestic changes in any particular country and serves as an important instrument of the stability of Russian-American relations.

### 'Irrationality' Seen in Moves To Assert Great-Power Status

944Q0354A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian  
No 17, Apr 94 (signed to press 26 Apr 94) pp 4-6

[Article by Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya: "Up and Down"]

[Text] The Russian troika-bird has in recent months been thoroughly jolted in the foreign policy pits and potholes: now the ephemeral Sarajevo triumph, now the NATO bombardment. The favorite of diplomatic fortune, Vitaliy Churkin, having in a fit of temper deafeningly slammed the door, had only just vowed, it would seem, henceforward no more assistance for the cheaters—the Bosnian Serbs—and called once again for a march in single formation with the West before Andrey Kozyrev and Vyacheslav Kostikov hastened without delay to clarify the emotional statements of the Russian special emissary.... Hardly had the connoisseurs of world politics (even the venerable wolf Georgiy Arbatov) heralded in unison the start of a new cold war before Boris Yeltsin, following a night-time telephone conversation with the American President, was hastening to reassure us: There has not been nor is there any crack in the relations of the two countries. Up and down, up and down.

The reason for the present "rough air" in Russian diplomacy is, in my view, the fact that some of the interests it is defending are irrational and that it is operating as yet, what is more, according to the "one down, two to carry" principle. This ailment is not new. Around the end of 1989 or the start of 1990 I, totally confused by the unintelligible foreign policy vocabulary, inquired of one of its creators: "How is the fact that the Warsaw Pact is changing from a military-political into a political-military organization to be understood?" "It is not," came the response. It is merely a signal that we are not to be feared." Simply a signal....

### Serbia Passions

It is hard to find a reasonable explanation or justification for the fact that in some parts of the world, where Russia's real interests are weak, Muscovite diplomacy is demonstrating effervescent activity, in others, on the

other hand, where for the sake of the cause dispatch should be shown, an Oblomov-like unruffled composure reigns. Let us take the most burning example—Serbia. Historical ties to it had been erased almost completely in the national Russian memory. Throughout the period between the two world wars, particularly following the rupture of relations in 1948, Yugoslavia was de facto on the periphery of Soviet foreign policy interests. In 1981 the world was in a state of agitation as to whether Soviet troops would be entering a Poland infected by the rebellious spirit of Solidarity. Several years later there was anxious conjecture as to how the Kremlin would react to Budapest's statements of its desire for the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. An invasion of Soviet tanks was never a serious threat to Yugoslavia, on the other hand, it was considered self-supporting. Its image in Soviet public opinion of the 1960's-1970's remained more symbolic than real: The supporters of a reform of real socialism wanted to see it as the embodiment of the open society and profound transformations, democracy, and prosperity, for the dogmatists, on the other hand, it embodied the betrayal of the socialist idea. Not just Yugoslavia but also other countries, with which we were linked far more closely in both the economic and military-political respects, Poland or Czechoslovakia, for example, were seen by the majority in the same symbolically simplistic manner, come to that. But in time Warsaw, Prague, Budapest receded into the background, into the "gray zone" of Russian interests. The people's orators are not making a clamor even about Bulgaria, Slav, Orthodox, and bound to Russia by historical ties, which currently seems particularly important to some people, nor are the Cossacks straining to go there. Around Yugoslavia, however, which has plunged into the tailspin of an endless bloody war, in which neither the just nor the guilty can any longer be discerned, truly unheard-of passions are raging in Muscovy.

It is possible that these passions are so tumultuous for precisely the reason that they have merely a conditional bearing on their subject. Both the communists and the nationalists are pursuing in the new Yugoslavia their own, clearly expressed political interest: Mixing truth with invention, they are stylizing Serbia as the victim of a world conspiracy (imperialist and/or Yid-Masonic, Muslim—these are details according to taste) which has led to the disintegration of a formerly unified multinational state. How everything occurred in actual fact plays exactly no part at all. This is convincingly shown by both the confidences of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, rare in their ignorance, and the response to them of his supporters. They are seeking merely transparent parallels to first emotionally transfer Soviet-Russian reality to Serbia and then "accept the justice of it." And, of course, to bring it back to Russia—in the shape, for example, of "Karadzic's red folder," with which the Duma members are about to be gladdened by their colleague Marychev.

#### After the Third Call

Unfortunately, the main motif of the highly active Russian diplomacy in Bosnia also is not so much protection

of the peaceful population and an end to the fratricide as, primarily, the self-assertion of Russia as a great power and emphasis of the range of its global interests. What was perfectly obvious previously also was confirmed once again by the comment that fell from Churkin's lips as regards the fact that Russia is not one of your banana republics. When, in the wake of our diplomacy's notorious Sarajevo triumph, the Bosnian Serb aircraft were shot down, this should have served as the "first call" for a conceptualization of the Balkan actions. But two more, loud and resonant, were required: the NATO bombing and Churkin's clash with the Bosnian Serbs over Gorazde, for the Foreign Ministry to take a time-out, and for the news media to pour cold water on Russian diplomacy. Perhaps this will bring it back to the soil of rationality. Although the coming Duma debate on Bosnia—against the background of the struggle for the signing of the Social Accord Treaty—is not all that reassuring in this respect.

The question, however, is how this rationality is to be understood and what sort of practical steps ensue from it. It is possible to swing to the opposite extreme and argue: Since Russia has at this time no priority national interests in the former Yugoslavia, it should pull out the peacekeeping formations from there—and the sooner, the better. Since there is nothing there by which we may "profit," let us at least make a show of our pacifism.

It is somehow awkward even inquiring: Is it merely a question of the fact that Slavs and Orthodox are dying in Bosnia? The war is carrying away *human* lives and crippling people's futures. And it is for this reason, not on account of some ideological chimeras or sovereign-power considerations, that Russia should not, of course, abandon its efforts for an end to the war in Bosnia. Whether they require the presence of Russian "blue helmets" or not, how long the presence of Russian soldiers is needed there and on what terms—this derives from the main thing: concerted actions with other countries of the world community attempting to untie the Bosnian knot. Doing this is hard enough as it is, but if, in addition, Russian great-power ambitions come to be interwoven in it, this knot altogether could not fail to become Gordian.

An end to the fratricide in the former Yugoslavia is undoubtedly in our interests. Not, moreover, irrational and "perverted" but entirely real—both general and palpable, material—inasmuch as we could in peacetime trade and cooperate without regard to blood and soil—with advantage and in the open (not as now, in secret, under the cover of "third countries").

#### 'Russia in a Crowd'

But let us take another problem—the absence for Russia of allies outside of the CIS. Each in its own way, but almost all political forces of the country—particularly in connection with the prospect of the expansion of NATO and the Partnership for Peace program—are speaking about the threat of strategic isolation and about a Black



Sea-Baltic cordon sanitaire allegedly threatening to cut Russia off from Europe. This question requires action and serious decisions, but what is not there is not there.

Truly, the USSR's former Warsaw Pact allies and the Baltic countries are reorienting at full speed toward the West. Fear of Russia, even if deliberately stoked by politicians, has nonetheless become a phenomenon of the mass mentality, which it would be impermissible simply to brush aside. It is at times so deeply rooted in the national memory that it cannot be simply rationalized just like that, overnight. An example is Poland, which was divided three times, by Russia and Prussia included, and a fourth time by the USSR and Germany, which subsequently swallowed up its eastern neighbor also. The Poles hated and feared the Germans no less than the Russians. But in recent years—and not only on account of the Deutsche mark but mainly owing to the perseverance of the German Government and the public—the picture has begun to change.

And Russia? Infrequent and unsuccessful, inadequately prepared visits. Proposals not meeting with a response in society, the absence not only of a formulated policy but even of a real desire to formulate it. And, most important—a dialogue with the United States or Germany over the heads of the small Central European or Baltic countries, to whom their ridiculously insignificant place in world politics is without compunction pointed out at every available opportunity.

I quote Andranik Migranyan, a member of the Presidential Council: "...we can no longer be first in line at NATO's doors. These doors are already surrounded by Romanians, Estonians, Slovaks, and Czechs. Ukrainians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are straining to get there also. It would be amusing to see what Russia, militarily still a superpower, would look like in such a crowd, where everyone is shouting about the threat emanating from Russia and for this reason wishes to lean against the powerful shoulder of NATO in the search for a guarantee of his territorial integrity and security.... Russia could hardly be the same type of candidate as, for example, Estonia and Poland, and Russia would hardly have the same commitments to the world community as the countries that have today swarmed all over NATO's doors." Justifying to a group of German and other West European politicians and scholars Russia's desire to obtain special status in the Partnership recently, Duma deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov (Party of Russian Unity and Accord) returned several times to one and the same purely hypothetical situation, which was, he believed, to have demonstrated the absurdity of the desire to put vast Russia on a par with some small country: "NATO decides, say, to stage exercises of a peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. When the decision is being made, what, would

the vote of Iceland, merely because the latter is a full member of NATO, outweigh that of Russia?"

#### **In the Language of Prince Gorchakov**

A preoccupation with the dimensions of Russia and a reluctance to evaluate them anew and find some basis for dialogue with the Central European and Baltic countries are irrational and lead, therefore, to an impasse. This, in fact, is the result at which Migranyan also arrives: "The analysts who say that in not having affiliated with the Partnership for Peace program and, subsequently, NATO also we would be condemning ourselves to strategic isolation are absolutely right. But it is just as correct also that in having consented to participate in the Partnership for Peace program with the preservation of the NATO bloc, which would decide who could become a full member of the bloc and when and how, we would find ourselves isolated." There is no solution, apparently, other than a cold war, for from the flight of the sovereign-power bird only NATO and Russia are visible. The rest are not worthy of attention, a trifle thronging around doors and deserving, at best, cross-guarantees. It would be more correct to call such a position not isolation but self-isolation, and self-isolation on account of inordinate great-power arrogance.

#### **Are We Condemned to a New Version of the Cold War?**

In American policy in respect to Russia also elements of irrationality are quite strong: Not all that comprehending of our chaos, the Americans, in defiance of their own rules, are oriented not so much toward structures as toward persons whom they consider influential. One Russian analyst recently even devoted an unusual article to the "Chernomyrdin phenomenon" and to his possible influence on the process of the adoption in the United States of decisions concerning Russia. With this approach the cooling in Russian-American relations, which is pronounced even now, could result in an abrupt and swift deterioration and breakdown.

This has not yet happened, and the slide toward a new version of the cold war is not a fatal necessity which cannot be avoided. But a mutual misunderstanding between Russian and European (both West and Central European) politicians and political scientists is growing increasingly distinctly. Some are speaking increasingly often in the language of the geopolitics of the start of the 20th century and even Prince Gorchakov, others, in the language of international law. But even in recognizing strength they refer primarily to economic strength. Irrationality, unpredictability, fraudulent signals—these are the anti-values of the European diplomacy of our day, that which could merely repel the Old World from us. Russia is facing one of the most critical foreign policy decisions in its history. At a fork in the road.

### Alternatives to Russian Participation in PFP Urged

944Q0347A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Apr 94 p 4

[Article by Sergey Samuylov: "The Inter-Civilization Approach—Russia Needs To Come Forward With a Counter Initiative to the 'Partnership for Peace'"]

[Text] At the present time NATO is the only political and military structure which unites the main components of Western civilization—North American and Western European—into a single whole. One of the weighty arguments of the Atlanticists, who advocate preservation of the alliance under U.S. leadership in the postcommunist era, is the need to preserve the West as a kind of unified whole.

The fact that, in the opinion of many American experts, Turkey recently has been distancing itself from NATO and claiming leadership in the Islamic world, confirms once again the Western nature of this alliance. Many countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic are literally bursting to get into NATO today, trying to return to the West—undoubtedly their ancient historical, cultural, and geopolitical bosom—as quickly as possible.

If we stand on the ground of historical objectivity, we must recognize that, unlike many Eastern European countries, Russia was never a part of the West. Even if we disregard the adoption of Orthodoxy in the 10th Century, it is well-known that approximately from the time of Peter the Great, that is roughly from the first quarter of the 18th Century, Russia was one of the Great European powers and an inseparable component in maintaining the European balance of powers, but it did not become part of Europe. Despite the significant Europeanization of the ruling dynasty and dominant class, Russia was seen in Europe as an alien, expansionist, and Asiatic power.

One of the primary reasons for this was the different manners of joint historical existence of the different peoples and ethnic groups. Whereas in the European empires the dominant, privileged nation stood out clearly, arrogantly classifying subordinate peoples as inferiors, trying to assimilate them by force and upholding imperial unity by force on the grounds that this nation itself was the representative of the Christian world, true civilization, and so on, and whereas in the later period the monoethnic nation states of Europe were formed by force and at the cost of great bloodshed and numerous wars among them to establish "natural" borders, on the other hand the formation of the Russian Empire differed fundamentally from this European model.

The governing strata of the peoples who joined or were conquered were not annihilated, destroyed, nor deprived of their privileges; rather they were immediately taken into the ruling classes in Russia. What was demanded of them above all was devoted service to the empire. They and their peoples usually kept their unique religious, ethnic, and

cultural features. Despite the periodic attempts of tsarist authorities at forced russification, the Russians who colonized the vast spaces of Eurasia did not become an imperial nation and did not act as the master people in relation to the ethnic groups who were conquered or annexed; assimilation was generally peaceful and painless. That is exactly why many peoples who were threatened with extinction as ethnic groups by more powerful neighbors joined Russia voluntarily, even though their leaders today prefer not to talk about this. It can be said without exaggeration that this difference between Russia and the West is a difference between civilizations.

In other words, the Western model of the attitude toward different civilizations, ethnic groups, and cultures begins from an ideology of Eurocentrism according to which the entire world is a backward province of the West and must be civilized; this justifies their assimilation and Westernization, by force in the past and by other methods today, for their own good. In other words, it takes for granted the establishment of a universal pro-Western uniformity. The Russian model, by contrast, begins from exactly the opposite idea, that preservation of the diversity of spiritual worlds, ethnic groups, and cultures is the natural form of their mutual existence. Put differently, neither the Russian Empire nor the USSR was an empire in the classical, European sense of this word.

One of the main reasons for the conflicts that have occurred and may occur on the periphery of the former USSR is exactly the fact that the leadership of a number of former Union republics, measuring everything by Western standards, are trying to create monoethnic nation states despite the artificiality of their borders. And this does not work for them because the small, separate ethnic groups and territories of these new states prefer the Russian model, which guarantees preservation of their unique ethnic and cultural features. In the European version there is a high probability that they would be lost.

So whereas the West has reasons for a guarded attitude toward Russia because it is in fact a different civilization, the Russians have just as good grounds for the same attitude toward the West. After all, armed aggression from the West has come on the Russian land more than once, bringing a multitude of misfortunes, and it took great exertion of forces to defend our national independence. The historical memory of a nation is a reality which is formed by the centuries, and its action today manifests itself in an extremely guarded attitude toward possible enlargement of NATO and its drawing closer to Russia's borders.

This is even more so when it appears that the West today, while renouncing forceful methods, has not changed its intentions regarding Russia. And they basically amount to the same civilizing mission, to assimilation of Russia, spiritually, ideologically, and culturally first of all, and later politically and economically. Through the "Partnership for Peace" program, the proposal of possible NATO membership, and on the defense level.

If the West is able to get its way their will be a high probability of gradual establishment of pro-Western uniformity all across the planet, but before that there will be a global standoff on a North-South line and in this case the non-European peoples will naturally resist furiously. If Russia preserves and consolidates itself as an independent civilization and a unique political nation, then the natural form of human existence as a great diversity of civilizations, ethnic groups, and cultures will also be preserved.

Russia does not need to walk always on a Western leash; it must come forward with a counter initiative which is linked to possibly joining the "Partnership" program.

It can be proposed to NATO to form a joint, permanent headquarters for conducting peacekeeping operations in Europe, where an equal number of NATO and Russian officers would be working, headed alternately by NATO and Russian generals, who would be given special military units from both the Alliance countries and from Russia. They would be rapidly deployed under his command in the case of a crisis situation. This headquarters should be subordinate not to NATO, but to the U.N. Security Council, where Russian has a veto. The CSCE is still an amorphous forum, not even an international organization, and so it is not suitable for rapid response to a crisis. Such a headquarters can act as a regional or European branch of the U.N. military staff committee, which is permitted by the Charter of this organization.

This version of Russia-NATO partnership would put an end to the deeply-rooted historical distrust of Russians for Western military activity, even under the U.N. flag, and the possible engagement of mixed forces close to Russian borders would not arouse fears. On the other hand, a serious step would be taken in the direction of creating a multipolar, and therefore more stable, postcommunist world order.

For their part, the United States and NATO would get a weighty, truly peace-oriented, and not just Western but all-European substantiation for extending the existence of the bloc, which they have been trying so hard to find since the end of the cold war.

It should also be stated that Russia does not intend to join NATO, even if it joins the "Partnership" program. Such membership is unacceptable for Russia because of its Eurasian location and the possibility of serious complications of relations, primarily with China.

As for the East Europeans, Russia has no power to stop their return to the West, but it is possible to try to direct this process into a course that is more acceptable. It can be suggested that for a start they join the Western European alliance, the EC defense structure, toward which Russia does not have the negative attitude that it has toward NATO.

## 1992, 1993 Foreign Trade Turnover by Sector Reported

944Q0328A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
13 Apr 94 p 11

[Report from the Center for the State of the Economy at the Government of the Russian Federation: "Structure of Russia's Foreign Trade Turnover in 1993 by Sector"]

[Text] The Center for the State of the Economy at the Government of the Russian Federation, on the basis of official statistical data on foreign trade turnover, has conducted an analysis of changes in the branch structure of Russia's exports and imports with states of the far abroad for the first nine months of 1992 and 1993.

## EXPORTS

During the period January-September 1993, as compared with the same period in 1992, the share of production of the fuel and power engineering complex declined somewhat, and amounted to 53.5 percent as opposed to 55.4 percent.

The production share of the metallurgy complex rose from 14.5 percent to 17.1 percent. However, the share of non-ferrous metallurgy declined from 9.5 to 7.5 percent, while at the same time that of ferrous metallurgy increased and amounted to 8.6 as opposed to 5.0 percent.

The share of exports of machine-building production (including deliveries along the line of military-technical cooperation) was reduced from 14.8 to 11.1 percent.

Exports from sectors of the chemical and wood products complex increased from 9.1 to 11.2 percent. However, more significant changes were observed in the timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industries. For the first nine months of 1993 the sector's share amounted to 4.4 percent, as opposed to 3.1 percent for the corresponding period in 1992. But exports of chemical and petrochemical products rose from 6.0 to 6.7 percent.

The share of product exports from the agro-industrial complex showed an insignificant increase—from 2.2 to 3.0 percent.

## Fuel and Power Engineering Complex

### Electrical Power Engineering

In the overall volume of exports, the sector's share is insignificant. For the first nine months of 1993 it amounted to 0.3 percent in all, and remains practically at the level of the corresponding period in 1992.

The value of electrical power exports for the first nine months of 1993 was calculated at \$95 million, as opposed to \$85 million during the period January-September 1992. As before, the main consumer of Russian electrical power is still Finland, whose share of the overall volume is at the level of 85-90 percent.



### Oil and Gas Industry

The share of the oil and gas industry for the first nine months of 1993 declined somewhat with respect to the first nine months of 1992, and amounted to 52.0 percent as against 52.9 percent in 1992. The value of exports from the sector remained practically at the level of the corresponding period of 1992, and the sum total of exported production was \$14.5 billion.

#### Oil

The share of oil (including gas condensate) continues to occupy a leading position in the structure of branch exports: during the period January-September 1993 it amounted to 44.4 percent; that is, it increased by 3.2 percent.

The increase in oil export volume is taking place under conditions of a continuing production slump. During the first nine months of 1993, as compared with the same period in 1992, the decline in oil extraction amounted to 13.3 percent, and initial refinement of oil declined by 15.3 percent. In this connection, the increase in the export volume of oil was made possible primarily by virtue of significant reduction of exports to countries of the near abroad. Thus, oil exports to these countries during the period January-September 1993 declined, in comparison with the corresponding period in 1992, by 43.9 percent, or by 25.5 million tonnes.

#### Gas

Deliveries of gas to the export sector occupy second place in terms of value. The share of export gas in the period January-September 1993 amounted to 36 percent, and with respect to the corresponding period in 1992, declined by 2.0 percent.

The decline in the value of export gas is connected with a decline in the level of both world and contract prices. While the volume of deliveries increased by 6.6 percent, their value declined by 5.2 percent.

### Petroleum Products

The share of petroleum products in sector exports was reduced from 21 percent to 19 percent, which is associated with changes in the structure of deliveries, and with a decline in the level of world and contract prices.

In all, during the period January-September 1993, petroleum products valued at \$2.7 billion were exported, as opposed to \$3 billion during the corresponding period of 1992; that is, exports declined by 10 percent on the average.

In spite of the decline in the value of petroleum product exports, deliveries in physical terms increased by 44.5 percent, or by 8.1 million tonnes, which is also taking place against a background of reduced production volumes.

### Coal Industry

The share of exports of production of the coal industry declined to 1.2 percent during the period January-September 1993, as opposed to 2.1 percent for the corresponding period in 1992. The value of exports amounted to \$322 million, and declined by \$250 million, or by 44 percent.

There were significant changes in the structure for deliveries in the sector: in terms of value the share of exports of hard coal increased from 86 to 98 percent, and the export share of brown coal declined from 14 to 2.0 percent.

### Metallurgy Complex

#### Ferrous Metallurgy

The export share of the sector rose from 5.0 percent in the period January-September 1992 to 9.6 percent in January-September 1993. This is the highest growth among all the sectors. The value of exports increased nearly twofold and amounted to \$2.7 billion as opposed to \$1.4 billion for the first nine months of 1992.

Eighty-five percent of the value of the sector's exports came from deliveries of steel and rolled metal. In the first nine months of 1993, their share was a little lower and amounted to 82 percent.

#### Non-Ferrous Metallurgy

The export share of non-ferrous metallurgy for the first nine months of 1993 declined in comparison with the same period in 1992, from 9.5 to 7.5 percent, while the value of exports decreased by \$600 million.

Changes have been made in the export structure of the sector over the past year. During the period January-September 1992, aluminum comprised 32 percent; nickel, 18 percent; and platinum, palladium and rhodium, 13 percent. During the period January-September 1993, the export share of aluminum amounted to 41 percent; nickel, 16 percent; and platinum, palladium and rhodium, 19 percent.

### Chemical and Timber Complex

#### Chemical and Petrochemical Industry

The share of chemical and petrochemical production showed insignificant increase—from 6.0 to 6.7 percent. The value of product exports from this sector amounts to \$1.9 billion; that is, an increase of 13.9 percent.

#### Timber, Woodworking and Pulp-and-Paper Industries

The share of exports for products of the timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industries increased from 3.1 percent for the first nine months of 1992, to 4.5 percent for the first nine months of 1993. On the whole, exports amounted to \$1.8 million; that is, a 49 percent increase.

Negative trends in the export structure remain and became even more critical: these are connected with a reduction in the export of ready-made products, and growth in the export of raw materials. The share of non-processed wood materials rose from 35 to 41 percent; processed wood materials declined from 28 to 25 percent; and exports of wood pulp from timber were reduced to the level of 1992 (12 percent).

#### Machine-Building

The proportion of machine-building products (including deliveries along the line of military-technical cooperation) declined from 14.8 to 11.1 percent. In absolute terms, for the first nine months of 1993, exports of machine-building products declined in comparison with the corresponding period of 1992 by 23.5 percent and amounted to \$3.1 billion. The decline in exports is rather significant and is approaching one billion dollars.

As in the past, the leading position in product exports in this sector is occupied by motor vehicle deliveries. Their share increased from 26 percent in January-September 1992 to 31 percent in January-September 1993. Next comes deliveries of technological (including boiler) equipment, whose export share has grown from 20 to 27 percent. The share of the remaining kinds of machine-building production decreased slightly in the period January-September 1993, or declined to the level of the corresponding period in 1992.

Changes in deliveries of basic groups of machine-building products for the first nine months of 1993, in comparison with the corresponding period for 1992, in order of decreasing export proportion in the sector, are shown in the following data:

Means of Ground Transport.....	91.2 percent
Technological Equipment .....	99.6 percent
Aircraft .....	50.7 percent
Electrical Equipment.....	71.6 percent
Optical Instruments and Apparati.....	76.5 percent
Rail Transport .....	42.8 percent
Exports of Clocks and Clockworks.....	10.0 percent

#### Light Industry

As in January-September 1992, the light industry product export share was insignificant, and amounted to 0.41 percent as against 0.7 percent. Product exports in the sector declined from \$193 million to \$114 million, or by 40.9 percent

Exports of cotton fabrics dropped by \$40 million. Losses from reduced exports of products made from flax amounted to nearly \$10 million.

The share of deliveries of raw leather goods increased somewhat, from 3.0 to 12.0 percent; for wool, from 2.0

to 4.0 percent; and for clothes from textile products, from 10 to 17 percent. At the same time, not only their export share but also their export value increased—by 230, 13.3 and 4.3 percent, respectively.

#### Food Industry

The production share of food industry exports grew from 1.8 to 2.8 percent; in absolute terms the growth in exports amounted to nearly \$280 million.

A basic increase of \$270 million was provided by virtue of increasing deliveries of fish. Exports of fish grew by 82.1 percent, including a \$150 million increase in sale of fish to Japan; a \$25 million sales increase to South Korea; and a \$43 million sales increase to Norway.

#### IMPORTS

As in the past, purchases of machine-building products occupy the leading position in imports; however, their share is gradually decreasing from year to year, and according to data from January to September 1993, it amounted to 38.5 percent, as opposed to 40.7 percent for the corresponding period in 1992.

The share in product imports from the agro-industrial complex decreased from 28.5 to 25.5 percent. However, the import dynamics of the sectors which make up the complex are taking different directions. For example, the share of agricultural products decreased from 14.8 to 10.8 percent, which is principally connected with a gradual decline in state grain procurement. The share of products from the food industry, on the other hand, increased by 1.0 percent, and for January-September 1993 was 14.7 percent as opposed to 13.7 percent.

Significantly, the share of products from the chemical and timber complex decreased from 12.4 to 8.6 percent. Moreover, the proportion for chemical and petrochemical products decreased from 11.2 to 7.6 percent, while timber, wood-processing and pulp-and-paper products remained practically at the level of January-September 1992

In the period under examination, the share of product procurement from the metallurgical complex increased nearly twofold, and for the first nine months of 1993 amounted to 6.9 percent. At the same time, ferrous metallurgy products increased from 2.7 to 4.1 percent, and non-ferrous metallurgy products from 1.3 to 2.8 percent.

A small amount of growth is seen in the proportion of products from light industry, and its share for the period January-September 1993 amounted to 12.3 percent, as opposed to 11.9 percent in the corresponding period of 1992.

**Machine-Building**

In January-September 1993, as compared with the corresponding period for 1992, purchases of machine-building products declined by more than \$5 billion, and their share of the overall import volume decreased from 40.7 to 38.5 percent.

As in the past, the leading place in imports of machine-building products went to purchases of technological equipment, whose share remained practically at the level of the preceding period, and amounted to 51 percent.

**Metallurgy Complex****Ferrous Metallurgy**

The share of imports of ferrous metallurgy products rose from 2.7 to 4.1 percent.

The year 1993 was characterized by an increase in procurement of ready-made products, in particular pipe, whose share in branch imports increased from 44 to 77 percent, and in terms of costs by a factor of 1.4.

About 42 percent of imports fell to the procurement of pipe for oil and gas pipelines, while 35.6 percent was made up of import of pipe for drilling oil and gas wells. According to information from the Institute on Economic Problems of the Transition Period, production of drilling pipe in Russia has decreased to 8.0 percent of the level of 1992; that is, it has practically ceased. Therefore, it was necessary to make up for their lack on the Russian market by procurement from import.

**Non-Ferrous Metallurgy**

In imports, the share of non-ferrous metallurgy products increased from 1.3 to 2.8 percent, and this is the only sector for which import costs increased in the period January-September 1993 in comparison with the same period of 1992.

The increase took place primarily as a result of an increase from 76 to 84 percent in the share of procurement of raw materials for the aluminum industry. The share of raw material procurement for production of zinc climbed from practically zero to 6.0 percent.

**Light Industry**

The share of this sector in overall import volume rose from 11.9 to 12.3 percent. On the whole, imports of products from light industry declined by \$1.4 billion; however, the rates of decline in this sector, which amounted to 46.7 percent, lag behind the rates of decline for imports as a whole.

During the period January-September 1993, the procurement structure for imports changed somewhat, and the share of basic goods was as follows:

Clothing from Textiles .....	29 percent
Shoes .....	18 percent

Knitted Wear .....	13 percent
Carpets .....	10 percent
Leather Goods .....	9.0 percent
Furs and Fur Goods .....	5.0 percent

**Agro-Industrial Complex****Food Industry**

The share of the food industry increased from 13.5 to 14.7 percent. On the whole, food industry imports were reduced by \$1.5 billion; that is, the rate of decline of procurement of food products amounted to 44.8 percent, which is somewhat lower than the rate of decline for imports as a whole.

**Agricultural Products**

The share of agricultural product imports declined rather significantly—from 14.8 percent in January-September 1992 to 10.8 percent in January-September 1993, which corresponds to a decrease of \$2.4 billion, or 62.4 percent.

Since the mid-1980's, procurement of grain had occupied one of the leading places in Russian imports; however, in 1993 grain imports began to decline in comparison with preceding years. Thus, in the period January-September 1993 the share of grain imports in total agricultural product import volume declined from 91 to 87 percent, which corresponds to a \$2.2 billion reduction in procurement.

**1994 First Quarter Foreign Trade Results**

944Q0327A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
19 Apr 94 p 11

[ADS report: "Foreign Trade Decreased by 5.9 Percent in the First Quarter"]

[Text] Russia's foreign trade in the first quarter of 1994 declined 5.9 percent in comparison with January-March last year, to 13 billion dollars, according to the current data of the State Committee for Statistics. The decline in January-February in comparison with the same period last year was 8.8 percent. The improvement of the quarterly indicator, according to Deputy Chief Vladimir Kiselev of the Main Economic Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, was due to the continued growth of exports and the slight deceleration of the decline of imports. The positive balance for the quarter was 5.2 billion dollars (2.2 billion in January-February).



**Russian Federation Exports in First Quarter of 1994**

Countries	Jan-Mar 93	Jan-Mar 94
Former CEMA countries	11.27	9.91
China, DPRK, Laos, republics of former Yugoslavia	4.38	4.04
Baltic countries	0.71	1.13
Industrially developed capitalist countries	41.82	42.46
Developing countries	34.37	35.05

Total export volume in the first quarter amounted to 9.1 billion dollars, displaying an increase of 5 percent over the volume for the first quarter of 1993. Exports in March increased to 3.5 billion dollars, as compared to 3 billion in February and 2.5 billion in January. Shipments to industrially developed countries in comparison with

the first quarter of 1993 displayed an increase of 8.4 percent and reached 5.5 billion dollars (2.2 billion in March), and exports to developing countries increased by 5.6 percent to 1.2 billion dollars. Exports to all other countries decreased by 2.3 percent, declining to 2.4 billion dollars.

**Russian Federation Imports in First Quarter of 1994**

Countries	Jan-Mar 93	Jan-Mar 94
Former CEMA countries	7.59	4.57
China, DPRK, Laos, republics of former Yugoslavia	8.64	5.90
Baltic countries	0.25	0.26
Industrially developed capitalist countries	41.76	44.64
Developing countries	28.15	38.06

Exports of crude oil increased by 3.1 percent to 18.5 million tonnes, shipments of petroleum products increased by 14.8 percent to 6.6 million tonnes, and exports of natural gas increased by 11.8 percent to 28.4 billion cubic meters. In terms of cost, however, exports of crude oil and petroleum products decreased by 17 percent and 20 percent respectively—because of the

drop in world prices in 1993. Exports of nickel and aluminum more than doubled. As Mr. Kiselev pointed out, the increase in exports of primary aluminum was accompanied by an even larger increase (2.7-fold) in imports of aluminum ores and concentrates, much of which come here as part of "tolling" operations (ore imports paid for with finished metal products).

**Main Russian Exports in First Quarter of 1994**

Name	Units of measurement	1994		1994 in % of 1993		Price per unit, dollars		% of total	
		Quantity	Amount, millions of dollars	Quantity	Amount	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			9066.4		105.0			100.0	100.0
Fresh-frozen fish	thousands of tonnes	197.7	155.2	110.5	62.0	785.0	1398.8	1.7	2.9
Calcium phosphate	thousands of tonnes	161.7	7.9	686.7	840.2	48.8	39.9	0.1	0.0
Portland cement	thousands of tonnes	8.7	0.2	38.7	26.5	20.9	30.4	0.0	0.0
Asbestos	thousands of tonnes	8.5	2.9	37.2	39.4	338.9	320.0	0.0	0.1
Iron ores and concentrates	thousands of tonnes	2354.9	51.9	247.6	168.0	22.0	32.5	0.6	0.4
Coal	thousands of tonnes	2729.6	94.5	81.8	85.7	34.6	33.1	1.0	1.3
Coke	thousands of tonnes	25.1	1.5	116.1	133.1	61.4	53.6	0.0	0.0
Crude oil	thousands of tonnes	18516.6	1666.5	103.1	83.3	90.0	111.5	18.4	23.2

## Main Russian Exports in First Quarter of 1994 (Continued)

Name	Units of measurement	1994		1994 in % of 1993		Price per unit, dollars		% of total	
		Quantity	Amount, millions of dollars	Quantity	Amount	1994	1993	1994	1993
Petroleum products	thousands of tonnes	6603.7	563.0	114.6	79.6	85.3	122.9	6.2	8.2
Natural gas	millions of cubic meters	28385.0	1992.1	111.8	101.7	70.2	77.2	22.0	22.7
Electrical power	millions of kilowatt-hours	1738.0	37.8	172.2	166.7	21.7	22.5	0.4	0.3
Ammonia	thousands of tonnes	869.7	81.1	103.0	108.4	93.3	88.7	0.9	0.9
Methanol	thousands of tonnes	272.9	32.7	130.7	209.4	119.9	74.9	0.4	0.2
Nitrogen fertilizers	thousands of tonnes	1369.3	103.7	127.7	116.3	75.7	83.2	1.1	1.0
Phosphorus fertilizers	thousands of tonnes	1.7	0.3	2.9	4.4	159.4	104.8	0.0	0.1
Potassium fertilizers	thousands of tonnes	575.0	37.7	105.7	95.5	65.5	72.5	0.4	0.5
Compound fertilizers	thousands of tonnes	798.1	98.0	114.9	128.7	122.8	109.7	1.1	0.9
Synthetic rubber	thousands of tonnes	48.7	42.7	117.8	124.9	875.7	826.1	0.5	0.4
Unprocessed lumber	thousands of cubic meters	2003.9	95.0	108.0	91.2	47.4	56.1	1.0	1.2
Processed lumber	thousands of cubic meters	669.7	75.0	135.3	140.1	112.0	108.1	0.8	0.6
Laminate	thousands of cubic meters	79.3	23.0	116.8	131.6	289.0	257.2	0.3	0.2
Cellulose	thousands of tonnes	145.5	32.8	164.0	130.7	225.1	282.4	0.4	0.3
Newsprint	thousands of tonnes	89.0	24.9	181.4	152.0	254.6	303.9	0.3	0.2
Uncut diamonds			151.8		59.4			1.7	3.0
Iron, steel, rolled metal			674.6		185.7			7.4	4.2
Conversion cast iron, spiegel iron	thousands of tonnes	550.2	59.5	366.2	151.9	108.1	106.9	0.7	0.5
Ferroalloys	thousands of tonnes	11.6	12.2	63.8	37.9	1052.4	506.4	0.1	0.4
Copper	thousands of tonnes	21.1	34.4	30.0	51.5	1635.7	2227.9	0.4	0.8
Crude nickel	thousands of tonnes	11.6	51.7	5.5	171.0	4472.7	5488.4	0.8	0.4
Crude aluminum	thousands of tonnes	572.7	489.1	236.2	241.0	854.0	859.0	5.4	2.4
Machines, equipment, vehicles			397.2		67.2			4.4	6.8

Import volume was 24.1 percent below the figure for the first quarter of 1993 and amounted to 3.9 billion dollars (1.6 billion in March, 1.3 billion in February, and 1.1 billion in January), including 2.7 billion (+8

percent) from the industrially developed countries, 0.5 billion (-61.6 percent) from the developing countries, and 0.7 billion (-47.9 percent) from all other countries.

**Main Russian Imports in First Quarter of 1994**

Name	Unit of measurement	1994		1994 in % of 1993		Price per unit, dollars		% of total	
		Quantity	Amount, millions of dollars	Quantity	Amount	1994	1993	1994	1993
Total			3941.0		75.9			100.0	100.0
Fresh-frozen meat	thousands of tonnes	10.6	14.0	46.4	37.8	1321.5	1623.1	0.4	0.7
Poultry meat	thousands of tonnes	10.8	13.2	371.6	507.7	1224.5	896.3	0.3	0.1
Dry milk solids	thousands of tonnes	4.3	14.1	1290.3	1919.8	3294.8	2214.5	0.4	0.0
Butter	thousands of tonnes	14.2	18.9	128.3	117.4	1331.0	1454.6	0.5	0.3
Potatoes	thousands of tonnes	1.2	0.2			178.0		0.0	0.0
Citrus fruit	thousands of tonnes	38.0	21.1	67.1	94.5	556.2	395.0	0.5	0.4
Apples	thousands of tonnes	10.8	3.7	138.3	81.0	341.1	581.9	0.1	0.1
Coffee and coffee substitutes	thousands of tonnes	1.7	5.4	110.2	104.8	3100.0	3259.7	0.1	0.1
Tea	thousands of tonnes	8.2	17.1	92.6	91.1	2095.3	2129.6	0.4	0.4
Grain	thousands of tonnes	372.2	61.8	12.4	15.2	166.1	136.1	1.6	7.8
wheat	thousands of tonnes	193.0	31.6	10.7	12.2	163.5	143.1	0.8	5.0
barley	thousands of tonnes			0.0	0.0		113.2	0.0	0.5
corn	thousands of tonnes	176.9	30.2	26.3	36.3	168.9	122.5	0.8	1.6
Wheat flour	thousands of tonnes	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	375.0	248.2	0.0	0.2
Vegetable oil	thousands of tonnes	5.5	6.2	69.9	97.0	1135.4	817.9	0.2	0.1
Raw sugar	thousands of tonnes	24.6	8.0	5.1	6.7	321.8	246.2	0.2	2.3
Refined sugar	thousands of tonnes	104.5	43.5	37.0	37.1	416.2	415.1	1.1	2.3
Aluminum ores and concentrates	thousands of tonnes	606.3	131.9	273.6	278.9	217.6	213.5	3.3	0.9
Medicines			88.9		104.9			2.3	1.6
Natural rubber	thousands of tonnes	1.5	1.6	25.4	26.6	1016.3	969.4	0.0	0.1
Leather garments			6.4		7.5			0.2	1.6
Fur garments			5.2		16.7			0.1	0.6
Knitwear			49.7		40.6			1.3	2.3



Main Russian Imports in First Quarter of 1994

Name	Unit of measurement	1994		1994 in % of 1993		Price per unit, dollars		% of total	
		Quantity	Amount, millions of dollars	Quantity	Amount	1994	1993	1994	1993
Textile garments			83.3		29.3			2.1	5.5
Leather footwear	thousands of pairs	4012.8	74.2	38.1	47.6	18.5	14.8	1.9	3.0
Iron, steel, rolled metal			23.0		293.9			0.6	0.2
Steel pipe	thousands of tonnes	161.1	121.5	243.7	194.3	754.2	946.1	3.1	1.2
Machines, equipment, vehicles			1310.0		90.1			33.2	28.0
Furniture			37.4		251.9			1.0	0.3

There was an increase in imports of aluminum concentrate (by 174 percent to 606,300 tonnes), steel pipe (by 144 percent to 161,100 tonnes), high-grade rolled steel, and some other commodities. Imports of machines, equipment, and vehicles decreased by 10 percent to 1.31 billion dollars (33 percent of all Russian imports from distant foreign countries).

Imports of the main foodstuffs continued to decrease. Imports of grain were 87.6 percent below the figure for January-March 1993, declining to 372,000 tonnes. Furthermore, as Mr. Kiselev reported, there were virtually no shipments of grain in March, and all incoming shipments in January-February were made in line with 1993 contracts. No contracts with the main foreign suppliers of grain were signed in the first quarter. There were decreases of 54 percent in imports of meat, 83 percent in sugar imports (including 95 percent for raw sugar), 30 percent in imports of vegetable oil, and 91 percent in imports of noodles in comparison with January-March 1993.

#### Government Restructuring Blamed for Foreign Investment Decline

944Q03394 Moscow *FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA*  
in Russian 7-13 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by journalist Mayya Lomidze: "RAMSIR Worried About Its Fate"]

[Text] In the past six months there has been a considerable decrease in the volume of foreign investments in Russian industry. As compared with August 1993, investments have dropped to one-tenth of the previous amount, from \$115.7 million to \$13.8 million. In December the share of foreign capital in the capital stock of SP [joint ventures] constituted 30-40 percent, as compared with 80 percent in July. In the opinion of certain Western businessmen, the reason for this decline was not only the instability of the political situation and

the imperfect nature of legislation, but also the unexpected reorganizations in the agencies of administration.

The edict entitled "The Restructuring of the Federal Agencies of Administration," which was signed in January 1994, essentially eliminates the only agency that used to carry out a more or less consistent investment policy. In accordance with the president's order, the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development (RAMSIR) is transferred to the jurisdiction of MVEs [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] "with transformation into a state enterprise."

Thus, the work of improving the state registry of enterprises is indefinitely postponed. No one knows which department will engage in the registration of the major investment agreements or who will guarantee the work of the Commission on Humanitarian Assistance to Russia, under the RF government.

Currently the government is working on the drafts of edicts entitled "Procedure for State Registration of Enterprises and Physical Entities Engaging in Entrepreneurial Activity" and "Encouraging the Attracting of Foreign Investments Into the Priority Branches of the National Economy." The president's administration is preparing a federal investment plan for 1994. However, if the tendency to "dissipate the functions" of one department among several others is preserved, one would scarcely expect those legislative drafts to be effective.

In the opinion of V. Korolev, deputy chairman of RAMSIR, the actual elimination of the agency will result in the further drop in investments. Potential investors once again will encounter complete confusion when one ministry will engage in providing informational support, another ministry will engage in the registration of enterprises, and a third one will engage in export-import problems.

**Officials Differ on Interpretation of Foreign Investment Edict**

944Q0350A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 27 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Vadim Bardin: "Minfin Challenges President's Benefits to Foreign Investors"]

[Text] [Begin boxed material 1]

**Foreign investments in Russia (data of Minekonomika [Ministry of Economics])**

- There are 12,000 registered enterprises with foreign investments.
- The contributions to the charter funds of these enterprises are estimated at \$1 billion.
- The most dynamic area of foreign investment in Russia is oil drilling. There are 30 registered joint ventures, which in 1994 may extract 9 million tonnes of oil (that is, increase extraction by three times over the last 2 years).

[End boxed material 1]

[Begin boxed material 2]

**The most attractive sectors for foreign investments (based on appraisals of participants in the seminar, "German Investments in Russia")**

- The food industry.** The volume of Russian import of delicatessen food products shows that there is a solvent demand, and Russian tariff policy makes the development of domestic production effective.
- Oil and gas extraction.** Needs no comment.
- Building materials industry.** A boom in the construction of cottages is being observed in Russia.

[End boxed material 2]

Representatives of firms which participated in the seminar, "German Investments in Russia," held yesterday in the FRG [Federative Republic of Germany] embassy, had the opportunity to see with their own ideas the different interpretations of Russian legislation on the part of presidential and government structures. Yevgeniy Yasin (the head of the analytical center under the president's administration) and Igor Noskov (the chief of the Minfin [Ministry of Finance] Department of International Tax Relations) have opposite interpretations of the benefits presented in the presidential edict, "On Improving Work With Foreign Investments."

The seminar which was held was interesting primarily because of its organizers. From the German side this was the Moscow Representation of German Economics—the first step on the road to opening a German chamber of commerce and industry in Moscow (an American chamber of commerce and industry already exists in Moscow). From the Russian side it was the Expert

Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Its director, Yevgeniy Yasin, was recently named to head up the analytical center under the president's administration. So that German businessmen had reason to expect from the organizers of the seminar not only appraisals of the development of the economic situation in Russia, but also support of their interests.

Yevgeniy Yasin characterized Russia's economic position as "naturally-critical, but not catastrophic." The decline in production in 1994 comprised 23 percent in January, 24 percent in February and 27 percent in March. According to Mr. Yasin's evaluation, this is an overproduction crisis, the solution to which is structural reorganization. A typical example is that of the textile industry, which Yasin's institute studied. There is a natural differentiation taking place in this industry: Leaders are emerging (15-16 percent of the 170 enterprises studied) as well as outsiders (24 percent), whose only prospects are—bankruptcy. The tactics of the leaders in 1993 amounted to sales priorities, including export, as well as the total absence of capital investments. In 1994, Yasin believes, these tactics must be supplemented by investment activity. The function of the government is reduced to holding down inflation and supporting private investments. Investment potential has been accumulated in foreign and domestic trade and at the commercial banks. Hopes are riding on the financial consortium of non-state banks and investment companies which is being created, and which will emit state-guaranteed securities and finance projects selected by the consortium itself from among those prepared by Minekonomika. This is not the only project. Thus, commercial banks are prepared to finance an investment project in the sum of \$200 million for production of the Il-96-m. Mr. Yasin's general conclusion was that the situation on the money market (inflation being held down and the positive value of bank interest) make realistic a turn toward stepping up investment activity, without which Russian industry "will not survive."

After such an announcement, the seminar participants turned to the problems of specifically foreign investments. Their attention, not surprisingly, was concentrated on taxes. The application of the VAT [value-added tax] (20 percent) and the special tax (3 percent) to import equipment was characterized as a "tax on investments." The 38 percent tax on "surplus wages" (including that of foreign citizens) was called a "fine." Explanations were presented by Igor Noskov, head of the Minfin Department of International Tax Relations. And it was he who gave the seminar participants their main surprise. Mr. Noskov said that, from the standpoint of Minfin, the 3-year immunity of foreign investments from statutes of the Russian authorities (except for federal laws and presidential edicts) which may inflict

material loss upon them, which was introduced by the 27 September 1993 presidential edict, "On Improving Work With Foreign Investments," does not apply to taxes. The justification for this is that all changes in taxes must be ratified by parliament. The comment of the German entrepreneurs to the effect that the 38 percent tax also did not get the approval of the Federal Assembly clarified the Minfin position: "To let everyone in and not to let anyone out." Igor Noskov's announcement met with sharp reproach from Yevgeniy Yasin, who announced to the satisfaction of the participants that Minfin must carry out the presidential edicts. Moreover, the stipulation of immunity must be secured and expanded (it is presumed that the term of the moratorium will be increased from 3 to 5-7 years) in the changes which are being introduced into the law on foreign investments.

#### **Davydov Promotes Foreign Investment on Overseas Visits**

944Q0351A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Sanko and Ruslan Sakirov: "Davydov Proposes Benefits for Investors; Duma Assumes Strict but Constructive Position"]

[Text] The visit of Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov to Spain, Morocco and Great Britain has been concluded.

In Spain, Oleg Davydov was a member of the delegation accompanying Boris Yeltsin during his official visit, and in Morocco he took part as an Russian observer in the concluding meeting of the Uruguay round of the negotiations within the framework of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In Great Britain he conducted talks with his English colleagues and business circles, reports POSTFAKTUM.

During his numerous meetings with foreign colleagues from Spain, Israel, Brazil, Uruguay, Great Britain and other countries, and with the business circles of Spain and Great Britain, Oleg Davydov called upon them to actively cooperate with Russia in trade as well as in economic investment. Recognizing the difficulties of work by foreign investors in Russia under conditions of a most difficult crisis, high inflation and, mainly, the absence of legislation to guarantee the effectiveness and ensure protection of foreign capital investments, Oleg Davydov noted that at the present time Russia is taking definite steps to stabilize the economy. Inflation has been reduced, although it has been impossible to overcome the inertia of economic decline. To support the continued movement of reforms, the government is developing proposals for creating beneficial conditions for foreign investors, specifically in the sphere of the light and food industry.

To expand its foreign trade, Russia, according to Oleg Davydov, intends to bring its foreign trade legislation in line with the conditions of GATT, which it intends to

join in the near future. For this purpose, there will be a gradual liberalization of foreign economic ties in accordance with the conditions of the transitional period. On the road to GATT, a reduction in export duties is envisioned, with their subsequent total repeal in the future. The list of goods subject to quotas and licensing is being reduced, certification of import goods has been undertaken and a system of certification of export products is being created, and the preferential financing of import is being repealed.

Oleg Davydov stressed that Russia intends to adhere to the right to intellectual property in accordance with the principles of the Uruguay agreement. While speaking out in favor of a free and open Russian market, Russia will nevertheless implement a policy of rational protectionism, without violating GATT principles.

Noting that British enterprises are most prepared for cooperation with Russia, Oleg Davydov called upon them to consider the fact that "in the next century Russia and China will define world economic development," reports POSTFAKTUM.

Upon his return to Moscow, the minister will meet with harsh criticism, as expressed in the recommendations of the Duma, "On Foreign Economic Activity."

Specifically, the Committee on Economic Policy headed by Davydov's former chief, Glazyev, is recommending to the president that the 12 presidential edicts on customs benefits be "brought into line with the legislation" (in essence, repealed). To the government it is recommending that it submit to the State Duma a draft of a federal program for the development of export; step up work on repayment of debts of foreign states to Russia; develop measures for preventing economic crimes in the sphere of foreign economic activity; introduce openness into the registration of exporters of strategically important raw material goods, and improve the system of management of foreign economic activity in the interests of national industry. For this purpose, it should examine the question of uniting the functions of the state administration in the sphere of foreign economic and industrial policy within the framework of a single department (ministry) on the basis of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], Goskomprom [RF State Committee on Industrial Policy] and subdivisions of the Ministry of Economics.

#### **Changes to Excise Tax on Oil Explained**

944Q0339B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 21 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Viktor Ivanov, under rubric "Taxation of the TEK" [Fuel and Energy Complex]: "The Government Has Sped Up the Oil Excise Tax"]

[Text] The Russian government has introduced a new system for levying the excise tax on oil. Now the excise tax will be computed not in percentages of the price, but in absolute values (the average amount of the excise tax will



be 14,750 rubles per ton of oil). The new system was introduced by the decree entitled "Excise Tax on Oil Produced on the Territory of the Russian Federation," which was put into the official delivery system yesterday.

The levying of excise taxes on the sale of oil by the petroleum and gas associations was introduced as long ago as September 1992. At that time it was established that the excise tax is levied in the form of a certain fixed percentage of the price of the output that has been sold. Such a measure was completely understandable—under the conditions of the formal freeing of the oil prices, the government was attempting to link the price increases with the budgetary proceeds (by raising the price, the oil producer automatically increased the payment of the excise tax). It is noteworthy that, unlike the excise taxes on ordinary commodities (for example, alcoholic beverages and tobacco), the Russian excise tax on oil is levied at a different rate for various petroleum-producing associations: for less effective producers, the rate of the excise tax is lower than for the more effective ones. Moreover, a number of associations operating at a low profit rate are completely freed of having to pay the excise tax. Thus, realistically speaking, the oil excise tax is, rather, a kind of variety of differentiated rent—in the instructional guide concerning the levying of this excise tax it is stated outright that the payers of the excise tax are the producers who are situated in relatively better natural and economic conditions.

In September 1993 the rates for the excise tax were increased. However, the principle remained the same—the levying of the excise tax in percentages of the price. Now, however, in conformity with the new decree, the principle has been changed—it has been decided to levy the excise tax in the form of a fixed amount, with its monthly indexing in conformity with the change of the exchange rate of the dollar to the ruble. For the time being, the rate of the excise tax has been established in the amount of 14,750 rubles per ton; simultaneously Minfin [Ministry of Finance] and Mintopenergo [Ministry of Fuel and Energy] have been instructed, within the period of one week, to develop new differentiated rates for the excise tax for individual petroleum and gas producing enterprises and associations. In addition to petroleum, the decree also pertains to an excise tax on gas—Gazprom [gas industry] has been instructed to develop recommendations concerning the possible increase in the rate for this excise tax, effective 1 July 1993 (for the time being, it constitutes 15 percent).

One's attention is drawn by the fact that, with the existing level of the release prices of petroleum, the new principle for levying the oil excise tax does not increase, but even somewhat decreases, the payments made by the petroleum enterprises to the budget. Moreover, the state actually is rejecting the idea of continuing to augment the budget at the expense of the increase in oil prices—inasmuch as the average amount of the payments becomes independent of the actual price level.

Thus, the new excise tax that is fixed in its absolute expression enables the authorities to achieve two goals at once. First, the government demonstrates its concern for the financial status of the petroleum producing enterprises, enabling them, if they so desire, to keep more funds at their disposal. Secondly, the authorities are emphasizing their disinterest in raising petroleum prices and are deflecting from themselves any accusations to the effect that the high prices are explained by the high excise taxes. Thus they are managing to display also their concern for the consumers of petroleum in the domestic market.

#### Evolution of the Russian Excise Tax on Oil

Time of introduction	Average rate of excise tax
September 1992	18 percent
July 1993	24 percent
April 1994	14,750 rubles

#### Central Bank Program for Hard Currency Control Described

944Q0351B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 4

[Article by Vladislav Kuzmichev: "Violators Are Threatened With Unusually Harsh Sanctions; Step-by-Step Introduction of Currency Control Is Underway"]

[Text] The RF [Russian Federation] Central Bank has developed a working program of step-by-step introduction of control over the currency operations of residents and non-residents performing entrepreneurial activity on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The first step in the organization of currency control in Russia is regulated by the joint instructions of the Central Bank and the RF GTK [Russian Federation State Tariff Committee] dated 12 October 1993, No 19 (coordinated with the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] of Russia), "On the Procedure for Implementing Currency Control Over Receipt by the Russian Federation of Currency Revenues From the Export of Goods." The said instruction went into effect as of 1 January 1994 in regard to the export of strategically important raw materials goods, and as of 1 March in regard to all nomenclature of export goods.

The system of currency control is based primarily on stepping up the role of authorized banks as agents of currency control, as well as of information exchange in regard to the movement of funds in foreign currency and foreign trade shipments between customs agencies, commercial banks and organs of state administration.

The only control document will be the tracking certificate, which is a universal document of control for all types of currency operations (including accounting not only for export, but also for the import of goods and services).

Information on specific shipments will be forwarded by the RF State Tariff Committee to the authorized banks which have signed the tracking certificate with the exporters. The authorized banks must fill out the cards received from the RF GTK and return them within the control period, using the column reserved for bank use to provide information on the receipt of revenues for the shipments indicated on the card.

There are also plans to create a data bank on the basis of the RF GTK computer center to keep track of all foreign trade shipments and payments. This will make it possible to verify information on the movement of funds and goods. Thus, it will become possible to identify cases where export prices have been reduced and import prices have been increased.

The adopted order of control provides for the collegial (MVES, TPP [Chamber of Commerce and Industry], etc.) adoption of decisions on controversial questions.

At the second stage (four-six months after start of implementation of control), the application of an analogous scheme is planned (under the so-called "mirror principle") for import and barter trade operations.

At the third stage (second half of 1994), a system of currency control for the export and import of services and for non-trade operations will be introduced.

Subsequent stages presuppose the implementation of control over operations associated with the movement of capital.

The introduction of a system of control is planned for May-June, when the computer center of the RF GTK will be able to provide exact information on all export shipments and currency receipts.

Strict sanctions are provided, up to the non-acceptance withdrawal of funds from banks whose clients are guilty of improper and untimely accounting for the mandatory sale of part of their export earnings.

In order to implement the currency control, the Main Administration of Currency Regulation and Currency Control has been created within the central apparatus of the RF Central Bank. Its primary functions are: To participate in the development of legislative and standard statutes and international agreements of Russia in the sphere of currency regulation and control; to license currency operations; to coordinate and provide methodological management of the activity of organizations implementing control, and to cooperate on these questions with the central banks of other states and international organizations.

In order to increase the effectiveness of operation of the agencies implementing currency control, the RF Central Bank proposes: To strengthen the legislative base, and specifically, to introduce criminal responsibility for violations in the currency sphere; to specify individual statutes of the law on currency regulation and currency control, and to adopt legislative statutes which permit

the signing and ratification of international agreements on currency questions. The Bank of Russia, in conjunction with the RF MFA [Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs], has sent to the RF government a proposal on joining in the Strassburg "Convention on Money Laundering, Identification, Arrest and Confiscation of Recovered Funds Obtained by Criminal Means."

#### **Rothschild's Plans for Cooperation With Russian Banks**

944Q0344A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 21 Apr pp 1, 5

[Article by Igor Trosnikov and Yana Mironitseva under the rubric "Foreign Trade": "Leopold Rothschild's Visit to Moscow: The London Company Will Work in the Interests of a Moscow Bank"]

[Text] In March of this year, the Russian National Bank signed a 10-year agreement on cooperation in the Russian stock market with one of the structural subdivisions of the London banking house, N. M. Rothschild & Sons Co, and the trust company, Rothschild Trust Corporation Ltd. The first joint project within the framework of this agreement was the issuance of bank bills which representatives of the London bank arrived to present (see yesterday's issue of KOMMERSANT). Yesterday representatives of the House of Rothschild and their Russian partners held a press conference devoted to business cooperation on the Russian capital market.

The plane which brought the English financiers to Russian land landed on Tuesday evening. Even earlier there were rumors floating about that the Englishmen had refused the services of the ninth directorate of the KGB and preferred to hire guards at one of the Israeli firms. And it was said that almost an entire planeload of bodyguards would fly to Moscow. However this information was indignantly denied by the bank's representative, who reported that the host side would ensure the delegation's safety.

So the business meetings of the representatives of the House of Rothschild began on Tuesday, and the schedule was so full that yesterday's press conference, despite the journalists' numerous questions, was brief. But even so, the KOMMERSANT correspondents managed to ask a question which bothers many people, why a powerful financial group agreed to become a business partner of a Moscow bank which is not the largest.

"We are very pleased to be working with the Russian National Bank," the president of the company Rothschild Trust Corporation Ltd., Leopold Rothschild, clearly did not want to reveal all the nuances of cooperation with the Russian bankers. According to him, the Moscow bank was the first to show initiative by proposing that the Rothschild group participate in issuing bills and the plan itself proved to be "very practical and interesting."

Leopold Rothschild emphasized that the agreement on cooperation in the Russian capital market was signed for 10 years and its prospects largely depend on the success of the first project. Mr. Rothschild reported that his company's role in it is minimal. Gold will be bought with the currency transferred to the trust company's account in the N. M. Rothschild & Sons Co. bank, and it will be kept in storage and sold as needed. In the opinion of KOMMERSANT experts, this plan has a number of indisputable advantages. Thus, the Russian National Bank, like most Russian banks which do not have a license to work with gold, thereby receives the opportunity to back bills with gold assets. And selling some of the gold will be sufficient to pay off the bills (the London company will do this at the bank's instruction) and settle obligations. The only problem is that after a year (the term of circulation of a bill), gold may drop in price.

Mr. Rothschild was asked the perfectly logical question of in what form the gold is to be bought. For example, will term contracts be concluded for its delivery? But the head of the trust company, who had obviously decided to avoid specific answers when possible, merely said that gold deals would be made "based on the principle of commercial wisdom" and "with maximum advantage for the Russian National Bank."

#### **Regulations Impede Foreign Trade Associations' Work**

944Q0344B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 22 Apr 94 p 9

[Article by Nelli Shmakova: "Foreign Trade Firms' Contracts Are Being Broken: Russia Will Get Back the Debts—If the Departments Agree"]

[Text] Of all the existing methods for paying off credits granted by the former Soviet Union to countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, specialists consider the most realistic to be paying a debt with commodity deliveries. But the numerous changes in Russian legislation have turned this possibility into a utopia too. Yesterday the administration of the Mashinoimport VO [foreign trade organization]—one of the organizations which handles deliveries of commodities to pay off debts—received a letter from the RF Ministry of Finance which imposed work conditions which can be considered nothing but enslavement.

The method of paying off the indebtedness of the developing countries with deliveries of goods, despite all its flaws, in principle could at least partially eliminate the difficult problem of paying the debt. On the one hand, Russia was supposed to receive various types of raw and processed materials, technological equipment, and consumer goods, thereby satisfying the most acute needs of our consumers in this sphere. On the other, the budget would have received a considerable amount of money. This practice gave perfectly positive results until 1993, but then the situation changed drastically. Among other things, the system of subsidizing imports was abolished

and the term for transferring money earned from selling goods to the budget was limited to one month (according to specialists' calculations, this operation can sometimes take up to 6 months). In response to these measures, foreign trade organizations stopped fulfilling contracts concluded. And this year the situation involving paying off credits with commodity deliveries was aggravated even more by the March increase in import duty rates.

In accordance with the new letter from the Ministry of Finance, the term for settling accounts with the budget is in fact increased—up to two months. But now firms must present the so-called guarantee obligation when Vneshekonombank (which, as everyone knows, services transactions on debt obligations of other countries) receives the shipping documents or a letter of credit is opened there. With this obligation, after two months time has elapsed, the associations grant the bank the right to deduct, on a nonacceptance basis, the shortfall from their own accounts, and if there are insufficient funds in the accounts, the organization is responsible with its fixed and working capital.

In this way, when fulfilling a state order, the associations are inevitably threatened with bankruptcy. The Ministry of Finance undoubtedly had good intentions—increasing budget revenue, but the conditions it proposed on deliveries do not suit anyone, and that, in turn, in no way helps replenish the Russian treasury. For example, last year as a result of stopping deliveries of goods to pay off credits, according to rough estimates the budget had a shortfall of several tens of millions of dollars just from the unpaid customs charges and taxes from trade organizations engaged in importing these types of goods.

As a result of the actions of departmental bureaucrats, not only is the fulfillment of intergovernmental agreements being disrupted, but the very possibility of credits issued by the former Soviet Union being returned is called into question.

#### **Inconsistent Legal System Hampers Work of Joint Ventures**

944Q0351C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 27 Apr 94 p 6

[Article by Sergey Krylov, jurist: "Businessmen Do Not Feel Safe: Free Economic Zone 'Yantar' in Kaliningrad Suffering Birth Pangs"]

[Text] Kaliningrad today is seemingly all in anticipation of an economic miracle. The hour is not far off when the free economic zone "Yantar" will announce itself in full voice. Already today there has been a notable revitalization of entrepreneurial activity in the city and the oblast. Representatives of the business world from all of Europe have become frequent visitors here. Blocks of bank offices, financial institutions, customs services and trade representations will spring up in the oblast center.



However, for a full assurance of tomorrow, the newly emerging Russian "gold coast" needs one other indispensable condition: Stability, the guarantee of effective and safe activity of businessmen, industrialists and merchants. And who, if not the law enforcement agencies together with the administration, must provide them?

The matter, of course, is not a simple one, and quite troublesome. Yet otherwise, the positive undertaking in development of an international economic and trade center in the west of Russia may become just the opposite—a sort of provincial Klondike, where there is a constant re-drawing of the zones of influence by shadow groupings, money laundering and racketeering, and where justice is meted out by people who are subservient to and dear to the hearts of those who are strong in this world. So as not to make unsubstantiated statements, let me cite just one example from the life of present-day Kaliningrad.

At the start of 1994, the local newspapers illuminated in detail the course of the judicial proceedings in the case of the joint Latvian-Russian-Argentinian enterprise "Silar International." Vladimir Shershakov, the general director of the firm, and Petr Saranchuk, the director of its Moscow branch, were sentenced by the court of Baltiyskiy Rayon in Kaliningrad to four years and three years two months, respectively, in a strict regimen correctional-labor colony, with confiscation of property. The convicted men were incriminated in attempted contraband and document forgery.

The scandalous episode began in the winter of 1993, when fuel belonging to "Silar" which had been prepared for shipment to fishing sites was suddenly detained by order of B. Livenkov, deputy chief of administration of the oblast MB [Ministry of Security]. Even before the trial, 10,000 tonnes of diesel fuel were handed over "for storage" to the Pioneer Base of the Kaliningrad Ocean Fishing Fleet. Then, in investigative language, this "material evidence" mysteriously disappeared. Together, as it later became clear, with the many thousands of dollars in profits from its sale. The accused parties, headed by Mr. Shershakov, patiently waited for proof of their guilt to be presented. The version of "attempted contraband" clearly did not hold water, and the MB investigators began looking for compromise throughout all the activity of the enterprise. For them it was now a question of saving face, since, with the aid of TV and the local newspapers, it had been reported to Kaliningrad residents ahead of time (before the trial!) that the activity of the contrabandists had been curtailed and that the 10,000 tonnes of diesel fuel had been returned to the homeland.

During this period, the associates of one of the rayon sections of the Kaliningrad militia filed a criminal case against the Pioneer fishing fleet base for unlawful sale of fuel which did not belong to them. It seemed that a further investigation of the cases should be conducted jointly, uniting them into one. However, the MB administration rejected this proposal. Moreover, the transport procurator's office, to which the case had been handed over, had already begun its processing.

Today, after the proceedings, it is not surprising that the accused persons never admitted their guilt and insisted that the case against them had been fabricated. At the same time, the representatives for the defense—both Moscow and Kaliningrad lawyers—synonymously called the trial "lawlessness in regard to progressive and law-abiding enterprise," and intend to fight for a review of the ruling in the oblast court, and if necessary even in the Supreme Court.

Work with problems of entrepreneurship and private business, for example, demands additional knowledge and special training on the part of the representatives of the law enforcement agencies.

In the economic zone which is being created, under conditions of market relations Kaliningrad jurists are already today encountering numerous problems. The goods traffic and turnover of capital is increasing many times over. Aside from the national code of laws, it is necessary to have an excellent knowledge of international law and its peculiarities in one or another partner country.

The judicial proceedings surrounding "Silar International," in my opinion, are a good illustration of what we have said.

If you, for example, do not have a sufficiently good grasp of the questions of formulating agreements between branches, or doubt the correctness of preparation of the customs documents, what will you do? That is right, you will call in experts. It is a pity that Judge Tamara Dolinskaya thought differently, and because of this for two months the defense was not able to have even one (!) economic expert evaluation with the participation of independent specialists.

We might add that an elementary commercial analysis, an expert evaluation, were it to be conducted, would immediately show that the efforts on organization of the fishing trade, including the provision of vessels with fuel, is several times more economically expedient than the resale of this fuel. And furthermore, a one-time deal cannot be more attractive to businessmen than a long-term profitable venture. (For comparison: The resale of the fuel could have brought "Silara" \$600,000 in profits, while the fishing could have brought it over \$3.5 million).

### U.S. Trade Policy Toward Russia Analyzed

944Q0326B Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
11-17 Apr 94 p 23

[Article by Igor Volosov, candidate of economic sciences and sector head at Russian Institute of Strategic Studies: "Russia-United States: Partners or Rivals?"]

[Text] One of the distinctive features of Russian-U.S. economic relations at this time is their development under qualitatively new military-political and economic conditions, which are having a decisive effect on the interaction of the two states.

The end of the "cold war" minimized the importance of military potential as a factor determining a country's position in the international arena and assigned priority to indicators of economic, scientific-technical, and financial strength. As a result, Russia, which had been the United States' equal as a leader in world development and which had essentially determined the course of this development in conjunction with the United States, turned into one of the large but economically weak states with claims to only a "secondary role."

The collapse of the USSR, the severe economic crisis in Russia, and the uncertainty of emergence from it made our state even more vulnerable in world politics and international economic relations. Members of the U.S. military-political, business, and scientific communities, however, know that Russia still has significant economic and scientific-technical potential in addition to nuclear strength and political influence. If the reforms are successful, this could turn it into one of the United States' principal competitors in the international arena and the world market, particularly in several advanced fields. This is one of the main factors motivating the United States to become actively involved in the reform of the Russian economy according to guidelines convenient for the United States.

#### Freedom of Choice?

One of the main elements of the present U.S. policy on Russia is the encouragement of the Russian Government to choose patterns of economic reform meeting the long-term economic and political interests of the West. In this context, the United States was instrumental in imposing the IMF stabilization program on Russia. This program has obvious foreign economic goals in addition to internal economic objectives. The experience of other states with comparable programs proves that their main results are "favorable" economic conditions for the servicing of foreign debts and the rapid growth of energy and raw material exports, which have always been convenient for the United States and the other leading nations that are the largest creditors and consumers of fuel and raw materials.

The results of Russian economic development since 1992 prove conclusively that the United States and other leading Western nations managed to create the necessary

conditions for Russia's integration in the world economy as a country specializing in the export of fuel and raw materials and of finished goods requiring only the slightest processing. Serious negative tendencies of a structural nature, resulting from the IMF stabilization program, are already apparent in the Russian national economy. One of these tendencies is the "weight gain" of the Russian economy, in which the processing industries' share of physical production had already decreased to 64.5 percent in the first half of 1993 in comparison to 65.6 percent in 1992 and 67.9 percent in 1991. This was accompanied by the noticeable growth of the fuel and raw material sector, which accounted for 25 percent of physical production in 1993 in comparison to 11.3 percent in 1991.

Besides this, the accelerated decline of industrial production as a result of the "shock therapy" also made additional fuel and raw materials available for export, which more than compensated for the reduction of output in various industries. When aluminum production in Russia decreased by 8 percent in 1990-1993, for example, its domestic consumption was reduced by a factor of almost 2.2, which allowed for a more than 3.7-fold increase in exports of this metal. Exports of crude oil from Russia increased by more than 20 percent just in 1993, in spite of the 6-percent reduction in output. As a result, exports of fuel and raw materials already exceed 80 percent of the Russian total.

The expansion of Russian exports of fuel and raw materials to the world market is in the long-term and short-term interests of the United States and other developed Western countries. Russian shipments in recent years were the main factor destabilizing these markets and lowering prices. The index of world prices of nonferrous metals, for example, had reached its lowest level in the last eight years by the end of 1993—40 percent below the 1990 indicator. Comparable tendencies were apparent in the markets for energy resources. These price dynamics are extremely convenient for the industrially developed countries, stimulating their economies and helping them surmount economic difficulties of a cyclical nature.

#### Welcome, or Off-Limits to Outsiders

The United States' attempts to accomplish the Russian economy's integration in the world economy as a fuel and raw material appendage of the industrially developed nations are also evident from the development of trade and economic relations between the two countries. Raw materials are clearly prevalent, for example, in Russian exports to the United States: The overwhelming majority of export shipments to the American market consist of nonferrous metals (aluminum, nickel, zinc, copper, and others), metals of the platinum group, silver and precious stones, petroleum and petroleum products, inorganic chemicals, and fertilizers. Russian fuel and raw materials have been of the greatest interest to American private businessmen, who invested around

400 million dollars in Russia in 1993. It is no coincidence that the biggest project will entail a consortium of U.S. oil and gas companies investing a total of 3.4 billion dollars in the exploration and development of new oil and gas deposits in West Siberia and on the shelf of Sakhalin Island.

All of this has been accompanied by U.S. attempts to crowd Russian exporters out of traditional markets and to keep Russia out of the world markets in which it could compete, particularly the markets for high-tech goods.

In the last seven years Russia's share of world arms exports decreased from 38 to 17 percent, while the United States managed to increase its share from 30 to 58 percent. In the last two years alone, the United States almost doubled its own arms exports. Meanwhile, the United States, which has a monopoly in the world market for space services, is constantly spreading rumors about Russian dumping in this field, although this industry is no longer subsidized by the state in Russia, and the low overhead costs of production are due to effective technology and cheap manpower. A similar situation is taking shape in the world uranium market, where Russian shipments still account for only 4 percent of the total, although the Russian output represents around 25 percent of the world total.

Furthermore, the United States is in no hurry to make any cardinal improvements in the trade and economic status of Russian goods. Most-favored-nation status in trade was extended to Russia for only one year, the Jackson-Vanik amendment is still in effect, and anti-monopoly legislation is still being applied vigorously to Russian goods.

Integration processes on the North American continent are having an increasing effect on the development of foreign economic relations between the two countries. The more active recent steps to form a North American free trade zone (NAFTA) created even more difficulties for Russian goods in American markets. The sale of Russian motor vehicles in the United States with minimal customs duties, for example, would require two-thirds of the components to be produced in the NAFTA states. There are even more serious restrictions on textiles. The exporter of Russian linen fabrics to the United States has to prove that the goods have no analogues in the North American countries. The perceptible relaxation of CoCom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control] controls on exports of several high-technology goods to Russia was dictated primarily by competition in the world market. The findings of a study by the U.S. Department of Commerce, in particular, indicated that existing restrictions were ineffective because high-power computers could be obtained in the world market in circumvention of all controls. According to statements by American officials, the liberalization of computer exports will enhance the competitiveness of American companies substantially without hurting U.S. national security.

In spite of Russia's increasingly severe socioeconomic difficulties, most of the West's financial aid is being extended in the form of comparatively expensive credits from international financial institutions, and not in the form of the nonrefundable aid that was extended to, for example, Japan and Germany during their periods of economic reform in the 1940s and 1950s. This provides more evidence that the West has no intention, or even the potential, to offer Russia sweeping economic assistance comparable to the famous Marshall Plan (the American aid in the restoration of the postwar economy of Western Europe), which would amount to 60-75 billion dollars in today's prices.

### The 'Triangle' Will Not Become a 'Square'

This approach to the Russian reforms is a reflection of the way in which the United States and other Western powers see the new balance of power in the world economy and international relations after the end of the "cold war." At present there is an obvious tendency toward more vigorous efforts by the leading Western countries to set up an effective system for the collective regulation of world economic processes and international relations, which should be based on the three "poles" of economic strength—the United States, the European Union, and Japan, which account for around two-thirds of the world GDP. As Director F. Bergsten of the distinguished Institute of the World Economy remarked in this context, the "big three" should begin acting like an unofficial managing committee of the world economy. Under these conditions, Russia's many attempts to become an equal member of the group of leading Western countries for the collective resolution of global problems will not win any support. We must not forget that the harsh laws of competition were always at work in the world economy and international politics, and there was always the determination to secure national interests, frequently by infringing the national interests of others.

### U.S. Group Considers Purchases From Defense Enterprises

944Q0350B Moscow KOMMERSANT DAILY  
in Russian 27 Apr 94 p 11

[Article by Viktor Titov and Nadezhda Yakhotina  
"Americans Preferred Reasonable Prices of Novosibirsk Plants"]

[Text] The management of one of the largest finance-industrial groups in the USA, the Harbor Group, is studying the possibility of placing a number of large orders with conversion enterprises in Russia. A press conference was held yesterday at the American business center in Novosibirsk, regarding the April visit by Harbor Group President Sam Fox to Moscow, Novosibirsk, Saratov and Kazan.



The Harbor Group unites 50 enterprises in the United States and Europe which produce goods made of metal, rubber, and plastic, as well as compressors, medical equipment, medicines and precision production parts. It is a supplier of components for IBM, Apple, Ford, Chrysler and General Motors. It provides over 50 percent of the medical equipment to all the hospitals in the United States. Its annual turnover is \$1.5 billion.

As the director of the American business center in Novosibirsk, Robert Ekkart, reported at the press conference, at the present time the Harbor Group has undertaken the development of 10 production programs which will be proposed for consideration to Russian plants in May of this year. Another visit by Harbor Group representatives to Novosibirsk is planned for that time. In the course of this visit, specific programs and conditions of cooperation will be discussed, and technologies and production blueprints will be handed over so that the enterprises may evaluate their own capacities.

The conversion enterprises of Moscow, Saratov, Kazan and Novosibirsk have evoked the greatest interest of the Harbor Group. The signing of a number of agreements with the Saratov Aviation Plant, the Novosibirsk production association "Sever," the Berd Electromechanical Plant and the "Sibtekhstilmash" plant is expected in the near future. The Harbor Group intends to place orders with these enterprises for the production of parts and components for computers in batches of from 10,000 to 1 million units. The value of these will comprise from \$0.2 to \$600, and the overall volume of the orders may comprise \$20 million.

Mr. Ekkart noted that, considering the high technological level of the Novosibirsk conversion enterprises and the presence of high class specialists, the Harbor Group considers the prices on the production of these enterprises to be satisfactory. In his words, in Moscow the representatives of the Harbor Group "silently walked out of the plant which they were considering, because of the absurdly inflated prices on its products."

The initial basis for serious interest by the Harbor Group in the enterprises of Novosibirsk was the cooperation with the Institute of Hydrodynamics of the Russian Academy of Sciences Siberian Department in the sphere of developing pumping equipment. Aside from expressing interest in participating in production projects with Novosibirsk enterprises, the firm is also exhibiting great interest in scientific-research cooperation.

Nevertheless, we should hardly expect any large investments by the Harbor Group in Russia in the very near future. This fact was confirmed by Mr. Fox in his comment to the effect that at the present time the Russian conversion enterprises are experiencing the need not for investments, but for loading their production capacities and creating conditions for work

**Davydov Views Russian-British Economic Ties**  
944Q0346C Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
26 Apr 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by Oleg Davydov: "Great Prospects for British-Russian Cooperation"]

[Text] Trade volume between Russia and Great Britain was \$3.7 billion in 1993, remaining at roughly the same level as in previous years. Products in the raw materials group continued to predominate in Russian exports, including diamonds and precious metals, oil and petroleum products, other metals and wood products. Generally speaking, based on figures for January 1994 one may conclude that there has been an upturn in Russian-British trade, as trade increased by a factor of two in comparison to January 1993, with growth in both Russian and British shipments. Russia and Great Britain are currently negotiating on ways of dealing with the former USSR's indebtedness based on the terms of the Club of Paris agreement. This will help resolve one of the most sensitive issues in the two countries' economic relations: the uninsured commercial debts of organizations in the former USSR to British companies, which total approximately \$250 million.

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A few days ago Oleg Davydov, Russia's minister of foreign economic relations, paid an official visit to Great Britain.

He met with members of the Cabinet of Ministers, including minister of trade Needham, minister of energy Eggar, and minister of state Goodlad. Talks were held with heads of the GPT Company regarding a plan to modernize Moscow's telephone network, a plan referred to as Comstar. The Russian minister visited the sorting rooms of the DeBeers Company, met with the head of the British Bankers' Association, and participated in a roundtable discussion with the Confederation of British Industry.

Before departing from London for Montreux (Switzerland) to attend a conference on trading in energy sources, Oleg Davydov shared his impressions of his visit with a DELOVOY MIR correspondent and talked about the most pressing problems of a foreign economic nature facing Russia.

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[Davydov] The first thing I should note is that British business people are better prepared to expand their cooperation with Russia than are their colleagues in other countries. They have a fairly large amount of experience working with our organizations. However, as you are aware, opportunities are determined by the level of participation in cooperation. You know that we have had a period of recession here, with declining output. Currently Great Britain is emerging from a period of decline, and soon it will start expanding its industrial production volume; the sales market which could stimulate economic development right now is quite well

defined. It is Russia and, of course, China. It appears that these are going to define economic development. Those markets' capacity is very large. It is only natural that the West is showing increasing interest in those countries, with a view toward starting up operations in those markets, or at least "staking a claim" in this new "Klondike." Therefore our talks and meetings in Great Britain were very serious.

This concerns us greatly. And the second thing that is causing us some worry is that foreign capital is primarily involved in the energy sector. Everybody is interested in oil and gas production or refining. Yet the largest market is in the consumer sectors, i.e. food industry and light industry. Thus far foreign investment in those businesses has been very slight. That is why we are currently considering ways of making the terms of foreign investment in that sector of the economy even more favorable. Proposals in this regard are being prepared by the government and will be submitted to the State Duma for discussion.

Generally speaking, in regard to the reason why foreign investors are still holding back one should note their insufficient understanding of the nature of the economic reforms being implemented in Russia. Naturally the influx of investment is hampered by the high rate of inflation, the weak banking system and insufficient tax breaks for investors during the period of initial capital recoupment.

Direct investments by British partners have also been very limited thus far. They mainly go into the energy sector, the textile industry, communications and a few other areas. British officials and businessmen have learned, "firsthand," so to speak, that a presidential edict entitled "On Improvement of Work With Foreign Investment" has been issued for the purpose of improving the investment climate for foreign entrepreneurs. They have expressed an interest in the fact that newly-created normative acts will not apply for three years to enterprises that exist at the time those acts are enacted, or to plans for the development of security-based forms of attracting foreign capital and the possibility of foreign investors' participation in privatization of Russian enterprises. The English were keenly interested in the news that the government is currently considering a new program to bring foreign capital into the process of defense plant conversion in Russia. The priority sectors singled out in this regard are manufacturing of civil aviation equipment, maritime and river transportation, equipment for the fuels-and-energy complex, new communications technology and equipment for agriculture and the food industry.

The amount of foreign investment in those areas could reach \$4 billion by 1995 and as much as \$20 billion by 2000.

The West, including Great Britain, has shown great interest in the terms of operation for foreign banks and the conducting of financial operations in Russia. At this

point our banks are still very weak. During the transition period it will be virtually impossible to ensure them the ability to compete successfully at the international level. Therefore we have offered 12 percent of the market to our partners and we feel that as of the present time that is as far as Russia is prepared to go. As reforms progress and banking structures grow stronger we will expand foreign banks' access to the Russian market.

Beginning in the middle of this year a favorable climate will be created for foreign investors, including British ones, due to a transition to the principle of selling shares in Russian enterprises through stock exchanges. That means that Russia is opening up to Western capital the stage of direct partnership in restructuring of the Russian economy.

### **Davydov Interviewed on Trade Relations With Spain**

944Q0326A Moscow DELOVOY MIR or Russian  
16 Apr 94 p 7

[Interview with Oleg Davydov, minister of foreign economic relations, by Andrei Avdoshin in Madrid; date not given: "How To Revive Trade and Economic Relations With Spain"]

[Text] The economic element was an important topic of discussion during RF President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's official visit to Spain. The details of the talks on ways of stimulating trade and economic relations between the two countries were discussed by a direct participant in the talks, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov, at the request of a DELOVOY MIR correspondent.

[Davydov] The first thing we ascertained during our conversations with Spanish colleagues and businessmen was the obvious lack of correspondence between our economic relations and the level of political relations and productive potential of Russia and Spain. This is particularly true of trade and investments, as well as the presence of Spanish business in our market.

I must admit that we also had problems with the Spanish businessmen's pessimistic opinion of current priorities in the Russian economy. They are still temporizing in the belief that the right time for them to enter our market has not arrived yet, preferring to allow such countries as the United States and Germany, with their colossal financial potential, to take all the risks at this time.

We feel, on the contrary, that temporizing could lead to the loss of the whole Russian market—which is undergoing spirited development. Furthermore, this process will be stepped up after 1 July this year, when further privatization comes to an end and privatization for money begins. This would be a convenient time for the Spanish to find their own niche in our economy for the best use of their experience and technology.

We were particularly impressed by the high standards of the production, processing, shipment, storage, and packaging of agricultural products in Spain. It was no coincidence that the Russian president visited one of the country's largest meat processing enterprises—Campofrio, which is also operating successfully in Moscow—on his last day in Madrid.

Spanish businessmen do not know enough about the situation in our currency market either, including the domestic convertibility of the ruble.

In view of all this, the Russian side invited Spain's Minister of Commerce and Tourism Javier Gomez-Navarro to visit our country with a group of businessmen for the purpose of taking a closer look at the situation and establishing business contacts. The main advice we tried to give the Spanish was this: "Do not get held up at the starting gate; start moving vigorously." Furthermore, they have to remember that Russian imports are being reduced: They decreased by 27 percent last year, and this tendency will continue. Today the state has already stopped all centralized imports: It is not buying anything. Of course, centralized exports still exist and represent around 20 percent of the total volume, but these will also be phased out by 1995. The state will be occupied solely in establishing favorable conditions for the development of export-import operations and helping domestic enterprises compete for sales markets.

[Avdoshin] What was your impression of B. Yeltsin's meeting with the Spanish businessmen?

[Davydov] The president's speech was quite brilliant, it seems to me, and all of the people present at the meeting were pleasantly surprised, first of all, by his awareness of the whole range of problems in Russian-Spanish trade and economic relations and, second, by his candor. He frankly discussed the difficulties we are experiencing but nevertheless advised the Spanish to work more vigorously in our market.

[Avdoshin] What kind of agreements were concluded on new Spanish credits for Russia? Reports in the local press have been ambiguous, particularly with regard to specific figures and amounts.

[Davydov] The whole thing is quite simple: The Spanish will extend 100 million dollars for the development of mutual trade and are willing to extend another 100 million through EC channels for various programs of aid to Russia and 425 million for the promotion of direct private Spanish investments in our country. These funds will be extended to private businessmen with specific promising projects.

[Avdoshin] The press has also had much to say about our debt to Spain, which is supposed to be impeding the intensification of bilateral economic relations.

[Davydov] We said we would pay it off (it amounts to 900 million dollars) within the confines of the clubs of Paris and London. This is not a problem. Last year we

fulfilled all of our obligations in the Club of Paris and we are fully determined to do the same this year. State budget allocations for this purpose amount to around 2 billion dollars.

[Avdoshin] What was your personal impression of your contacts with Spanish businessmen? How would you assess the results?

[Davydov] The results were indisputably positive. I have rarely encountered this kind of sincerity and eagerness to establish relations. Furthermore, all of this is occurring at a time when Spain has serious economic difficulties of its own!

[Avdoshin] In his speech the president said that measures would be taken soon to establish more favorable conditions for foreign investments in Russia. What did he mean?

[Davydov] This is envisaged in the amendment to the Law on Foreign Investment in Russia that was submitted to the State Duma for consideration. One of its provisions stipulates that foreign companies investing in Russia will be exempt from profit taxes for the whole period of investment recoupment and will then be taxed at the national rate. If we do this, the investment climate is certain to improve dramatically. The government feels that this would be advisable.

#### **Business Club Formed To Promote Russian-Greek Trade Ties**

94AQ0346A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Sergey Tsekhnistrenko: "Russian-Greek Economic Relations: The Path From the Varangians to the Greeks Passes Through a Business Club"]

[Text]

#### **Russian-Greek Trade Volume (Based on Information From the Greek Embassy in Russia)**

Greek exports to Russia: \$125 million in 1992 and \$175 million in 1993 (an increase of 40 percent). The export structure is dominated by agricultural products, refined petroleum products, bauxite and other ores, and consumer goods.

Russian exports to Greece: \$437 million in 1992 and \$479 million in 1993 (an increase of 9.6 percent). The export structure is dominated by oil, non-ferrous metals and motor vehicles.

Russia's share of Greek exports was 1.3 percent in 1993, and 1.9 percent of its imports.

There are already 70 large and 150 medium-sized and small Greek firms in Moscow. Their numbers are growing. A total of 20 Russian-Greek joint ventures have been established in Greece (primarily in Piraeus).

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At the end of next week Brussels will witness the final and decisive round of Russia's talks with the European Union regarding partnership and cooperation. In connection with this Moscow attaches particular importance to the position taken by Athens, current chairman of the Union. But there appears to be no reason for concern: Greece has already announced its intention to facilitate the signing of an agreement without delay. Furthermore, Athens has decided to set an example and demonstrate that mutually advantageous cooperation with Russia is quite possible. Toward that end a business club has been established at the Greek Embassy in Moscow, with its official opening held yesterday.

The Greeks make no secret of the fact that the signing of a cooperation agreement between the European Union and Russia would be a worthy prize for Greece's six-month chairmanship of the Union. And Greece's new ambassador to Moscow, Kiriakos Rodusakis, has from the very first days following his arrival a few months ago devoted particular attention to the establishment of contacts between business people in the two countries. He proposed establishing a business club in order to help his countrymen who are willing to take the risk of plunging into the tumultuous Russian market. That initiative garnered the support of approximately 20 Greek companies that have been operating in Russia for several years and have offices in Moscow. The time lag between words and actions proved short, and last Thursday the Greek Embassy was the scene of an official presentation of the business club (with the club temporarily headquartered in the embassy's commercial section). It was there that Mr. Rodusakis announced his intention to get Russian entrepreneurs who have or would like to have business ties with Greece involved in the club as well.

According to the Greek ambassador, the business club's primary function is to fill the information vacuum that has thus far hampered expansion of economic relations between the two countries. Toward that end the decision was made to establish close cooperation both with the Russian authorities and with commercial structures. In addition, the club intends to provide information about prospects for business in various sectors of the economy. Priority will be given to those sectors in which the Greeks have considerable experience and strong traditions: trade, shipping, tourism, banking, insurance, construction, communications and the food industry. The club will place particular emphasis on familiarizing Greek businessmen with regions both in Russia (Siberia and the Volga region) and in the rest of the CIS (the Crimea, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) where the Greek diaspora is represented.

For this summer the club has plans to sponsor the first international Greco-Russian congress on cooperation in Moscow, and also to open a joint business center in Russia's capital.

### **Russia, Vietnam To Cooperate in Engineering, Electric Power**

944Q0346B Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian

21 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Yevgeniy Spiridonov under the heading "Neighbors": "Russia To Continue the Electrification of Vietnam: Russian and Vietnamese Heavy Industries Will Become Friends"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Committee on Machine Building and the Vietnamese Ministry of Heavy Industry are preparing counterproposals on cooperation between enterprises in the two countries in the field of machinery and equipment manufacture, an agreement regarding which will be signed on 6 June 1994 (during a visit to Moscow by Vietnamese prime minister Vo Van Kiet). An ADS correspondent learned this from Anatoliy Ogurtsov, chairman of the Russian Committee on Machine Building, who visited Hanoi as part of a government delegation headed by vice-premier Yuriy Yarov. Between 12 April and 15 April the delegation held talks within the framework of the intergovernmental Russian-Vietnamese commission on economic, trade-related and scientific-technical cooperation.

During a meeting with Tran Lum, Vietnam's minister of heavy industries, said Anatoliy Ogurtsov, the Vietnamese expressed their intention to renew the partnership between machine builders in the two countries, particularly with regard to the manufacture of electric machines with a capacity of 10-50 kilowatts and 5,000 kilowatts for the micro-hydroelectric power plants and small hydroelectric plants that Vietnam is preparing to build in inaccessible areas in the northern part of the country. Since it was with assistance from the former USSR that Vietnam built virtually all its large-scale energy facilities, including seven units of the Hoa Binh Hydroelectric Power Station, with a capacity of 1.92 gigawatts, according to Mr. Ogurtsov it is like God himself is telling Russian machine builders to continue their partnership with their Vietnamese colleagues in the field of electrification. Particularly since the Central Boiler and Turbine Institute Scientific Production Association, the Leningrad Metals Plant Joint-Stock Company and the Syzran Turbine Plant are already manufacturing a series of small-scale hydroelectric units developed by them, units that are already operating successfully in the republics of the Northern Caucasus, Tajikistan and Kirghizia.

Vietnamese machine builders have also indicated an interest in the joint manufacture of certain types metalworking machinery with computer numerical control, as well as assembly of the Vladimir Tractor Pl., DT-50 and DT-52 wheeled tractors, the Volgo Tractor Plant's DT-75 caterpillar tread tractors and KamAZ vehicles at plants in Vietnam. Also announced was a shipment of sheet metal-bending presses manufactured by Tyazhprommash Joint-Stock Company (Ryazan) and the Kolonna Heavy Machine Tool Plant

Production Association. According to Mr. Ogurtsov, all these proposals by Vietnam are presently under consideration, and by the time of the May arrival in Moscow of Vietnam's minister of heavy industries Tran Lum the forms of cooperation between machine building enterprises in the two countries will have been worked out, as well as schedules and prices for shipments in both directions.

#### **Turkey's Foreign Minister on Russo-Turkish Cooperation Prospects**

944Q0334A Moscow *AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA* in Russian No 2, Feb 94 (signed to press 22 Feb 94) pp 33-34

[Interview with Hikmet Cetin, minister of foreign affairs of Turkey, by Anatoliy Koritskiy; place and date not given: "To Cooperate in the Name of Peace"]

[Text] [Koritskiy] A priority area of Turkey's foreign policy are the Turkic-speaking republics of the former USSR. Russia also maintains its interests there. How do you, Minister, evaluate the possibility of joint, concerted action on the part of Moscow and Ankara in this region which might correspond to the interests of the peoples living there?

[Cetin] I would like to emphasize first of all that Russia is for us an important neighbor. Both Russia and Turkey undoubtedly perform a key role in this region, primarily from the viewpoint of the preservation of peace there. It is for this reason that our countries should cooperate. I believe that this is precisely how matters stand there at the present time and I believe that this will be the case in the future also.

There has recently been a number of meetings of the leaders of our countries, my meetings with Mr. Andrey Kozyrev in Moscow and Ankara included. Our president, Suleyman Demirel, and, subsequently, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller also paid official visits to Moscow, during which negotiations were conducted with President Boris Yeltsin. In the course of these meetings, talks, and negotiations we discussed our policy in respect to the newly sovereign Turkic republics. We were persuaded that Russia, like Turkey also, is interested in these republics being independent and truly sovereign. For my part, I would like to mention especially that Turkey has no intention of governing them. They will do this themselves. But Russia and Turkey could play an important part in their upswing. And we have the opportunity to cooperate with Russia here.

Truly, aside from the long-standing traditional ties to Russia, these republics have things in common that link them with Turkey also: language and cultural, historical and religious traditions. For this reason we are trying to make our contribution to their development also. But in performing this duty of ours we are by no means competing in the region with Russia. We are cooperating with Russia. And the events taking place there confirm

that for these countries' independence and their economic development and political stability cooperation with Russia is vitally necessary.

[Koritskiy] Quite recently even voices were being heard in Turkey quite often and at quite a high level about the "threat from the north." Do you, Minister, perceive this threat today?

[Cetin] I see no threat emanating for Turkey from the north. There can be no question of such a threat at the present time. An analysis of the events occurring in the Caucasus, the Near East, the Balkans, and in other regions shows that there is an insistent need for the close cooperation of Turkey and Russia. In my view, our relations with Russia are distinguished by mutual understanding. If we look at the entire 500-year history of Russo-Turkish relations, it may be seen that there have been wars between us, that there have been times of quite cool relations. But the periods of mutual understanding and good cooperation have lasted far longer. The times of the cold war are now ended. This affords extensive opportunities for Russia and Turkey in respect to a unification of efforts in the struggle for peace and stability both in the region and throughout the world. I am convinced that we have a chance to considerably increase the efficiency of our trade and economic relations also.

[Koritskiy] Esteemed Minister, the process of change on the European continent has begun with a search for ways toward a common nonbloc Europe. The military opposition on the continent has today become a thing of the past. There is no Warsaw Pact. NATO should leave the stage also, it would seem. Instead, we are observing the opposite. The question of the expansion of NATO has gradually switched from the sphere of discussion to a practical plane. How do you assess this problem?

[Cetin] NATO was created as a defensive alliance. But the threat against which this organization was to have defended us has gone, it no longer exists. The cardinal changes that have occurred indicate that NATO needs a new role, which it could perform in a strengthening of peace and stability in the world. For a definition of this role it is essential to restructure, and we believe that NATO could be doing this very soon.

[Koritskiy] Esteemed Minister, how do you evaluate the prospects of the joint actions of Russia and Turkey to settle the conflicts surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh and on the Afghan-Tajik border? There is, after all, a real danger of their internationalization.

[Cetin] Armenia's armed forces occupy approximately 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory. I believe that their actions are not in the least bit different from Iraq's aggression when it occupied Kuwait. Armenia is ignoring the UN Security Council and CSCE decisions on this issue. You are right in saying that there is a danger of internationalization of the conflict. I am convinced that the joint efforts of all countries are needed. The pooling of the efforts of Russia and Turkey would produce

certain results. This is shown even by the difficult process of a settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

As far as Afghanistan and Tajikistan are concerned, I consider that the presence and active operations of representatives of the CSCE are essential here. The directed intervention of the UN Security Council would be useful also. The conflict on the Afghan-Tajik border affects the interests of Turkey also. Turkey is prepared to join its efforts with those of Russia to avert a negative development of events here. I am convinced that it is in this way that we could defend and preserve peace and stability in the region.

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#### **Director of MFA Africa Department Views RF Interests in Africa**

944Q0330A Moscow MEZHIDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 2, Feb 94 [Signed to press 18 Mar 94] pp 120-128

[Article by Leonid Alekseevich Safonov, director of Russian MFA Africa Department: "Russian Priorities in Africa"]

[Excerpts] Africa today, like the "Third World" as a whole, with its profound socio-economic, national-ethnic and military problems, is becoming one of the prime sources of global and regional threats for decades to come. Armed conflicts, which have a destructive effect on international stability, social and ethnic upheavals, massive famine and pandemic diseases, terrorism and the narcotics business, are threats on a global scale and objectively cannot but affect the interests and security of other regions and states, Russia included.

The contemporary world, and above all the industrially-developed countries, are faced with the growing realization that one can hardly isolate oneself from the problems of the African continent, which are already leading to an increase in the influx of emigrants from Africa to Europe and other regions: such as, the growth of Islamic extremism; and the spread of diseases, including AIDS. It is no coincidence that in this connection Prime Minister of France Balladour stated, that the interests of his country "are suffering greatly from African crises, whether it is a question of development of trade, reliable supply of raw materials, the dangers of uncontrolled emigration, or conflicts which threaten to upset the balance of power on the entire continent."<sup>1</sup>

Obviously, for these same reasons, Russia too cannot wall herself off from Africa behind the palisades of her own difficulties. The more so since, while acting judiciously and with knowledge of affairs; and while structuring relationships with the African states on a genuine, mutually advantageous basis, with equal rights, without the previous distortions in the ideological and military sphere—it is possible that cooperation with Africa,

which is still a rich and independent region despite its severe crisis, can be put to use in overcoming our own specific problems.

At the very same time, if we withdraw from Africa, we are then in essence acknowledging our inability to engage in positive, constructive cooperation, and we are confirming the opinion which is still heard from time to time, that our policy in Africa was founded merely on the negative values of the "cold war."

The warm breeze of change, which is breaking up the ice of many years of confrontation in the world, is blowing over Africa as well. Many countries on this continent have set about making democratic transformations: elections have been held on a multi-party basis, fundamental rights of citizens have been proclaimed, and more attention is being devoted to human rights. The changes taking place in the world, and in African states as well, along with those transformations which are being carried out in Russia, force us to look anew at the development of Russo-African relations as well. A thorough "inventory" must be made of the experience of our over 30 years of ties, singling out all that is of value and useful, and decisively rejecting the approaches which were dictated by the market conditions and ideological considerations of the past.

At the same time one can properly set the priorities in our relations with Africa, discover the most promising areas for cooperation, and determine the circle of reliable partners, only on the basis of precise analysis and forecasting of the economic and political development of African countries, taking into consideration those factors which have decisive influence on the formation of a political and economic climate both for the African continent as a whole, and for the individual countries. [passage omitted]

I believe that it is also in the Russian interest, especially in the economic plane, not to lose sight of the potential of Africa as our partner, the more so since we have already established a firm foundation for cooperation in our relations with many African countries.

For the most part, future Russo-African relations are seen precisely in all-round development of mutually-advantageous economic ties; however, it will hardly be possible to achieve this until military-political stability is assured on the African continent, and until the prerequisites are established for stable socio-economic development. Orienting herself on the prospects which lie in the plane of economic and trade relations, Russia, employing political means, will strive to support the processes of democratization in Africa, and will take part in settling existing conflicts and forestalling potential conflict.

Within the framework of the given approach, we should obviously focus special attention on activating political ties with this continent. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to its specific nature, when quite often cooperation in all other sectors depend upon the level of

political relations and with establishing contacts with the leadership of a country. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the ruling circles of many African states still take a cautious attitude toward the political processes and reforms in Russia, lack confidence in their successful outcome, and doubt that our country, at the present stage, is capable of playing a definitive role in the international arena.

African leaders, as practical experience shows, apart from discussing questions of bilateral relations, are prepared for dialogue with us on a broad range of problems associated with strengthening international peace and security, and primarily among those who are either directly influencing the situation on their continent, or who are promoting the acceleration of positive global transformations. From this point of view certain directions in Russo-African interaction are seen to be promising, such as certain aspects of disarmament, creation of nuclear-free zones, formation of regional security systems, strengthening international mechanisms for forestalling and settling conflicts, and formation of an international economic climate that is beneficial for Russia and Africa as well.

The political assistance of Russia to settlement of the basic "hot spots" of Africa, to include support in the UN Security Council, is directed toward fulfilling the global mission of assuring a more secure world. We also consider this assistance an important part of our political partnership with the African countries, which strengthens the basis for mutually-advantageous cooperation with them.

Russia is taking a most active part in the Angolan settlement, and together with the United States and Portugal is joining a "troika" of observers over the process of carrying out the Bisesskiy (Lisbon) Agreements (May, 1991). Russian military and civilian observers have been sent under UN auspices to a number of other conflict zones in Africa (Mozambique, Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda).

On the whole it is obvious that in analyses of the prospects for stabilization of the situation in the "hot spots" of Africa and around them, one should avoid excess optimism. In this connection, Russian proposals made at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly are considered timely ones. The essence of these proposals is—to establish within a United Nations framework additional mechanisms which will permit significantly increasing the success rate for peacemaking operations, to include the African continent as well.

Experience in operations in support of peace implemented by the international community on the African continent is important for us, for application to Russia's own efforts on the territory of the former USSR.

At the same time, while cooperating with the West on the African continent, one should proceed from the fact that the commonality of approaches noted for a number of problems does not at all signify that they are completely

identical. Russia must operate above all in consideration of her own national interests, as well as the reality of the multipolar world that is taking shape.

In spite of a certain slump in the sphere of trade and economic relations, prospects for developing cooperation with Africa exist, and above all in the extraction of minerals; in geology; and in construction, fisheries, woodworking and agriculture. Constructing and utilizing major new facilities—such as the bauxite extraction complex in Dian-Dian (Guinea); expanding the scale of independent activities of state and commercial structures; setting up joint enterprises; establishing new zones for trade and economic activities, for example, in Namibia and the South African Republic—can genuinely raise the overall qualitative level and scale of Russia's economic ties with Africa.

The interests of Russia are served not only by maintaining, but also by expanding existing ties. It is at the same time necessary to purposefully and consistently place them on a new basis: to establish multi-level forms of cooperation with the countries which remain, chiefly for ideological motives, beyond the sphere of our attention. At the same time we should above all examine the possibilities for developing relations with those states which represent a promising market for acquiring Russian products, or suppliers of the goods and raw materials which we need.

Intensification of Russo-African interaction will to a large extent also depend upon transition to new forms and methods of cooperation—granting of licenses and know-how, rental of machinery and equipment, collaboration between industrial sectors, and scientific-production cooperation.

In recent years, while overcoming significant difficulties, the processes of integration have intensified in Africa. One may quite confidently assume that in the future, inter-African economic cooperation, aimed at the creation of an African economic community and regional economic structures, will become more significant. Such intentions have already appeared very vividly in a number of regions on the continent.

Russian foreign economic structures could also take advantage of trends for integration in Africa for increasing her own exports to the corresponding markets, which will apparently be expanding as a result of the aforementioned trends. Our participation is possible at the level of enterprises, investment banks, and in the form of joint ventures.

In resolving African problems of development, for the continent as a whole, for subregions and countries, Russia is devoting significant attention to the role of the UN Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] and, in particular, to the fact that ECA could stimulate and attribute a truly international character to its programs in such areas as transportation, power engineering development of natural resources, and environmental protection, as well as support of small and mid-level entrepreneurship.

Russian organizations are completely capable of participation in implementing projects within the framework



of the second decade of industrial development in Africa and the second decade of transport and communication of the UN's ECA. It would appear that Russo-African cooperation, taking into consideration the peculiarities of the continent, could promote the solution of problems of employment and the development of facilities in the infrastructure; and could have as its ultimate goal the involvement to the fullest of African countries in the system of international division of labor on a fair basis.

An important element of bilateral relations between Russia and countries of Africa, which requires a weighty and well-thought-out approach, is the problem of their obligations for credits issued by the former USSR. In terms of state credits alone, the volume of indebtedness of sub-Saharan African countries amounts to nearly \$14 billion. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the domestic political situation in many of the countries which are the principal debtors is unstable, and the economy is in a state of crisis. Therefore, the task consists of finding ways and means of restoring the debts, without straining political relations, and without breaking existing mutually-advantageous ties.

It is most important to proceed from the fact that the search for solution of this problem must not rest on narrow departmental considerations. It is necessary to take into account all aspects of political and commercial-economic relations with each country, individually. The question of indebtedness should be examined comprehensively, employing various strategies: partial payment in freely-convertible currency and local currency, compensation for debt by deliveries of goods, or reinvestment; taking things one step at a time, using part of the debt for covering the expenses of Russian missions, and so on.

The sphere of military-technical cooperation remains an important link in Russia's foreign policy and economic ties with Africa. This form of interaction appears to be quite promising in the context of increasing its profitability and placing it on an exclusively commercial basis. A number of African states have an appropriate degree of interest in this.

One must not fail to consider that a prolonged pause in the given sphere of relations with Africa can have a negative effect on Russian interests: since the vacuum formed as a result of breaking military-technical ties with the Soviet Union, and then with Russia as well, is being energetically filled by other countries—including those which produce weapons under Russian licenses, of greatly inferior quality than that which Russia herself could offer. It is evident, incidentally, that Russian arms deliveries should not appear in regions of existing and potential armed conflicts, nor in countries with openly dictatorial regimes.

Apart from solving the urgent problems cited above, developing stable relations with African countries demands long-term humanitarian and political investment in the future of our ties. In this context one should,

obviously, be thinking about the possibility of continuing, in modern conditions, the training of African national cadres in the VUZ's of our country. Such a practice provides its own positive results. It is another matter, that this cooperation should be for the most part placed on a compensatory basis. At the same time it should remain advantageous and attractive for our African partners as well.

The question of future Russo-African relations continues to attract the attention of the Russian and world community. Today, it is true, few people doubt whether or not we need Africa in general. On this account, it would appear that at last a more-or-less unified point of view is taking shape—Yes, it is necessary, since Russia, even with her present difficulties, cannot allow herself the luxury of turning her back on Africa, nor to all the other regions of our planet. Russia must assure herself a fitting role in the world balance of influence, and in the multilateral processes for regulating the world economy and international relations.

By preserving all that is rational in bilateral political, economic and cultural ties with Africa; applying to them content appropriate to the realities of today; and by developing cooperation in new directions, to include those countries which previously lay beyond the bounds of our active policy, Russia will support her own state interests, and will obtain greater freedom in the choice of foreign policy alternatives. In this manner the prerequisites will be laid down for more solid positions for our country, not only on the African continent, but in the world arena as a whole.

#### Footnotes

1. "Le Monde", 23 septembre 1993.

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#### Japanese Attitudes to 'Putina-94' Antipoaching Operation Eyed

944Q03371 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
22 Apr 94 p. 2

[Article by Vasily Golovnin under the rubric "Fish": "The Japanese Are Asking Us Not To Fire. Tokyo Advises Its Fishermen Not To Mess With 'Putina-94'"]

[Text] Tokyo—An influential official in Tokyo stated: "If your border guards begin shooting, this will be the end of normal Russian-Japanese relations." Official Tokyo responded quite nervously to "Putina-94," a large-scale operation to put an end to foreign poaching which began on 20 April in the waters of Russia's Far East. Now the Japanese are anxiously anticipating the results of this action. However, so far the newspapers have been reporting on the operation of Russian border guards which has begun in an unemotional and markedly informative manner.

As is known, in addition to the vessels, aircraft, and shore installations of the border guard troops, the forces of the Pacific Fleet, the patrol craft of the Russian Federation Committee on Fishing, specialists from the Customs Committee, and even a surveillance satellite have been pressed into service for "Putina." The objective of the operation is to restore control over Russian waters in the Far East where poachers from Japan, North and South Korea, China, and even representatives of a faraway Poland have operated with virtual impunity in recent years. At the same time, at issue is restoration in the region of the prestige of the Russian border guard troops, which have recently been referred to with compassion in, for example, Japan: They lack fuel, their patrol craft are old, their engines are weak—how can they keep up with border violators?

There are a few very attractive regions in the Far Eastern zone to which foreign fishermen are drawn as if by a magnet. These are the shores of Kamchatka, with the best crabs in the world, and the famous zone in the center of the Sea of Okhotsk where an entire army of poachers from the world over literally scoops out pollock and other valuable marine life, taking advantage of the fact that technically this area is considered to be open water. From this standpoint the South Kuril zone, in which the confrontation between Russian border guards and Japanese fishermen has become particularly acute, is the least favorable. Naturally, a long-standing dispute between Moscow and Tokyo over title to these islands makes the situation particularly piquant.

According to data from the border guards, more than 7,000 incursions by Japanese vessels in the Russian waters of the Far East were registered last year; the South Kuril zone accounted for most of them. The violators are apprehended, kept in dirty pretrial confinement cells, put on trial, fined, and even have their vessels confiscated. Recently the captain of one of the trawlers caught was wounded in the leg when a Russian patrol craft fired warning shots. However, so far these measures have failed to bring about a radical change in the situation because poachers are apprehended quite infrequently, after all.

The Russian authorities displayed their determination to take harsher measures for the first time early this year, when about 80 Japanese vessels entered the zone of the South Kuril island of Kunashir on 21-22 January all at once; the vessels stayed there for a long time, despite numerous warnings from Russian border guards. The incident was widely publicized and for the first time caused vigorous protests from Moscow bolstered by a conspicuous pick-up in the activity of the border guard troops. However, incursions into the waters of the islands in dispute continued on a smaller scale until the beginning of April, causing the irritation of our marine guards to mount.

Tokyo's position with regard to all these events is ambiguous. On one hand, Japan calls on its fishermen not to invade Russian waters. As a representative of the Japanese Marine Safety Directorate has communicated, his department intends to convince potential violators "not to cross the border" of the Russian Federation zone, warning them of possible consequences, especially in the course of "Putina-94."

However, it is well known that for the most part a particular variety of fishermen who are closely associated with the yakuza mafia engage in poaching in our waters. As a rule this element could not care less about admonitions; besides, it is a mark of special valor for them to "rub the noses" of the Russian occupiers of the South Kuril Islands in it, since most of the yakuza subscribe to an extreme variety of nationalism.

Tokyo's official position objectively prompts incursions into this zone. Tokyo considers the South Kuril Islands its own territory and, correspondingly, does not consider the passage of its vessels there to be a "violation of the state border." The Government of Japan has consistently rejected all protests from Moscow on this occasion, and approaches revealed cases of poaching strictly from the standpoint of its domestic legislation, which virtually eliminates any opportunity to punish the culprits.

Nonetheless, statements by influential officials in Tokyo who have a direct involvement in relations with Russia indicate that Japan is alarmed by the pick-up in the activity of our border guards, since the Japanese are afraid that the border guards will start firing on violators. In essence, the authorities here have nothing against poachers being apprehended, as they believe this to be unavoidable, and even useful in a way. However, even a chance killing of a violator-fisherman while being chased and apprehended would unavoidably cause an unpredictable surge of hatred for Russia in Japan, which apparently is not to the liking of a majority of local politicians. On the other hand, there are quite influential forces in Japan that might even be waiting for blood to be drawn in order to dispense once and for all with all attempts at normalizing relations with Moscow by making a racket about "Japanese being killed by KGB soldiers," as our border guards are still called locally.

In view of this, statements by Andrey Nikolayev, commander in chief of the border guard troops, to the effect that "Putina-94" is not aimed at a coercive resolution of the issue of unlawful fishing but is mainly called upon to be a powerful psychological influence on potential violators, are hopeful. It appears that the essence of the issue is in making the apprehension and a substantial financial penalty for the poachers virtually unavoidable, because shooting in the Far East is caused only by the inability of the border guards to compete as equals with poachers on fast vessels. This problem has another aspect, too: There are virtually no continuous working contacts between the border guard services of the two countries which could get the ball rolling.

## KAZAKHSTAN

**Increased Almaty Police Activity Explained**

944K1216A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 11 May 94 p 1

[Article by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents Irina Bakayeva and Tamara Kaleyeva: "A 'Noose' Has Been Thrown Around the Neck of Crime. What Will Be the Result?"]

[Text] Lately the capital has been agitated by rumors, each more wild than the next. Allegedly there have been several assassination attempts, including on Ministry of Internal Affairs officers, on the president of the Butya company, Bulat Abilov, and on other famous people.

We called the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] press service and found out that these rumors were not news to them.

"We know of this," said the deputy chief of the MVD press center, Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Vulf. "This information is not true, however. All the persons whose names are being mentioned in 'unofficial chronicles' are alive and well."

"Nevertheless, residents of the capital noticed, for instance, unusual activism on the part of the militia over the past few days. Why?"

[Vulf] In the past the militia has always worked in a special mode during holidays. The same was true over the past few days: The militia was put on a round-the-clock operation schedule, with reinforced patrols—that is why there was more special equipment on the streets than usual, and patrols were armed with submachine guns. This is not at all related to a crime surge. On the contrary, over the past four months the total number of crimes in the republic has dropped by 7 percent, and criminal investigations—by 10 percent. The number of murders, robberies, and assaults has dropped. In order to maintain this trend, the republic organs of internal affairs conducted Operation "Kuryk" ("Noose") a few days ago. Over a period of three days 1,288 crimes were registered, of which 888 were solved while the trail was hot. We also detained 1,153 suspects—63 for inflicting grave bodily harm, 92—for hooliganism, and 21—for assault. "Noose" also caught 262 drug addicts, from whom we confiscated 22.5 kg of drugs. On the basis of these facts, 1,069 criminal cases have been initiated.

In the course of the operation 633 units of firearms were confiscated, 55 stolen cars were found, and 4,152 persons were delivered to medical sobering-up facilities. We checked dormitories, hotels, and "suspicious" apartments. It turned out that 425 foreign citizens were living in Kazakhstan not only without a residence permit but even without a passport. One hundred thirteens persons were expelled from the republic.

These are the facts we were given at the MVD press center. And at the offices of the Butya company we were told that Bulat Abilov is in good health and actually is on a business trip to Japan.

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Of course, there is no smoke without a fire, but the rumors surrounding the incident that took place on 5 May near the famous Arasan bathhouse have acquired the appearance of a smoke-screen: Rumor had it that one of the top officials in the republic MVD died in a mafia score-settling incident.

In reality the incident was far more prosaic. At 2330 Colonel A. Seitov, chief of the MVD criminal investigations department, who lives near Imeni 28 Panfilov Soldiers Park, was taking his dog for a walk as usual. This time his whole family had decided to get a bit of fresh air: A. Seitov himself, and his wife, son, and daughter-in-law. Some intoxicated young men, who were "having fun" at a commercial kiosk near the bathhouse, took a liking to the beautiful dog. Two of the six confronted the family and pulled out a gun: "Give us the dog or we will kill it."

Admonishments, verbal warnings, and even an MVD officer ID produced no effect: The drunks continued to brandish their weapon. Then the colonel pulled out his standard-issue weapon and fired a warning shot in the air. Instead of coming back to their senses, the riesenschauzer lovers attacked the colonel and wounded his daughter-in-law. Then A. Seitov, too, used his weapon. One of the attackers—B. Alpysbayev, 30-year-old director of the bathhouse men's department—was killed, and the other one was wounded.

The procuracy initiated criminal proceedings against the attackers. It was found that A. Seitov's use of a firearm had been justified.

Thus, there was no "score-settling," nevertheless, an attack on, of all people, a top criminal investigations official is indeed troublesome: After all, we mere mortals do not carry standard-issue weapons for self-defense.

## KYRGYZSTAN

**Akayev on Background, Seabeco Scandal**

944K1194A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian  
No 17, Apr 24 p 3

[Interview with President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev by Mikhail Serdyukov in Bishkek; date not given: "I Am Looking for the Formula for Life"]

[Text] Question to Kyrgyz Radio: "What Does Kyrgyzstan have in abundance and what is lacking?" Answer: "We have a lot of lazy and foolish people, and Akayev has no alternative."

"That is it," said the president, "I am leaving...."

He said that to his wife, but she knows him very well and she was not very frightened. Again the opposition...both looked out the window. The sun played on the nearby mountains, covered with eternal snow. In such moments, if they managed to remain alone, they did not turn out the light in the residence.

"I will leave if I get less than two-thirds of the votes on the referendum," stated the president.

"Oh, God almighty!" Mayram begged. "When will you deliver our family from such words?" She was praying, understandably, for herself.

Is Allah present in Kyrgyzstan? The president received 98 percent of the votes. The figure reminds one of the days of stagnation, but that is a part of the past. The people were left with their chosen one, and his wife with her fate.

As the sun went down we drank tea and complained about the spring: It brought nothing but disaster—mud slides, mountain torrents, flooding, and—asked: Is it easy to be president under such conditions? When there is disaster after disaster, when the people do not really want to live in the old way but they have simply not learned the new way....

[Serdyukov] I bet you never dreamed of such a fate when you were a child.

[Akayev] I wanted to be a historian. Military. Since third grade I have been addicted to reading about the campaigns of Suvorov, Nakhimov...I read everything there was to read about Napoleon. Then I saw the film "Waterloo" and it seemed that I already knew it all, I understood, but how I wanted Napoleon to be defeated....

[Serdyukov] Were there military people in your family?

[Akayev] Both military people and government leaders. Incidentally, I am the great great great grandson of Atake-Biye himself. In 1785 he was the Khan and sent ambassadors to Russia. They were received by Catherine II, and with great respect. Because she was an intelligent woman and she understood that Russia would have a great interest in our region. My ancestor Shadan-Batyr ruled in northern Kyrgyzstan and helped General Skobelev unite the southern part of our country with Russia.

My father, as a descendent of the Khan's tribe, was forced to hide on the steps of Kazakhstan. There he met my future mother. Asel is alive, she is 93 years old. She is Kazakh.

[Serdyukov] So you are good friends with Nazarbayev—thick as thieves?

[Akayev] Yes, we are not simply friends. We are relatives...my mother is a second cousin of Nursultan Abishevich.

[Serdyukov] This is the first time I have heard of that. And I do not think I am the only one....

[Akayev] What is so special about this? Such things are not really miracles in Asia. But here is what is surprising: Until 1989 Nazarbayev and I did not know one another very well. We met in Moscow when we both became deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I told him about our kinship....

[Serdyukov] Was he very happy?

[Akayev] We were like two brothers.

[Serdyukov] You do not happen to be a relative of Yeltsin as well?

[Akayev] No, we are simply good friends. We have been helping each other since the times when we were both deputies.

[Serdyukov] Does it seem to you that the very concept of "male friendship" is impossible in its true sense for high-level politicians? How, for example, do you deal with the situation when "you may die, but you rescue your friend"? Is such a thing really acceptable for a president? What should he do, destroy his state while saving another leader?

[Akayev] Did you see "Dinner" with Oleg Tabakov and Armen Dzhigarkhanyan? I know that it is hard to get in to see this show. When my wife and I were in Moscow, only Tabakov himself was able to get us tickets. Anyway, in this show two important politicians, Fouché and Talleyrand, are vowing their friendship to one another even though they are actually sworn enemies.

Talleyrand wanted to use Fouché to get into power and then quietly get rid of him. But Fouché understands this and is saving up compromising material against his "friend." It becomes clear to Talleyrand that he will not be able to betray his friend. And so he concludes what is now a truly friendly alliance with him for the rest of his life. Question: How real is it? This is a show all presidents would do well to see. I was convinced once again that the professional politicians today are not so different from their colleagues back in those feudal times. What is bad? All the presidents' forces are now going for an empty struggle, they are using up all their ammunition in verbal battles. That is no way to emerge from the crisis. And I am beginning to understand why dictatorial regimes have achieved success in economic prosperity ...

[Serdyukov] Do you have to keep a tight rein?

[Akayev] How else was Napoleon able to keep Fouché and Talleyrand in check? After all, they were sold out and they betrayed other people, but for the most part they served him faithfully and truthfully. Him and understandably, the empire.

[Serdyukov] When you became president, did you have to change any of your habits or get rid of former friends?

[Akayev] One of my mottoes is always remain yourself. I will not betray myself. For which I am frequently criticized: They say the president should be a little more



pompous, definitely secretive, and of course, powerful. And "he"—that is, I—continue to be...a member of the intelligentsia.

[Serdyukov] But has it ever happened that you have broken off relations with a recent friend because of high-level political considerations? Let us say that at one time he was a good comrade to both you and Yeltsin. And suddenly he had a large fallout with Boris Nikolayevich. Upon meeting him, how would you act with the person who was "out of favor"?

[Akayev] As I did before.

[Serdyukov] And if Yeltsin was offended and your relations with him became cool? Would the whole republic not suffer?

[Akayev] No, I cannot remember such a thing with him. Here is an example—Gennadiy Burbulis. We became friends back when we were deputies. He was the one who at my friendly request organized Yeltsin's first visit to Kyrgyzstan as president of Russia. That was a month before the August putsch, and I had certain information about preparations for it. Of course, I warned Boris Nikolayevich in a private conversation. And he said: "Can you discuss this where everyone can hear?" "Of course, I can!" And I did when we exchanged official greetings. Gorbachev was greatly offended at that time...he did not believe it...but then there was Burbulis. He parted ways with Yeltsin, but that does not diminish our friendship. I recently flew to Moscow, phoned him, and invited him to dinner: I said, let us sit down and talk...he was terribly surprised about something: "All the rest of the presidents are avoiding me, they think that I will have the wrong influence on their relations with Yeltsin, but you..." I'm a friend of Boris Fedorov, Yegor Gaydar...they did not fall in my estimation at all after losing their posts.

[Serdyukov] Askar Akayevich, what do you think: Can the president have shortcomings?

[Akayev] I have a pile of them. But my main teacher, the scholar Sergey Aleksandrovich Mayorov, who is well known in his field, taught me to fight against them: Write down all your shortcomings on a card and every day try to correct at least one of them.

[Serdyukov] Are you succeeding?

[Akayev] I am trying. But still, in 1986, when they took me into the Central Committee to be in charge of the department of science and scholarly institutions, I received a letter from my teacher in which he gave me, as a person "who is now a leader and an official," several pieces of advice. Guess what the first was?

[Serdyukov] Always keep smiling.

[Akayev] That is a character trait, the external manifestation of it—I am a confirmed optimist. And that is in my blood, without any advice....

[Serdyukov] Well, then do not contradict the leaders.

[Akayev] I contradicted them. For which they very quickly asked me to take less "responsible" work.

[Serdyukov] I give up. What?

[Akayev] "Beware of journalists!"

[Serdyukov] And so, is it very terrible?

[Akayev] Sometimes it is not terrible but very revolting.

[Serdyukov] Your position is such that you are always in the public eye. Incidentally, I recall one boom not so long ago. Your name was fluttering in the newspaper-journalistic wind of the boundless CIS area in connection with the notorious Seabeco campaign, which you for some unknown reason endowed with gold from the treasury. And now Boris Birshteyn is repaying you by educating your eldest daughter in the best Swiss higher school. I know there is a bitter taste in your mouth. But if possible, for SOBESEDNIK, shed some light on this situation just one more time.

[Akayev] It is all painfully simple. Back before I was elected president, the Swiss firm Seabeco concluded with the former Kyrgyz Government a contract that was very advantageous for itself and essentially extortionate for the republic for joint development and extraction of our gold. I demanded all the documents, studied them attentively along with specialists, and came to the conclusion that further joint work would be inexpedient.

Well, since Seabeco had already invested a certain amount of its money in this project, we decided to return its money from the republic budget. That is all there is. I think we dealt with this Birshteyn in a gentlemanly way and one can say that we settled our accounts immediately. As for my eldest daughter Berma—she has nothing to do with this story. She is a student in the department of computer mathematics and cybernetics of Moscow State University, in her third year. The best students were sent abroad. And she was among them. The training is financed by the "business and management" fund. Birshteyn and certainly I have nothing to do with this. It is just that my eldest daughter is a very hard worker.

[Serdyukov] Like her father?

[Akayev] Mayram spends more and more time with the children. We have four. Two students—a girl and a boy. Two schoolchildren—the same combination. My eldest son, Seydar, is also abroad, in Washington. He is taking exams in an American University. He lives with friends. Remember Sagdeyev, the academician?... He is our friend and welcomed our son...I think that whether or not I am president, the children should receive the best education possible. This is of major value to them.

[Serdyukov] Have you studied all your life?

[Akayev] And now—where can you hide? I was a specialist in the area of precise sciences. But a president cannot do without knowledge of economics.

[Serdyukov] The more I get to know you, the more clearly I understand that you were not all that eager to become president...

[Akayev] That is exactly right. In the Supreme Soviet I worked on the committee for economic reforms. With Bunich and Bogomolov—real jewels—and we became friends...there, of course, I became interested in politics and economics. Imperceptibly I became more involved. And then suddenly in Kyrgyzstan the parliament decided to elect a president. They came to me and I said immediately: "No. Categorically. Look for a president among the professional politicians. There are so many of them nowadays...or—I advised—draft Ayimatov. He has enough respect for any position..." Well, it seems they backed away from me. Thank God!... And then my daughter and I happened to be guests of academician Samarskiy—an extremely great mathematician—we were talking...there was a phone call from Bishkek—the democrats had found me here too! Well, they drafted me: I had to fly home immediately. And I was elected president on the first round. I had to work...

[Serdyukov] How many hours a day?

[Akayev] Figure it out. I wake up at 6:00. I do not go to bed until after I have seen all the news on television—after midnight.

[Serdyukov] All those hours without letting up?

[Akayev] What do you mean? I spend about 40 minutes shaving. At home they know that this is my weakness. Previously my wife was always scolding me, especially when we lived in a tiny apartment in Leningrad. I was the only person knew who could take so long in the toilet. I do not use mechanical razors. Only razor blades. It gives me wild pleasure.

[Serdyukov] And, of course, jogging?

[Akayev] Absolutely. With friends. My doctor and the general who is the chief of my personal guard. Twenty kilometers a week—a golden norm.

[Serdyukov] Do you really have to have a maid?

[Akayev] I do not have to. But like any president, my freedom is quite restricted.

[Serdyukov] Is there any place where you can get away from it all?

[Akayev] Yes. In the mountains. My whole family enjoys downhill skiing. True, the chief of the guard is there as well....

[Serdyukov] During hours of recreation Nazarbayev takes out his mandolin and Yeltsin—his spoons. And when you are together, what role do you play in this trio?

[Akayev] I listen. And very attentively. It turns out that presidents need listeners very much. And I feel simply irreplaceable in this trio. I know that both Yeltsin and Nazarbayev value me as an attentive conversationalist. I am capable of understanding their thoughts. It is important to have such a person. I never let anyone think that he is the only one who is right.

[Serdyukov] And do you swim in cold water? Boris Nikolayevich respects....

[Akayev] That is exactly right. But now I have a new diversion. Nazarbayev recently suggested that we arrange a tennis tournament among the presidents. I had to have a court built in the yard of my residence. Now I am training hard. Since I had never before learned

[Serdyukov] They are clever. They have been playing tennis for a long time. Ask for a handicap.

[Akayev] Why? I will suggest my own sports. A marathon, for example. And definitely running. In order to even out the chances.

[Serdyukov] You probably go hunting for "wild boar"—with a rifle.

[Akayev] Boris Nikolayevich has a dream of hunting in Kyrgyzstan. But it has not all worked out yet.

[Serdyukov] Probably because you are not a hunter.

[Akayev] Not even a fisherman.

[Serdyukov] But what entertains you most?

[Akayev] Music. I love classical music. When I need a burst of inspiration I listen to Mozart. In moments of heavy reflection nothing can replace Liszt's "Hungarian Rhapsody."

[Serdyukov] Do you spend a lot of time listening to Liszt?

[Akayev] I can put the record on in the morning and listen to it all day long. Over and over again. That is the way it is so far.

P.S. The editors thank Vasilii Tolstunov, president of the Sezam firm, for help in organizing this article.

## TAJIKISTAN

### Draft Republic Constitution Presented

#### Decree on Procedures

944K1176A Dushanbe NARODNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 22 Apr 94 p 1

["Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan: on the Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan"]

[Text] In accordance with clause 14 of Article 108 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan decrees that:

1. The draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan submitted to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan by the Commission for Preparation of the Draft New Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Tajikistan shall be published in republic, oblast, and rayon newspapers for public discussion.
2. The Commission for Preparation of the Draft New Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Tajikistan shall consider the proposals pertaining to the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan received in the course of the public discussion, modify the draft with regard to them, and present the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan by 1 July 1994.
3. The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan, ministries and departments, the executive committees of oblast, city, rayon, community, and village soviets of people's deputies, and the leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations shall make provision for extensive discussion of the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan in the work force and at the place of residence.

Shall for the purpose of coordination of this most important work and the collection of the proposals submitted in respect to the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan by the citizens, the work force, and public associations and also received from the news media form under the auspices of the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies special staffs headed by the chairmen of the executive committees of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies.

4. Organs of the press and television and radio shall organize special programs, broadcasts, and columns devoted to discussion of the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, regularly illustrate the course of public discussion of the bill, and make provision for the collection of the proposals and observations received in respect to it.

5. The proposals received in respect to the draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan shall be presented to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan altogether 10 days prior to 15 June 1994.

6. This decree shall be submitted for approval by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan.

[Signed] E. Rakhmonov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan  
City of Dushanbe, 13 April 1994

#### Text of Draft Constitution

944K1176B Dushanbe NARODNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 22 Apr 94 pp 1-2

["Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan"]

[Text]

#### Preamble

We the people of Tajikistan, an inalienable part of the world community,

recognizing our duty and our responsibility to past, present, and future generations;

understanding the need to ensure the sovereignty and development of our state;

considering unshakable the liberty and rights of the individual;

respecting the equality and friendship of all nations and nationalities which reside in Tajikistan; and

considering our mission the creation of a just society, adopt and proclaim this constitution.

#### Chapter One

##### Principles of the Constitutional System

##### Article 1

Tajikistan is a sovereign democratic secular united republic based on the rule of law. "Tajikistan" and "Republic of Tajikistan" are equivalent concepts.

##### Article 2

The official language of Tajikistan is Tajik (Farsi).

All nations and nationalities that reside on the territory of the republic are entitled to use their native language without restriction.

The procedure of the use of languages is regulated by law.

##### Article 3

The Republic of Tajikistan has official symbols—a flag, a coat of arms, and an anthem.

**Article 4**

The capital of Tajikistan is the city of Dushanbe.

**Article 5**

Human rights and liberties are sacred. The state recognizes, observes, and defends the rights and liberties of man and citizen.

**Article 6**

In Tajikistan the exponent of sovereignty and the sole source of state power is the people, who exercise it within the limits established by the constitution, directly or via their representatives.

No public organization, group of people, or individuals may appropriate state power. The usurpation of power is a heinous crime.

Only the president of the republic and the National Assembly may speak on behalf of the entire people of Tajikistan.

**Article 7**

The territory of Tajikistan is indivisible and sacrosanct. Propaganda and actions aimed at destruction of the unity of the state are prohibited.

The state ensures the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Tajikistan.

**Article 8**

In Tajikistan social life develops on the basis of political and ideological pluralism.

No ideology, religious included, may be established as the official ideology.

Public associations shall be created and shall operate within the framework of the constitution and the laws. The state shall afford them equal opportunities in their activity.

Religious organizations are separate from the state and may not interfere in state affairs.

The creation and activity of public associations propagandizing racial, national, social, and religious enmity and calling for the forcible overthrow of the constitutional system and the organization of armed groups are prohibited.

**Article 9**

State power is exercised on the basis of its separation into legislative, executive, and judicial.

**Article 10**

The Constitution of Tajikistan possesses supreme legal force, and its provisions are of direct effect. Laws and other legal instruments contrary to the constitution have no legal validity.

The state and all its bodies and officials and citizens and their associations are required to observe and execute the constitution and the laws of the republic.

Instruments of international law recognized by Tajikistan are an integral part of the legal system of the republic. In the event of the laws of the republic not conforming to international treaties of the Republic of Tajikistan, the provisions of the instruments of international law shall apply.

Laws and instruments of international law recognized by Tajikistan shall take effect following their official promulgation.

**Article 11**

Tajikistan respects the sovereignty and independence of other states, pursues a peace-loving policy, and determines its foreign policy on the basis of international law.

Guided by the highest interests of the people, Tajikistan may establish relations with foreign countries and join commonwealths and other international organizations and also withdraw from them.

The state cooperates with overseas compatriots.

**Article 12**

The family, as the basis of society, is under the protection of the state.

**Article 13**

Various forms of ownership constitute the basis of the economy of Tajikistan.

The state guarantees freedom of economic and entrepreneurial activity and the equality and legal protection of all forms of property, private included.

The exclusive property of the state is determined by the law.

**Article 14**

The state guarantees the use of the land and other natural resources and also environmental protection in the interests of the people of Tajikistan.



**Chapter Two****Rights, Liberties, and Basic Obligations of Man and Citizen****Article 15**

Man and his natural rights—life, honor, dignity, and freedom—are sacrosanct.

Human rights and liberties are guaranteed, regulated, and protected by the constitution and laws and international instruments recognized by Tajikistan.

Restrictions in respect to the application of rights and liberties are permitted in the constitution and the laws only for the purpose of assurance of the rights and liberties of other citizens, public order, and protection of the constitutional system and the territorial integrity of the republic.

**Article 16**

A person who on the day that this constitution is adopted is a citizen of the Republic of Tajikistan is considered a citizen of Tajikistan.

Citizens of Tajikistan's citizenship of another state is not recognized, except in the instances specified by law and interstate treaties of Tajikistan.

The procedure of the acquisition and forfeiture of citizenship is determined by law.

**Article 17**

A citizen of Tajikistan outside of the country is under the protection of the state. No citizen of the republic may be extradited to a foreign state. The extradition of a criminal to a foreign state shall be authorized on the basis of a bilateral agreement.

Foreign citizens and stateless persons enjoy the proclaimed rights and liberties and have equal obligations and responsibility with citizens of Tajikistan, except in the instances specified by law.

Tajikistan may grant political asylum to foreign citizens who are victims of a violation of human rights.

**Article 18**

All are equal before the law and the courts. The state guarantees the rights and liberties of each, regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious faith, political and religious beliefs, education, and social and property position.

**Article 19**

Everyone has the right to life.

No one may be deprived of life, other than in accordance with a judgment of a court of law for a heinous crime.

**Article 20**

The state defends the liberty, sanctity, honor, and dignity of the individual. No one should be subjected to torture, cruelty, or inhuman treatment. Compulsory medical and scientific experiments on man are prohibited.

**Article 21**

Everyone is guaranteed legal protection.

Everyone has the right to demand that his case be heard by a competent and impartial court.

No one may be subjected without legitimate grounds to detention, arrest, or deportation. A person is entitled from the moment of detention to avail himself of the services of a lawyer and, in accordance with the law, to petition a court of law.

**Article 22**

A person is considered innocent of a crime until the sentence of a court takes legal effect.

Proceedings may not be instituted against anyone following the expiration of the timeframe of criminal prosecution or for actions which at the time they were perpetrated were not considered a crime. No one should be punished twice for one and the same crime.

A law adopted that is after a person has perpetrated an unlawful action and increases the punishment for it is not retroactive. If following the perpetration of an unlawful action liability for it is eliminated or extenuated, the new law applies.

The confiscation in full of the assets of a convicted person is prohibited.

**Article 23**

The law defends the right of the victim. The state guarantees the victim legal protection and compensation for the damage caused him.

**Article 24**

The dwelling place is inviolable. Intrusion into a dwelling place, except in the instances specified by the law, is prohibited.

The willful deprivation of dwelling place is not permitted.

**Article 25**

The secrecy of personal correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraph and other communications of the citizens is assured, except in the instances specified by law.

**Article 26**

A citizen is entitled to free movement and choice of place of residence and to unimpeded departure from and return to the republic.

**Article 27**

Everyone has the right to create a family. Men and women who have reached marriageable age are entitled to enter into marriage freely and without hindrance. In family relationships and at the time of dissolution of a marriage, husband and wife are equal.

**Article 28**

Mother and child are under the special protection and patronage of the state.

Parents are responsible for children's upbringing. Adults and able-bodied children are required to care for their parents and render them assistance.

The state displays concern for the protection of orphaned children and their upbringing and education.

**Article 29**

The collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information on a person's private life without his consent are prohibited.

**Article 30**

State bodies, public associations, and officials are required to ensure for each individual the opportunity to obtain and familiarize himself with documents concerning his rights and liberties, except in the instances specified by law.

**Article 31**

Everyone has the right to independently determine his attitude toward religion, separately or in conjunction with others to confess any religion or none, and to participate in the administration of religious worship, rituals, and ceremonies.

**Article 32**

A citizen is entitled to take part in political life and the administration of the state directly or via his representatives.

Citizens have an equal right to public service.

A citizen has the right upon reaching the age of 18 to vote and to run for office. Citizens of at least 25 years of age have the right to run for the National Assembly.

Persons found by a court of law to be incapable or who have been deprived of liberty in accordance with a judgment of a court of law are not entitled to take part in elections or referenda.

Elections and referenda are conducted on the basis general, equal, and direct suffrage by ballot.

**Article 33**

The creation of public associations and membership thereof and withdrawal therefrom are voluntary.

**Article 34**

Citizens have the right to assemble peacefully unarmed and to stage gatherings, mass meetings, demonstrations, and marches. No one may be forcibly enlisted in participation in them.

**Article 35**

Everyone is guaranteed freedom of speech and the press and the right to avail himself of the news media.

Official censorship and prosecution for criticism are prohibited.

The list of information constituting a state secret is determined by law.

**Article 36**

Everyone has the right to property and the right of inheritance.

No one has the right to deprive and limit the right of the citizen to property. The confiscation of assets for state and public needs is permitted only on the basis of the law and with the consent of the owner with compensation for the value thereof in full.

Material and moral damage caused an individual as a result of the unlawful actions of state bodies, public associations, or individuals is compensated in accordance with the law at the latter's expense.

**Article 37**

Everyone has the right to labor, choice of profession and job, and occupational safety. Wages should not be lower than the minimum remuneration established by the state.

Any restrictions in labor relations are prohibited. Equal pay is given for equal work.

No one may be enlisted in forced labor, except in the instances determined by law.

Use of the labor of women and minors in heavy and underground work and also in operations with harmful working conditions is prohibited.

**Article 38**

Everyone is entitled to engage in entrepreneurial activity and may, in accordance with the law, use wage labor.

**Article 39**

Everyone has the right to a dwelling place. This right shall be secured by way of state, public, cooperative, and individual housing construction.

**Article 40**

The citizen has the right to recreation. This right shall be secured by way of the establishment of the length of the work day and week, the granting of paid annual leave and weekly days off, and other conditions specified by law.

**Article 41**

Everyone has the right to health care. This right shall be assured by free medical assistance in public health-care institutions and by measures to improve the environment. Other types of medical assistance shall be determined by law.

**Article 42**

Everyone has the right to social security in old age, in instances of sickness, disability, loss of fitness for work, and loss of the breadwinner, and in other instances determined by law.

**Article 43**

Everyone has the right to unrestricted participation in the cultural life of society, artistic, scientific, and technical creativity, and the use of their achievements.

Cultural and spiritual values are protected by the state.

Intellectual property is protected by law.

**Article 44**

Everyone has the right to education. The state guarantees general education free of charge.

Other forms of the acquisition of an education are determined by law.

**Article 45**

On the territory of Tajikistan everyone is required to observe its constitution and laws and to respect the rights, liberties, honor, and dignity of other people.

Ignorance of the laws does not grant exemption from liability.

**Article 46**

Defense of the motherland, protection of the interests of the state, and a strengthening of its independence, security, and defense might are the sacred duty of the citizen.

The procedure of military service is determined by law.

**Article 47**

The protection of the natural environment, the land, and other natural resources and historical and cultural monuments and their efficient use is the obligation of everyone.

**Article 48**

The payment of taxes and charges determined by the law is the obligation of everyone. Laws establishing new taxes or causing a deterioration in the position of the taxpayer are not retroactive.

**Chapter Three****The National Assembly****Article 49**

The National Assembly is the highest representative and legislative body of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The National Assembly is elected for a five-year term.

The procedure of the formation and activity of the National Assembly is determined by law.

**Article 50**

The powers of the National Assembly are:

- 1) the adoption and revision of laws and decrees and their abrogation;
- 2) interpretation of the constitution and the laws;
- 3) determination of the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state;
- 4) the formation of a central commission for elections and referenda;
- 5) the scheduling of a referendum;
- 6) the scheduling of elections of the president of the republic;
- 7) the scheduling of elections to the highest and local representative authorities;
- 8) consent to the formation and abolition of ministries and state committees;
- 9) confirmation of edicts of the president on the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister and his first deputy and deputies, ministers, and state committee chairmen;
- 10) the election and recall of the president and his deputy and justices of the Constitutional Court, the president and his deputy and justices of the Supreme Court, the president and his deputy and justices of the Higher Economic Court, the prosecutor general and his deputies, and the chairman of the National Bank and his deputies, as recommended by the president of the republic;

- 11) approval of socioeconomic programs and the state budget; consent to the allocation and receipt of credit and the rendering of other states economic assistance; determination of the possible size of the state budget deficit and the sources for covering it; determination of tax policy;
- 12) establishment of the monetary system;
- 13) determination of the structure and formation and alteration of administrative-territorial units;
- 14) ratification and denunciation of international treaties of the Republic of Tajikistan;
- 15) formation of the courts;
- 16) confirmation of edicts of the president of the republic on peace, martial law, and a state of emergency;
- 17) the institution of government awards;
- 18) the establishment of military titles, diplomatic ranks, and other special titles;
- 19) approval of state symbols;
- 20) approval of the official seal;
- 21) announcement of an amnesty;
- 22) the exercise of other powers determined by the constitution and the laws.

#### Article 51

The basic form of activity of the National Assembly is the session.

The first session of the National Assembly is convened by the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda one month after the elections of people's deputies.

A session of the National Assembly is competent if no fewer than two-thirds of the total number of people's deputies are taking part.

#### Article 52

For organization of the business of the National Assembly and the exercise of other powers specified by the constitution and the laws a Presidium of the National Assembly headed by the chairman of the National Assembly is created.

The Presidium of the National Assembly is composed of the chairman of the National Assembly and his first deputy and deputies and the chairman of the committees and standing commissions of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly may elect other people's deputies to the Presidium of the National Assembly also.

#### Article 53

The powers of the Presidium of the National Assembly are:

- 1) the convening of the National Assembly;
- 2) preparation of sessions of the National Assembly;
- 3) coordination of the activity of committees and standing commissions of the National Assembly;
- 4) presentation for public discussion of draft laws and other important questions of state and social life;
- 5) the organization of interparliamentary relations;
- 6) leadership of the press organs of the National Assembly and the appointment and dismissal of chief editors;
- 7) consent to the appointment and recall of diplomatic representatives of Tajikistan in other states and at international organizations;
- 8) the exercise of other powers determined by the constitution and the laws.

The Presidium of the National Assembly adopts decrees.

#### Article 54

The National Assembly elects from the ranks of the people's deputies a chairman of the National Assembly and first deputy and deputies and chairmen of the committees and standing commissions of the National Assembly. A people's deputy from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast is a deputy chairman of the National Assembly.

The chairman of the National Assembly is elected by ballot by a majority of the total number of people's deputies.

#### Article 55

The powers of the chairman of the National Assembly are:

- 1) exercise of general leadership of the preparation of matters to be considered at the sessions;
- 2) chairmanship at sessions of the National Assembly and sessions of its Presidium;
- 3) presentation to the National Assembly of the candidates for first deputy and deputy chairmen of the National Assembly and the chairmen of committees and standing commissions of the National Assembly;
- 4) the signing of decrees of the National Assembly and decrees of its Presidium;
- 5) representation of the National Assembly within the country and outside;
- 6) the signing of interparliamentary agreements;



- 7) leadership of the work of the administrative machinery of the National Assembly and the issuing of directives;
- 8) exercise of other powers determined by the constitution and the laws.

**Article 56**

The first deputy and the deputy chairmen of the National Assembly perform on the authorization of the chairman certain of his functions. In the event that the chairman of the National Assembly is absent, his duties shall be performed by the first deputy.

**Article 57**

For bill-drafting work, the exercise of control functions, and the preliminary consideration and preparation of questions the National Assembly elects from the ranks of people's deputies committees and standing commissions.

The National Assembly may, if necessary, create investigation, auditing, and other temporary commissions.

**Article 58**

The people's deputy has the right to demand of any official the information necessary for the exercise of his deputy's powers.

The people's deputy may freely express his opinion and vote according to his conscience.

**Article 59**

The people's deputy working on a permanent basis in the National Assembly may not occupy another position, other than in research and creative activity, or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

A citizen of Tajikistan may not simultaneously be a deputy of more than two representative bodies.

**Article 60**

A people's deputy has right of immunity. He may not be arrested, taken into custody, subjected to measures of punishment under administrative law imposed in legal form, or arraigned on a criminal charge without the consent of the National Assembly. A people's deputy may not be detained, except in instances of detention at the scene of a crime.

The powers of a people's deputy terminate upon his retirement, if he is adjudged incapable, or upon a substantiated decision of the National Assembly.

The status of a people's deputy is determined by law.

**Article 61**

The right of legislative initiative in the National Assembly belongs to the people's deputy, the president of

the republic, the government, and the Assembly of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.

**Article 62**

Laws of Tajikistan and decrees of the National Assembly are adopted by majority vote of the total number of people's deputies.

The laws specified by the constitution are adopted by no fewer than two-thirds vote of the total number of people's deputies.

**Article 63**

Laws of Tajikistan are presented for the signature of the president of the republic. The president is entitled within 15 days following presentation of a law for signature to send it back with his objections to the National Assembly. If by a two-thirds majority the National Assembly upholds the decision it adopted earlier, the president signs the law. If the president does not object to a law within the established timeframe, he is required to sign it.

Laws of Tajikistan and decrees of the National Assembly are adopted in the official language and published in official publications.

**Article 64**

The National Assembly may dissolve itself early with the consent of no fewer than two-thirds of the people's deputies.

In all instances the powers of people's deputies of Tajikistan terminate on the day of the opening of the first session of the new National Assembly.

**Chapter Four****President of the Republic****Article 65**

The president of the republic is the head of state and the executive (the government).

The government of the republic consists of a prime minister, his first deputy and deputies, ministers, and the chairmen of state committees.

The president is the guarantor of the constitution and the laws, the rights and liberties of man and citizen, and the national independence, unity and territorial integrity, continuity, and longevity of the state and provides for the concerted functioning and interaction of state bodies and the observance of international treaties of Tajikistan.

#### Article 66

The president of the republic is elected by citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan on the basis of general, equal, and direct suffrage by ballot for a five-year term.

Each citizen aged from 35 to 65 who knows the official language and who has been resident on the territory of Tajikistan for no fewer than the past 10 years may be nominated as a candidate for president of the republic.

A person for the nomination of whose candidacy the signatures of no fewer than 5 percent of the electorate have been collected may be registered as a candidate for president of the republic.

One and the same person may not be president of the republic for more than two terms in succession.

#### Article 67

The elections of a president are considered valid if there has been a turnout of more than half the electorate.

The candidate for the office of president of the republic for whom more than half of the electorate that participated in the ballot voted is considered elected.

The procedure of the election of a president of the republic is determined by law.

#### Article 68

Prior to his assumption of office the president of the republic shall take the following oath at a sitting of the National Assembly:

"I, as president of the republic, swear to defend the constitution and the laws of the republic, guarantee assurance of the rights, liberties, honor, and dignity of the citizens, defend the territorial integrity and political, economic, and cultural independence of Tajikistan, and devotedly serve the people."

The powers of a president are terminated following the swearing-in of the new president of the republic.

#### Article 69

The president is not entitled to hold other office, be a deputy of representative authorities, or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

The pay of the president of the republic is established by the National Assembly.

#### Article 70

The powers of the president of the republic are as follows:

- 1) he represents Tajikistan within the country and in international relations;
- 2) forms and abolishes ministries and state committees with the consent of the National Assembly;

- 3) appoints and dismisses the prime minister and his first deputy and deputies, ministers, and chairmen of state committees with their subsequent confirmation by the National Assembly;

- 4) creates the executive machinery of the president;

- 5) appoints and dismisses the mirs of oblasts, cities, and rayons and presents them for confirmation to the local assemblies;

- 6) presents to the National Assembly candidates for election and recall as the president and his deputy and justices of the Constitutional Court, the president and his deputies and justices of the Supreme Court, the president and his deputy and justices of the Higher Economic Court, the prosecutor general and his deputies, and the chairman of the National Bank and his deputies;

- 7) in accordance with a recommendation of the minister of justice, appoints and dismisses justices of the court of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and oblast, municipal, and rayon courts, except for justices of the courts of cities and rayons of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast;

- 8) submits for approval by the National Assembly socioeconomic programs and the draft state budget; with the consent of the National Assembly decides questions of the allocation and receipt of credit and the rendering of economic assistance to other states; submits proposals to the National Assembly pertaining to determination of the possible size of the state budget deficit and the sources for covering it; administers a reserve fund and notifies the National Assembly of its expenditure.

- 9) submits to the National Assembly proposals pertaining to the establishment of a monetary system;

- 10) signs laws;

- 11) rescinds or suspends acts of organs of state administration in the event of their being contrary to the constitution and the laws;

- 12) directs the implementation of foreign policy, signs international treaties, and presents them for approval to the National Assembly;

- 13) with the consent of the Presidium of the National Assembly appoints diplomatic representatives in other states and at international organizations;

- 14) accepts the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states;

- 15) is the supreme commander in chief of the armed forces of Tajikistan; appoints and dismisses the commanders in chief of the armed forces of Tajikistan;

- 16) declares, when there is a real threat to the security of the state, martial law, with the immediate introduction of an edict for confirmation by the National Assembly;
- 17) declares a state of emergency throughout the territory of the republic or in individual localities, with the immediate introduction of the edict for confirmation by the National Assembly;
- 18) creates a Security Council and directs it;
- 19) grants political asylum;
- 20) decides questions of admittance to citizenship and deprivation of citizenship;
- 21) grants pardons for convicted persons;
- 22) confers the top military titles, diplomatic ranks, and other special titles;
- 23) bestows government awards and confers official prizes and honorifics of Tajikistan;
- 24) exercises other powers specified by the constitution and the laws.

#### Article 71

The president issues within his authority edicts and directives, informs the National Assembly as to the situation in the country, and submits important and urgent questions for consideration by the National Assembly.

#### Article 72

In the event of his death, resignation, dismissal, or incapacity preventing performance of the duties of president of the republic, his duties until a new president is elected pass to the chairman of the National Assembly.

In these instances elections of a president of the republic are conducted within a period of three months.

The question of the resignation of the president and of the president being found incapable is decided by the National Assembly by majority vote of the people's deputies.

#### Article 73

The president has the right of immunity.

In the event of a violation of his oath or the perpetration of a crime by the president of the republic, the National Assembly, with regard to the findings of the Constitutional Court, by two-thirds vote of the people's deputies relieves the president of office.

The question of the president of the republic being charged with having violated his oath or of having perpetrated a crime is submitted by one-third vote of the people's deputies. In this case chairmanship at the special session of the National Assembly is entrusted to the

president of the Supreme Court. The people's deputies swear that in consideration of this matter they will act according to their conscience, the law, and justice.

Following the dismissal of a president of the republic from office, investigation of his case continues, he is indicted, and his case is sent for trial.

### Chapter Five

#### The Government

##### Article 74

The president of the republic forms the government and presents it for confirmation by the National Assembly. Members of the government do not have the right to hold other office, be deputies of representatives authorities, or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

The government provides for leadership of the efficient functioning of the economy and the social and spiritual spheres and execution of the laws and other decisions of the National Assembly and edicts and directives of the president of the Republic of Tajikistan.

##### Article 75

The government issues, in accordance with the laws of the republic, decrees and directives which are binding on the territory of Tajikistan.

The government relinquishes its authority to the newly elected president of the republic.

The procedure of organization, the activity, and the powers of the government are determined by the law.

### Chapter Six

#### The Local Authorities

##### Article 76

Tajikistan consists of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, oblasts, cities, rayons, city-type communities, and villages.

The procedure of the establishment of administrative-territorial division and the status of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast are determined by law.

##### Article 77

The local authorities consist of representative and executive bodies, which operate within their powers. They provide for fulfillment of the constitution, the laws, and acts of the National Assembly and the president of the republic.

##### Article 78

The local representative body is the assembly. Deputies of the assembly are elected by the population for a five-year term.

Executive power locally is exercised by the mir.

The executive and representative authorities of the corresponding administrative-territorial units are headed by the mir.

The local assembly confirms edicts of the president of the republic on the appointment of mirs of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, oblasts, cities, and rayons.

The mir of a city-type community and village is, as recommended by a superior body, elected by the local assembly.

The mir is responsible to the superior body and the corresponding local assembly and is not entitled to act in defiance of the demands of the constitution and the laws.

The procedure of the formation, the authority, and the organization of the activity of organs of local power is regulated by law.

#### Article 79

The representative authorities and the mir adopt within their authority legal instruments binding on the corresponding territories.

In the event of the instruments of the local representative authorities and the mir failing to conform to the constitution and the laws, they are canceled by superior bodies or the court.

#### Article 80

In the event of the systematic nonfulfillment by the local assembly of the demands of the constitution and the laws, the National Assembly has the right to dissolve it and schedule new elections.

### Chapter Seven

#### The Court

#### Article 81

The judiciary is independent and defends the rights and liberties of the individual, the interests of the state, organizations, and institutions, and legality and justice.

Judicial power is exercised by the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Higher Economic Court, the court of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, and the oblast, city-of-Dushanbe, municipal, and rayon courts.

The creation of special courts is prohibited.

#### Article 82

Persons no younger than 30 years of age and no older than 60 with a length of service as a justice of no fewer than five years are elected to the positions of justices of the Supreme Court, the Higher Economic Court, oblast courts, and courts of the city of Dushanbe.

Persons not younger than 25 years of age and no older than 60 with a professional length of service of no fewer than three years are elected to the positions of justices of municipal and rayon courts.

#### Article 83

Justices of the court of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and oblast, city-of-Dushanbe, municipal, and rayon courts are appointed and dismissed by the president of the republic following a recommendation of the minister of justice.

Justices of municipal and rayon courts of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast are appointed and dismissed by the mir of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast following consultation with the minister of justice.

The procedure of the organization and activity of the courts is determined by the law.

#### Article 84

The term of justices of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Higher Economic Court is 10 years.

The term of justices of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, oblast, city-of-Dushanbe, municipal, and rayon courts is five years.

#### Article 85

Justices are in their activity independent and subordinate only to the constitution and the law. Interference in their activity is prohibited.

#### Article 86

Justices try cases collegially or individually.

The judicial process is realized on the basis of the principle of adversary pleading and the equality of the parties.

The trial of cases in all courts is open, other than in the instances specified by law.

Legal proceedings are conducted in the official language or in the language of the majority of the population of a given locality.

Persons involved in a trial who do not know the language in which the proceedings are being conducted are provided with the services of an interpreter.

#### Article 87

The Constitutional Court consists of seven persons.

Persons not younger than 30 years of age and no older than 60 may be elected justices of the Constitutional Court.



Justices of the Constitutional Court are elected from the ranks of lawyers with a professional length of service of no fewer than 10 years.

The powers of the Constitutional Court are:

- 1) determination of the conformity to the constitution of laws and legal instruments of the National Assembly, the president of the republic, the Supreme Court, the Higher Economic Court, and other state and public authorities and also international treaties of the Republic of Tajikistan which have not taken effect;
- 2) the resolution of disputes between state authorities as regards their jurisdiction;
- 3) presentation to the National Assembly of findings on questions of a charge against the president of the republic of having violated his oath or of having committed a crime;
- 4) the exercise of other powers determined by the law.

Acts deemed by the Constitutional Court to be contrary to the constitution become null and void.

Rulings of the Constitutional Court adopted within its jurisdiction are final.

#### Article 88

A justice may not hold another position other than in research, lecturing, and artistic activity. A justice may not be a deputy of representative authorities or a member of political parties and associations or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

#### Article 89

A justice has right of immunity. Without the consent of the body that elected him a justice shall not be subject to arrest or arraignment on criminal charges. A justice shall not be subject to detention, except in instances of his detention at the scene of a crime.

#### Article 90

Legal assistance is recognized in all phases of legal proceedings.

### Chapter Eight

#### The Procuracy

#### Article 91

Supervision of the precise and uniform execution of the laws on the territory of Tajikistan is exercised by the prosecutor general and prosecutors subordinate to him within their authority.

#### Article 92

The unified and centralized system of arms of the procuracy of Tajikistan is headed by the prosecutor general. The prosecutor general is accountable to the National Assembly.

#### Article 93

The prosecutor general of Tajikistan is elected for a five-year term.

The prosecutor general appoints to office the prosecutors subordinate to him and dismisses them. The prosecutors' term is five years.

The activity, powers, and structure of the arms of procuracy are regulated by law.

#### Article 94

Arms of the procuracy exercise their powers independently of other state authorities and officials and are subordinate only to the law.

#### Article 95

A prosecutor may not hold another position other than in research, lecturing, and artistic activity.

A prosecutor may not be a deputy of representative authorities or a member of political parties and associations or engage in entrepreneurial activity.

### Chapter Nine

#### State of Emergency

#### Article 96

A state of emergency is a temporary measure and is declared to ensure the security of the citizens and the state in the event of a real threat to the rights and liberties of the citizens and the independence of the state and its territorial integrity and natural disasters, as the result of which the constitutional authorities of the republic cannot function normally.

A state of emergency is established for a term of up to three months. If necessary, this term may be extended by the president of the republic. An edict on an extension of the term of the state of emergency is presented immediately to the National Assembly for confirmation.

#### Article 97

Under the conditions of a state of emergency the rights and liberties specified in Articles 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, and 31 of this Constitution may not be restricted.

The president of the republic shall communicate the declaration of a state of emergency and its timeframe to the United Nations.

The legal status of a state of emergency shall be determined by law.

## Chapter 10

### Procedure of Revision of the Constitution

#### Article 98

Revisions and addenda to the constitution shall be made by way of a referendum.

A referendum shall be held if two-thirds of the people's deputies have voted for it.

The procedure of realization of a referendum shall be determined by law.

#### Article 99

Proposals for revising and supplementing the constitution are made by the president or no fewer than one-third of the people's deputies of the Republic of Tajikistan.

Proposals for revising and supplementing the constitution shall be published in the press three months prior to the referendum.

#### Article 100

The republican form of government, the territorial integrity of the republic, and the democratic law-based secular essence of the state are invariable.

**The draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was prepared by a working group consisting of:**

A.S. Dostiyev, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan (leader of the group); T.O. Azizova, head of the Legal Office of the Administrative Department of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan; Z.M. Aliyev, candidate of legal sciences and chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan; Sh.M. Ismoilov, doctor of legal sciences and minister of justice of the Republic of Tajikistan; R.G. Musayeva, candidate of technical sciences and chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan for Constitutional Development; R.K. Rakhimov, member of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan; S.R. Rakhmonov, candidate of legal sciences and deputy chairman of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan; S.R. Radzhabov, chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan for Legislation, Law and Order, and Human Rights; Sh. Rustamov, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan and figure of science of Tajikistan emeritus; M. Salikhov, prosecutor general of the Republic of Tajikistan; and Kh.Kh. Khamidov, candidate of legal sciences and first deputy minister of justice of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The draft Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was discussed at a sitting of the Constitutional Commission for Preparation of a Draft New Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan and, following addenda and revisions, has been recommended by it for public discussion.

### Opposition Goals at Moscow Talks Reviewed

944K1208A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian No 17, Apr 94 pp 10-12

[Article by Arkadiy Dubnov: "General Gromov Is Not Afraid of the Tajik Opposition: He Is Afraid of a 'New Afghanistan' for Russia"]

[Text] There is no general in the Russian army who knows better than General Boris Gromov what a war outside of Russia means. He was the last commander of the Soviet expeditionary corps which fought in Afghanistan and was the last to leave it, in the wake of his 40th Army, crossing the border Amu-Darya at the now-celebrated bridge in Termez. This was five years ago. Since that time General Gromov has been a convinced opponent of Russia's involvement in such wars, in which neither victory nor glory are to be found. But the general has not forgotten against whom his Afghan vets were fighting. The Mujahidin remain his enemies today also.

Boris Gromov is now deputy minister of defense of Russia. For his subordinates the Afghan Mujahidin have become the enemy once again. They are being fought by a Russian expeditionary corps which is now in Tajikistan. They and combatants of the Tajik opposition. Now, the corps is called not a "limited Soviet military contingent," it is true, but a part of the coalition peacekeeping force of the CIS. But this does not alter the essence of the matter, albeit languid, a war is under way in Tajikistan, nonetheless, and Russian soldiers are fighting on one side for the Tajik Government in Dushanbe and against the Afghan enemy and Tajik combatants.

### Turadzhonzoda Was Surprised

It is any wonder that the meeting between General Gromov and an acknowledged leader of the Tajik opposition, Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhonzoda, deputy chairman of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Tajikistan, which took place in Moscow at the end of last week, was held in a less-than-diplomatic atmosphere, to put it mildly. No, it was not Gromov who had sought this meeting, the former spiritual leader of Tajik Muslims had requested that a head-to-head meeting with the general be arranged. Turadzhonzoda had come to Moscow at the end of the first round of inter-Tajik peace negotiations. He and his movement colleague, Mukhammad-sharif Khemmatzoda, chairman of the Islamic Revival Party, who are the official leaders of the Tajik opposition delegation, refused to sit at the negotiating table until Dushanbe was officially represented thereat by some top person of the Tajik Government. For the opposition leaders, the visit to Moscow meant an opportunity familiarize the Russian leadership with its position in personal contact with it for the first time. It is hard to say whether this meeting was useful for the deputy defense minister.... But for his interlocutors—undoubtedly. To their astonishment, they learned that they were being taken for some others. The point being

that General Gromov began the conversation with accusations that the opposition was demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tajikistan and an end to all relations with Russia, and this was unacceptable.

"You are mistaken, you have, evidently, been misinformed," Turadzhonzoda responded. "We recognize Russia's geopolitical interests in Tajikistan and are not demanding the withdrawal of the Russian, more precisely, coalition, peacekeeping force, provided that the command staff, which does not occupy a neutral position and which supports the present Tajik Government, is replaced. As far as relations with Russia are concerned," Turadzhonzoda observed, "we do not envisage the future of Tajikistan without the closest and most friendly ties to it. This viewpoint should be well known to the Russian leadership, the Tajik opposition has conveyed it to Moscow in its messages, and the Russian press has expounded it also," the former chief qadi of Tajikistan added in surprise. "We would like to know where you came by this misinformation," he asked Boris Gromov.

"From the opposition," the general replied.

"We represent the opposition, it is important, therefore, that we know from whom this comes...."

"Do not interrupt me," the deputy defense minister stopped his guest....

This tone of the exchange did little, evidently, to contribute to its productiveness. General Gromov asked that it be conveyed "back there" that the Russian army would, in spite of everything, defend the Russian-speaking population. Turadzhonzoda replied that this was not how the issue should be framed, that no one was intending to attack the Russian speakers, and that their safety could be secured only by peace in the republic. And if some people do have a bad attitude toward the Russians, it is because, possibly, they are treating Tajik refugees badly in Russia.... Do not treat them badly here, do not attack them, and no one will touch Russians either....

"You should not try to frighten us," Gromov said, "otherwise you will be duly repulsed...."

This was how the discussion went. It would be hard to call it a peacemaking discussion.

#### **One Out of Every Five Tajiks in Exile?**

The meeting between the leaders of the Tajik opposition and Russian diplomats was at somewhat of a different level. Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhonzoda termed the conversation with Albert Chernyshev, deputy minister of foreign affairs, "friendly" even. The deputy minister inquired, the deputy chairman of the movement responded.

"Can the opposition be reconciled with the government in Dushanbe? Should it not join in the process of preparation for the elections to the new Tajik parliament scheduled for this year?"

"How is this possible when political parties are banned, political opponents are jailed or wanted by the police, there is no free press, and the principal 'authority' in the republic is the man with the gun? What kind of elections are they if one out of every fifth Tajik is in exile?" Turadzhonzoda answered the question with a question. "The present government should be replaced by a new leadership made up of professionals who were not involved in the Tajiks' civil war, the opposition is not laying claim to political power today, and we want the leadership of the People's Front, which came to this power in illegitimate fashion, to do the same...."

"But then there would be a power vacuum," the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "especially since the government in Dushanbe was elected legally at a session of the Tajik parliament in December 1992 in Khudzhent."

"Can a government elected by deputies under the threat of death be legitimate, we should not deceive ourselves.... Could it otherwise have been possible for the government to have been made up of 13 representatives from Kulyab Oblast alone, more precisely, from just one of its rayons—Baldzhuvanskiy. We cannot recognize such a government," Turadzhonzoda said. "If Russia wishes to defend its interests in Tajikistan," the former qadi continued, "it could do so at a far smaller cost in terms of human and material resources: It has only to put pressure on Dushanbe for it to agree to our proposals. And as soon as a new government is formed, we guarantee the disarmament of our armed formations, if the same is done with 80 percent of the government formations."

The functions of maintaining order, the opposition believes, could be assumed by the CIS peacekeeping force, if states bordering Tajikistan are not members of it. And only then, 18 months to two years hence, when the refugees have returned to their homeland, Turadzhonzoda maintained, could elections be held and a new Constitution of Tajikistan adopted.

#### **The Hot Breath of the 'Irreconcilables'**

"And what would your plans be were you to win the elections," the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia asked.

"We understand your concern," his interlocutor replied. "you are afraid of the scarecrow of Islamic fundamentalism being shoved onto you.... We propose that Russia and other countries of the CIS be the guarantors of the preparation of a constitution which excludes the possibility of the formation of a theocratic state. We aspire to a secular, democratic regime, in which religion would be separate from the state," the former leader of Tajik Muslims emphasized. "and the constitution should contain a provision prohibiting its revision for 30-50 years."

The Tajik opposition is convinced that the government in Dushanbe will never relinquish its power as long as Russia supports it by its military presence, and for this



reason the success of the inter-Tajik negotiations depends, in its opinion, on Moscow alone. Otherwise, the leaders of the opposition say, we will be compelled to prove that we are right by force, and Russia will be drawn increasingly into a "dirty" war, the outcome of which is determined in advance: Russia would be forced to withdraw from Tajikistan in disgrace, repeating its Afghan path. Turadzhonzoda acknowledges that "we are unpracticed at diplomatic negotiations," and this is why he came to Moscow, endeavoring to achieve understanding and support. It is possible that the difficulties of the opposition leaders who came here amount additionally to the fact that they feel the "hot breath" of the radical and irreconcilable armed opposition or of the Islamic circles that are backing it. The position of Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhonzoda and his closest associates who resolved to agree to negotiations is still quite influential today, it would seem. But what will be the case tomorrow?

Dushanbe is content with the results of the Moscow round. They are speaking there about a "psychological turning point" in relations with the opposition. If this is even the "desire," it is hardly "reality." The Kulyab clan, which controls the main power structures in the government and which has the most hostile attitude toward the opposition (this is mutual, for that matter), has no intention of ceding its positions. According to certain information, the attempts made this February to remove from the government Yakub Salimov, minister of foreign affairs (the most odious figure among the leadership and a leader of the disbanded People's Front, who has, in addition, a criminal past), was unsuccessful. Salimov declared that he would resign only together with the top leaders of the republic. His departure would undoubtedly enhance the image of the official Tajik leadership, but there are fears there, not without reason, of the republic splitting in this case into not two but three hostile camps.

#### **The Chief Banker of Tajikistan Rebukes Russia**

It is naive to imagine that Moscow does not see this, and we should not be deluded as to its readiness to put pressure on Dushanbe under these conditions. The Tajik regime has no intention of capitulating to the demands of the opposition. Especially since it has managed to pull itself into the orbit of Russia's economic and military-strategic attraction. The situation appears amusing at times. Kayum Kaymiddinov, chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan, recently rebuked the Ministry of Finance of Russia for delay in the payment of R60 billion promised the republic last year on account of a loan of R120 billion, thanks to which Tajikistan was permitted to join the ruble zone.

What demands can be made of Dushanbe here, it will be a case of apologizing, more likely.... And of printing hundreds of billions of rubles with Tajik symbols as quickly as possible until the R70 billion of real rubles which have already been allocated are finally "washed" out of Tajikistan.

There is, meanwhile, about a month to go before the next round of inter-Tajik negotiations. It will take place, most likely, in Tehran, where the official Tajik delegation will head in the same composition as before. And this means that the opposition leaders will once again fail to show at the negotiating table. But whereas in Moscow their absence did not prevent agreement being reached on the future 27-point agenda, in the Iranian capital the delegations' authority for adopting decisions on these points will be manifestly insufficient. After all, it will be impossible to decide questions of a political settlement including an end to mutual hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the republic, the attitude toward the various military formations of both the government and the opposition, and measures of mutual trust in the absence of the political leaders from both sides.

A situation where these leaders are unofficially present alongside and determine the tactics of their delegations, as was the case in Moscow, say, where Rashid Alimov, minister of foreign affairs of Tajikistan, was present at the time of the negotiations, is possible. But it is hardly likely that the decisions adopted in that case could be deemed legitimate for both parties.

#### **A 'Second Afghanistan' Still Looms**

...Making forecasts, even for a month ahead, is a thankless task. Nonetheless, some things may be anticipated. As a result of the change of commander of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan (General Valeriy Patrikeyev, who was prior to this commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, has been appointed in place of General Boris Pyankov, who attempted to don the garb of peacemaker and simultaneously called one side "gangsters," whom he contrasted with the "constructive government forces") a softening of the threatening rhetoric in respect to the opposition may be expected for a certain length of time. Especially since the inflaming of military hysteria by Patrikeyev's predecessor in connection with a powerful opposition offensive expected in the spring has not been justified.

There will be a revitalization of the propaganda campaign in Dushanbe designed to show on the one hand the peaceful aspirations of the government and, on the other, the perfidy of an opposition wishing only to return to power. The preparations for elections, which are to substantiate the legitimacy of the current regime, will be rapid. And with the introduction, in May, presumably, of the transitional Tajik-ruble currency in the republic the government could establish itself as the guarantor of economic stability. All this put together could force the Tajik opposition to take a chance on other than peaceful means of struggle. Unless, of course, it proves to be prepared for a negotiating process which is long and exhausting and not without forced compromises.

Moscow also will be thinking that the threat of a "second Afghanistan" is far from ephemeral.



## UZBEKISTAN

### Master Plan Drafted for Improved Telecommunications System

944K1160A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 16, 22 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Takhir Ramazanov: "China-Uzbekistan—Further the West"]

[Text] Tashkent—The draft of a general plan for the reconstruction and development of Uzbekistan's telecommunications networks to the year 2015 has been completed. Assumed as a basis were the recommendations of the international union of electrical communications, which proceeded from the fact of an extremely poorly developed telephone system in the republic, especially in the village.

More than 2,500 rural population centers in Uzbekistan do not have a telephone. By the year 2015, the instrument will be in 72 out of each hundred rural families. In cities where fiber-optic communications will be developed, the capacity will grow to 3.3 million numbers, and out of each 100 families, 90 will have apartment telephones. A Transasiatic-European fiber-optic cable line passing through the territory of Uzbekistan will unite China with Western Europe. To satisfy the internal requirements of the mass installation of a telephone system, the republic will require not less than \$20 billion, which it generally cannot afford. But, then, in international business, you cannot do without the establishment of joint enterprises and foreign investments. The famous German Siemens and Alkatel firms and the Japanese association for assistance to international cooperation, which unites 216 large companies, have shown a serious interest in Uzbek projects.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Historic Roots of PRC Quest for Influence

944Q0353A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian  
No 17, Apr 94 (Signed to press 26 Apr 94) pp 12-3

[Article by Yakov Berger, under rubric "Central Asia—China": "'Trip to the West': New Version—China Feels Out the Ground for Cooperation With the Central Asian States"]

[Text] Geopolitical position, economic interest, and cultural roots—everything is directing China's chief aspirations to the East. The future beckons. In the conviction of Beijing strategists, the Asian-Pacific Ocean region [ATR], and primarily East Asia, will become in the twenty-first century a center of world development—instead of the North Atlantic. A pledge of this is the fact that in our time the states in the region—first Japan, then the "four small dragons," and, finally, the other ASEAN countries and, of course, China—discovered unparalleled capabilities for dynamic development.

China's main trade partners are located in the ATR. The basic foreign capital investments arrive from there. Linked with the immediate southeastern "underbelly" is the most ambitious plan for the immediate future: to create a "Large China" that would include not only Hongkong, which is returning to the mainland bosom in 1997, but also, they hope, Taiwan with its powerful industrial-financial potential, and possibly also, later on, the ethnically related Singapore.

### Why Does China Need the West?

Nevertheless China, which always considered itself to be the center of the world, is not forgetting the three other points of the compass, including the West, which, true, is perceived chiefly in the distinctively Chinese way. It is not the West that, for the European, traditionally opposes the East, but the one that, for him, is an inseparable part of the East. We are talking about Central and Middle Asia. Those are the specifics of the view from China.

As long ago as the time immemorial of the first Chinese empires on the threshold of our era the Great Silk Route, which economically linked China and the West, was laid. Then, during the early Middle Ages, Buddhism began to spread in China, from India by way of Central Asia. It was by that route that the famous travelers came from China to gain secret knowledge. In order to reach their goal, they crossed the extremely high mountain ranges and burning deserts—"the refuges of evil demons and burning winds", where the only markers along the way were the bleached bones of people who perished en route from hunger and thirst.

The Chinese people created dozens of legends concerning one of these travelers, Xuan Zang. In those legends he is presented as a hero who, with the aid of his true friends, overcame 9981 obstacles and finally achieved his cherished goal—the Western Kingdom.

Today it is much simpler to travel from China to the West. And it is other interests that lead the travelers there: for the most part, economic and political ones.

The dynamic growth of the Chinese economy in recent years has been fraught with the aggravation of many contradictions, among which the ones that definitely do not occupy the last place are the territorial contradictions: the growing split between the northern and southern regions of China, and between the western and eastern. The fact of the matter is that it is not China as a whole that is gravitating toward the East, but primarily its eastern and southern maritime region. It is precisely that region that is winning more than any other region from the course aimed at opening China to the outside world from the creation of free economic zones and the attraction of foreign capital. The territories within the continent, specially the western ones, are lagging considerably behind in economic and social development from the maritime region that has gone far ahead.

Further aggravation of this situation is dangerous. It can create in the long run a threat to the integrity of the country and can even lead to its disintegration, especially in the event of the political cataclysms that are almost inevitable in the future.

During the years when China followed the Soviet model, the territorial differences between eastern and western China were artificially equalized, primarily at the expense of restraining the economic growth of the eastern territories. Today this method is inconceivable. It is necessary to maintain at least a relative balance by another method: by creating incentives for the laggards. It is in regard that the economic ties with the Asian part of the former Soviet Union take on special importance.

#### Kinsmen Neighbors

Therefore something that is increasingly important is the interaction between China's borderland western territory—Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region—and the former Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The contacts between them go very far back into the past. Historically, ethnically, and culturally, this is a single region.

Living along both sides of the border are either peoples which are one and the same, or are related: Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Uigurs. With the inclusion, obviously, of the population that has immigrated—in the one instance, from Russia, and in the other, from internal China.

In the twenty-first century the interests of two empires striving for expansion collided here: the Russian empire and the Manchurian empire. Unresolved border problems have remained from those conflicts. The fact of the matter is that it is unusually complicated to mark the border here: in some instances the border is lost in the unpopulated high mountains, and in others, on the contrary, it is supposed to divide pastures that are being intensively used on both sides.

The crossing of human beings and livestock across an imaginary border line is an ordinary matter, although formally it is reprehensible. There have also been frequent mass migrations. Large Kazakh tribes left Russia and went to Sinkiang after the suppression of the uprising in 1916 and during the 1929 collectivization. Tens of thousands of Uigurs fled Sinkiang to the Soviet Union during the starving 1962.

The flourishing of Soviet-Chinese friendship in the first half of the 1950's enlivened the trade ties with Sinkiang. The Soviet Union imported various kinds of products

from animal husbandry and raw materials, and exported machinery and equipment. For the sake of friendship N. S. Khrushchev, in a broad gesture, made China a present of a number of joint-stock companies that had been created in Sinkiang with the participation of Soviet capital. Soviet or Soviet-Chinese geological and other expeditions that studied the natural and economic resources for the development of that area operated on the territory of Sinkiang.

#### Chinese Colonization

Since time immemorial the western territories were viewed by the Chinese as one of the potential reservoirs for placing the excess manpower from the overpopulated eastern part of the country, with a small amount of land. The relatively unpopulated steppe areas, which seemed, to the Chinese who were accustomed to population density, to be boundless. Actually, however, those areas could be assimilated for vegetable husbandry only at the expense of the vital interests of the local livestock growers.

Actually the colonization always occurred only under armed guard, and most frequently military personnel were the settlers. In the nineteenth century they were Manchurian banner troops, and after the creation of the CPR the land was settled by an armed army corps of members of the Kuomintang, which was renamed the production and construction corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It is obvious that this could not fail to cause dissatisfaction on the part of the local population.

Today, when China's rapid economic development makes it possible to lessen the demographic pressure somewhat, the country has been given the opportunity to shift manpower from vegetable husbandry to trade, services, and construction, and the nature of the colonization of the West is also changing. Therefore, one would scarcely think that the former Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan have any basis for fearing the mass penetration of Chinese with the purpose of settling their territory and assimilating it for vegetable husbandry.

But the intensive use of raw-material resources is another matter. Under conditions when the ties between a Russia that is experiencing an economic slump and this region have been weakened, that region, naturally, turns toward China. If the situation does not change radically within the next few years, there is a serious danger that the Central Asian region will change from an agrarian, raw-materials appendage of Russia, to one degree or another, into a supplement to the economy of the Eastern giant.

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